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Glossary
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR): The EU’s human 
rights document. All EU law must meet its standards and those 
standards are significant, going beyond what otherwise exists 
in UK law.
Common Travel Area: An umbrella term for a scattering of 
understandings and reciprocal agreements between the UK and 
Ireland (and surrounding islands) regarding rights and respect 
for each other’s citizens.
Customs union: When countries in an FTA agree to apply a 
single customs policy to outsider (or ‘third’) countries at their 
external borders.
Dáil: This is the name for the directly elected lower house of 
the Irish Parliament/Oireachtas.
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018: The first major 
piece of law to make its way through the UK Parliament to 
facilitate Brexit. Parliamentarians have made and attempted 
many amendments to it. At the time of writing, it has not been 
concluded as law.
Free trade agreement (FTA): An agreement between two or 
more countries not to apply customs charges to (certain) goods 
at their shared border.
Garda: An Garda Síochána is the official name of the Irish 
police force.
Good Friday Agreement (GFA): Formally known as 
the Belfast Agreement, this is the 1998 peace agreement for 
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Northern Ireland, approved by referenda North and South of 
the border.
Irish Free State/Ireland/Republic of Ireland: On 
independence in 1922, Ireland was known as the Irish Free 
State/Saorstát Éireann. On the passing of the 1937 Constitution, 
the state became known as Ireland/Éire. Republic of Ireland is a 
description of Ireland that came out of the Republic of Ireland 
Act 1949; however, it is not the official name of the state.
Joint Report: The agreement between the UK and EU in 
December 2017 that marked ‘significant progress’ on major 
negotiating issues.
Oireachtas: This is the collective name for the joint houses of 
the Irish Parliament, the Dáil and the Seanad.
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: An annex to the 
Withdrawal Agreement specifically addressing the island of 
Ireland. It is not yet binding, but has substantial agreement in 
principle or on an exact form of proposed text.
Seanad: This is the name for the largely indirectly elected upper 
house of the Irish Parliament/Oireachtas.
Single market: A further agreement between the countries in 
an FTA or a customs union that goes beyond customs matters 
and, instead, focuses on the development of shared regulations, 
standards and institutions. (The European Union [EU] Single 
Market is also regularly called the ‘Common Market’ or the 
‘Internal Market’.)
Stormont: A name used as shorthand for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (since 1998) and for the earlier Northern Ireland 
Parliament (1921–72).
Tánaiste: The title of the Irish Deputy Prime Minister.
Taoiseach: The title of the Irish Prime Minister.
Withdrawal Agreement: The draft legal text produced by 
the EU to transpose the Joint Report into legal provisions. It 
is currently not concluded or fully agreed, and either the UK 
or EU could still walk away from it to cause a ‘no-deal’ Brexit.
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Abbreviations
CFR European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
DExEU Department for Exiting the European Union
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
EAW European Arrest Warrant 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FTA Free trade agreement
GFA Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
IHREC Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission
NIA Northern Ireland Act 1998
NIAC House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee
NIHRC Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary
UK United Kingdom
WTO World Trade Organization
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ONE
A tale of two unions
‘We do not wish … [the referendum] to be used for their 
own purposes by those who wish to divide the United 
Kingdom.’ He [Edward Short, MP] went on to say, ‘We 
are not concerned with what Northern Ireland thinks,’ 
in words hardly felicitous for the occasion. (John Peyton, 
MP, 1975)
The people have spoken
As the referendum results edged towards a conclusion on 
that fateful June night, Northern Ireland was, as expected, an 
outlier. Many Unionist MPs had castigated the European project 
ahead of the vote, whereas Nationalist politicians had tended 
to emphasise its benefits in diminishing the significance of the 
Irish border. The Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP’s) Ian 
Paisley had thundered through the campaign about the perils of 
‘a Roman Catholic super-state’ that should be ‘totally repugnant 
to freedom-loving Protestants’. When the tallies were finalised, 
a 52%/48% split loomed large, but Northern Ireland had voted 
in favour of membership.
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That referendum, however, was in June 1975, not June 2016. 
Then, Northern Ireland had been considerably less enthusiastic 
about the European project than the remainder of the UK. Its 
52% ‘yes’ vote contrasted with overall UK electorate support 
for membership of the-then European Economic Community 
of 67% (Dixon, 1994, pp 177–8). Whereas many Unionist 
politicians remained concerned over the dilution of UK 
sovereignty inherent in European membership, most Northern 
Ireland voters were swayed by more day-to-day concerns. 
Fast-forward to 2016 and Northern Ireland was one of the 
most pro-European parts of the UK. While the preceding 
quotes come from Ian Paisley Sr (Royce, 2017), in 2016, his 
son and namesake, who vigorously supported Brexit, happily 
declared his willingness to sign Irish passport forms for any of 
his constituents eager to maintain their European Union (EU) 
citizenship (Peyton, 2016).
Since the June 2016 vote, much of political life in Northern 
Ireland has focused upon the implications of Brexit. This book 
is about Northern Ireland’s relationships with two unions (the 
UK and the EU), how those relationships have changed over the 
last few decades and how they will change again when the UK 
leaves the EU. We also consider how Ireland and its relationship 
with the EU continues to be influenced by developments in 
Northern Ireland.
The United Kingdom(s)
Northern Ireland’s place within the first union featured in this 
book – the UK – has been fraught from its creation in 1921. 
In the early 20th century, ‘centrifugal’ (pushing away from the 
centre) and ‘centripetal’ (pulling towards the centre) forces 
destabilised the union that had existed between Ireland and 
Great Britain since 1801, requiring the creation of two new 
constitutional settlements on the island of Ireland (Calvert, 1968, 
p 3). At least, that is one way of explaining Irish history. The use 
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of such abstract terms to characterise the partition of Ireland in 
the early 1920s should, however, come with a health warning. 
Sterile legal writing often disguises the intense human suffering 
produced when, within a restricted geographical space, two 
communities divided by faith, ethnicity and nationalism each 
attempt to impose their preferred vision for society on the other.
Partition broke, and simultaneously reinvented, the UK. The 
centrifugal force of Irish Nationalism spun the Irish Free State 
out of Westminster’s orbit, taking much of the island of Ireland 
out of the Union. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland transformed into the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. Unionism, which increasingly became a 
brand of ‘Ulster nationalism’, acted as a centripetal force keeping 
the six counties of the province of Ulster that made up Northern 
Ireland within the Union. Even with its place in the UK secured, 
Northern Ireland took shape as a territory at the constitutional 
margins – part of the Union, but with autonomous institutions 
based at Stormont, near Belfast.
Partition of the island of Ireland and devolution for Northern 
Ireland as a ‘solution’ to the Irish Question (Taylor, 1971) 
proved to be as unstable as the Union of Britain and Ireland 
that preceded it. It left a large community of Irish Nationalists 
within Northern Ireland. Their political ambitions unfulfilled, 
Nationalists were viewed by much of the larger Unionist 
community as being intent upon undermining the Union with 
Britain. In the late 1960s, decades of prejudice and suspicion 
boiled over into the Northern Ireland conflict. The first era 
of devolution in Northern Ireland ended ignominiously in 
March 1972 with the collapse of the Stormont Assembly amid 
a seemingly inexorable slide into civil war. For the next three 
decades, life in Northern Ireland would be characterised by 
conflict.
Then came the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998 
(GFA), supported by over 71% of the Northern Ireland electorate 
in a subsequent referendum. Political violence within Northern 
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Ireland has declined dramatically following this deal, but peace 
has not necessarily brought with it the system of governance 
that was promised. The GFA mandated the creation of devolved 
institutions that operated on a power-sharing model, obliging 
parties from across the divide in Northern Ireland to cooperate 
in governance and law-making (GFA, Strand 1). Power sharing 
within Northern Ireland was supported by North–South 
cooperation (between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland) (GFA, Strand 2) and East–West cooperation (between 
the Republic of Ireland and the UK as a whole) (GFA, Strand 
3). The GFA would be augmented and amended by a series of 
agreements, from St Andrews in 2006 to Fresh Start in 2015, 
each one an effort to sustain power sharing and to paper over 
various breakdowns and crises. Although several elements of the 
GFA framework remain unfulfilled, including the promise of 
a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, there have been significant 
successes, including the expansion of cross-border trade and 
cooperation on energy, tourism and health care across the island.
The unnaturalness of the GFA’s neat division of Northern 
Ireland’s people into Unionists and Nationalists (as well as a far 
less defined category of ‘others’) is inescapable. The division 
is a legacy of the conflict that the deal halted, but one that is 
increasingly divorced from the realities of 21st-century Northern 
Ireland. Using census data as a rough proxy, today, some 
65% of the population identify as British (Unionist) or Irish 
(Nationalist), with a sizable portion instead seeing themselves 
as Northern Irish (21%) or as having hybrid British–Irish–
Northern Irish identities (9%), or as not identifying as British, 
Irish or Northern Irish (5%) (Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency, 2012, p 15). This complexity is often poorly 
served by with a political culture in which diverse voices are 
often ignored or drowned out.
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The European Union
Nearly two decades of on-and-off cooperation abruptly lurched 
to a standstill in January 2017. The immediate pretext for the 
collapse of the power-sharing Executive, and the inability to 
form another after the subsequent Assembly elections, was a clash 
between the main Nationalist party (Sinn Féin) and the main 
Unionist party (the DUP) over the waste and possible misuse 
of public funds through the Renewable Heating Incentive 
Scheme. However, it is Northern Ireland’s place in the other 
union in our story – the EU – that has exacerbated the rift 
between these parties.
EU membership has changed the dynamic of relations 
between the UK and Ireland. In the 1960s, when the UK was 
Ireland’s biggest market, Ireland was all but obliged to follow 
the UK’s efforts to join the European project. However, for 
Ireland, it was vital that when both it and the UK joined in 
1973, they did so as equal members (Arthur, 2000, p 129). From 
this basis of mutual respect, the representatives of these English-
speaking islands on Europe’s north-west periphery found that 
they shared many common policy interests. European summits 
obliged ministers from both countries to participate in the 
collegial ‘family photographs’ and enabled them to forge ‘quiet 
cooperation’ in a context less burdened with expectation than 
the intermittent bilateral meetings that had characterised the 
dark days of the early 1970s (Hainsworth, 1981, p 7).
Today, the EU’s role in Northern Ireland life is so pervasive 
that it frequently goes unnoticed. Nonetheless, its farm payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy and development 
funding have a bigger impact on the Northern Ireland economy 
than on any other part of the UK. Its combination of Northern 
Ireland and Ireland into a single agricultural regulating area 
was vital during events such as the Foot and Mouth crisis in 
2001. The single market provided the opportunity for cross-
border business to flourish, and the EU directly supported the 
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peace process through tranches of PEACE Programme funding 
(Murphy, 2016, pp 142–8).
Brexit upends this picture, beginning with the undermining 
of the uneasy partnership between Sinn Féin and the DUP in 
the 2016–17 Executive. They campaigned on opposite sides of 
the 2016 referendum. In removing the commonalities between 
Ireland and the UK provided by the EU framework, Sinn Féin 
regarded Brexit as tilting Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
balance towards London and away from Dublin. Post-Brexit, 
the DUP likewise became increasingly distrustful of Sinn Féin, 
which it saw as using Brexit to agitate for a border poll in 
Northern Ireland. Brexit, moreover, tore a hole in the 2016–17 
Executive’s programme for government. The potential transfer 
of competence for corporation tax to Northern Ireland under 
the Corporation Tax (Northern Ireland) Act 2015 provided 
the basis for the Executive’s flagship economic policy. By 
lowering corporation tax to 12.5% to make Northern Ireland 
more competitive with the Republic of Ireland, the Executive 
hoped to have greater success in attracting inward investment. 
The uncertainty surrounding Brexit, however, undermined 
such opportunities.
In short, Northern Ireland is one of the most challenging 
aspects of Brexit because its relationship with both the UK and 
EU is so distinctive. Societal attitudes towards these two unions 
have been shaped by different concerns from those at work in 
Scotland, Wales and England, and Brexit will once again reshape 
these relationships. Key issues in the Brexit negotiations, such as 
the control of borders, citizenship rights, freedom of movement 
and access to foreign markets, have distinct resonances and 
impacts within Northern Ireland. Moreover, Strands 2 and 3 
of the GFA, which managed to run on autopilot during every 
interminable power-sharing crisis in Northern Ireland, stand to 
be hollowed out when the UK leaves the common frameworks 
of the EU.
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Most dangerously of all, however, Brexit stands to create 
winners and losers within Northern Ireland. Any changes in 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status that tie it closer into 
Westminster’s orbit seem to affirm a Unionist vision of Northern 
Ireland’s place in the world. On the other hand, any recognition 
in the Brexit deal of a special place for Northern Ireland under 
aspects of EU law could be interpreted as having the opposite 
effect of bringing it into closer alignment with Dublin. No 
shared approach to governance can easily sustain winners and 
losers on such key issues.
The shape of things to come
In this book, we unpack the significance of Brexit for the future 
of Northern Ireland by examining how Northern Ireland has 
shaped (and continues to shape) some of the most important 
struggles within the UK–EU withdrawal negotiations. This 
book is intended for anyone interested in how Brexit will 
change Northern Ireland, and how Northern Ireland is changing 
Brexit (for the UK as a whole, for Ireland and for the wider 
EU). We seek to shed some light on a series of fraught issues: 
what role EU membership plays in the Northern Ireland peace 
process; how Brexit could change identity in Northern Ireland; 
what Brexit means for different groups in Northern Ireland’s 
society; whether Brexit can be compatible with the GFA; and 
how Brexit could alter our understanding of Northern Ireland’s 
place within the UK and its constitutional relationship with 
Ireland. All of those questions carry with them a weight of 
technical legal terminology. If the Brexit debate seems shrouded 
in mysteries, like the difference between a single market and a 
customs union, what it means to claim EU citizenship, and the 
nature of maximum facilitation and regulatory alignment, we 
will try to explain the impact of these concepts in the Northern 
Ireland context.
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No small volume like this one could hope to comprehensively 
cover the Northern Ireland aspects of Brexit; instead, we address 
one pressing issue in each of the following chapters. We start by 
examining the nature of the Irish border, from its creation to the 
radical changes of the late 20th century, and of the influence of 
the UK’s and Ireland’s EU membership upon that border. We 
then examine aspects of Brexit in turn, with chapters tackling 
how Northern Ireland became such a major feature in the Brexit 
negotiations on trade, citizenship, human rights and justice. 
Having sketched how Brexit will affect Northern Ireland, we 
come to evaluate the profound implications for the constitutions 
of Ireland and the UK as a whole of the emerging settlement 
for this one small part of the UK. We close by considering the 
cumulative impact of what has already been agreed within these 
areas of negotiation for Northern Ireland’s status as part of the 
UK in a special relationship with the EU.
It is impossible to write about Brexit’s impact upon Northern 
Ireland without using disputed language. Many Nationalists 
continue to refer to Northern Ireland as ‘the North’, 
demonstrating their opposition to the partition of Ireland (Sales, 
1997, pp 3–4). However, as the GFA repeatedly uses the term 
‘Northern Ireland’ and it has therefore received the endorsement 
of the people of Northern Ireland in the GFA referendum in 
1998, we try to stick to that term.1 The name for the Agreement 
itself remains something of a fraught issue, with some Unionists 
avoiding the use of the term ‘Good Friday Agreement’ because 
of its religious overtones and supposed links to the Easter Rising 
(Morgan, 2011, pp 3–4). However, the deal was widely referred 
to by Unionist politicians as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ in 
the late 1990s before these suspicions developed. Rather than 
an inelegant compound term, we use the acronym ‘GFA’ 
1 Admittedly, the GFA also repeatedly uses ‘North and South’ as shorthand, 
so we will not feel so constrained as to plod through ‘Northern Ireland and 
Ireland’ at every time of asking.
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throughout. Nationalists, Unionists and Republicans are all 
treated as proper nouns in our work. While the terms used and 
analysis provided in the following pages are unlikely to satisfy 
everyone, we have set out to be even-handed in our treatment 
of sincerely held positions.
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TWO
Navigating the Irish border
[I]t is better that we should not even mention Partition 
in international assemblies, for our doing so would savour 
of the old coercionist policy of enlisting outside support 
against our fellow-countrymen, and, like that policy, 
would merely irritate without effecting any useful purpose. 
(Donal Barrington, 1957, p 400)
Introduction
Discussion of the challenges that the Irish border poses for Brexit 
has tended to quite literally size up the problem; the border, 
we are solemnly informed, is 310 miles in length, features over 
200 formal crossings and is traversed by some 30,000 people 
daily for purposes of work alone (NIAC, 2018a, paras 5–7). 
Such approaches give the image of borders as narrow spaces at 
which checks on travellers and goods can occur, and the risk 
of a ‘hardening’ of the border between Northern Ireland and 
Ireland on Brexit comes to be seen solely in terms of extra 
checks and delays. Borders, however, also operate on a deeper 
level; partition in Ireland created separate political and legal 
11
orders where no formal divisions had existed before. When the 
European Union (EU) has done so much to standardise rules 
and regulations applicable on either side of the Irish border, 
any ‘hardening’ of this dividing line could produce increasingly 
pronounced divergences.
In this book, we approach the Irish land border as both a 
narrow space at which regulation happens (which could become 
much more highly regulated post-Brexit) and a deeper divide 
between two states (which could pursue increasingly divergent 
policies post-Brexit). Before we do that, however, we outline 
the legal topography of the border: the major concepts and laws 
that shape our understanding of this divide. We do not follow a 
fixed timeline of legislation because, over the last century, some 
aspects of the border were being hardened at the same time as 
others were being softened. Instead, we first explain the legal 
divisions erected with partition (the division of the island into 
the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland) and their impacts on 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (the ‘bordering’ of 
Ireland). We then identify the various ways in which law and 
politics have softened the border over time (the substantial ‘de-
bordering’ of Ireland). Finally, we will highlight the key stages in 
the Brexit process to date (leading to the potential ‘re-bordering’ 
of Ireland).
Bordering
Partition
Talk of 800 years of British rule in Ireland creates an inaccurate 
image of continuous close control. At the end of the 18th 
century, the Irish Sea remained a distinct legal border. Ireland 
might have been a UK colony, but the UK Prime Minister Pitt 
the Younger had been unable to secure the Irish Parliament’s 
consent to a free trade agreement between Britain and Ireland in 
the 1780s (Schweitzer, 1984, pp 129–30). Only with a rebellion 
in Ireland in 1798 and the threat of French invasion did things 
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change; the Act of Union incorporated Ireland not only into 
the direct reach of Westminster, but also into a customs union 
with Britain (Act of Union 1800, Article VI). The Irish War of 
Independence ended with the creation of the Irish Free State 
and Northern Ireland as two separate jurisdictions through 
what became known as ‘partition’. The rules on the customs 
union between Ireland and Britain no longer applied to the new 
Irish Free State. The fracturing of the Union was nonetheless 
partial; the violent separatism of the Easter Rising and the War 
of Independence of 1919–21 ended hopes not only that most 
Nationalists would accept limited autonomy within the UK 
(Foster, 2007, p 145), but also that most Northern Unionists 
would be reconciled to devolution for Ireland as a whole within 
the UK (‘Home Rule’). Ireland was divided.
Between the 1920s and 1970s, partition became the defining 
aspect of the UK’s relations with Ireland, with the land border 
providing a focal point. Once the Boundary Commission’s 
efforts to adjust the border line came to nothing in the mid-
1920s, approved routes were designated for the cross-border 
transit of goods and customs posts were established. As we will 
discuss further in Chapter Three, this caused serious dislocations 
of border life: train lines that criss-crossed the border soon 
closed; small businesses in border counties lost access to their 
suppliers or markets; and diverging laws on either side of the 
border encouraged the smuggling of everything from white 
bread to condoms. On a deeper level, the ‘authoritarian and 
homogenizing instincts’ of governments in both parts of the 
island of Ireland meant that the border became a means of 
looking inward in an effort to control their own populations 
(Leary, 2016, p 124). Until the late 1960s the government in 
London largely left the Stormont government in Northern 
Ireland to its own devices.
The early years of partition were marked by a Free State 
boycott of goods from Northern Ireland, officially as a protest 
against ongoing sectarian violence against its Nationalist 
13
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minority but viewed by Unionists as a naked attempt at industrial 
protectionism (Good, 1922, pp 270–1). These changes in Ireland 
were capped by Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Irish Constitution, 
which made territorial claims over the entire island and thereby 
denied the legitimacy of Northern Ireland. In 1956, the 
Northern Ireland government published Why the Border Must 
Be, a staunch defence of partition, in which Ireland was crudely 
caricatured as a backwards-looking place of censorship and 
poverty (Northern Ireland Government, 1956). Its target was 
not the people of Northern Ireland, but only its own supporters. 
The border had become a mirror, reflecting back the image that 
ministers North and South wanted their own people to see and 
distracting them from internal woes.
Conflict
Although centuries of UK government policy had fostered 
divisions in Ireland, the border became ‘an external symptom 
of an internal disease’ (Horgan, 1939, p 425). Partition reflected 
intractable identity divisions. However, the border also left a 
sizable minority of Nationalists in Northern Ireland cut off 
from their majority on the island as a whole. Decades went by 
without high-level official contacts between the governments 
on either side of the border, and when Taoiseach Seán Lemass 
and Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister Terence O’Neill did 
meet in 1965, the moment was fleeting and the discussions 
were insubstantial (Patterson, 1999, p 146). Instead, given the 
intense politicisation of the land border, it quickly became a 
focal point for political violence. Attacks on border posts in the 
1920s, 1930s and 1950s were part of an undercurrent of political 
violence in Northern Ireland that while not as intense as during 
the later conflict, was nonetheless considerable. The 1960s saw 
political inertia gradually give way to tension; impatience within 
Nationalism about discrimination spurred on the Northern 
Ireland Civil Rights Movement, while increasing concerns 
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among Unionist politicians over Northern Ireland’s changing 
demography (two thirds of Northern Ireland’s population 
identified as Protestant in 1926, but under half by 2001) stoked 
a backlash. As the conflict intensified and the UK armed forces 
were deployed in 1969, the border became intensely militarised, 
and the border counties became ‘bandit country’. The division 
of Ireland became ringed with barbed wire and cast in concrete.
De-bordering
The Common Travel Area
Since the foundation of the Irish Free State, the position of 
Irish citizens in the UK and of UK citizens in Ireland has been 
unique: both countries treat each other’s nationals as equivalent 
to citizens in most respects. The openness of travel between 
the two countries dates from 1922, when the Irish Free State 
decided to enforce the same travel arrangements as those in place 
in the UK. Neither country required passports for cross-border 
travel, a ‘pragmatic’ response to the difficulties in establishing ‘an 
effective immigration frontier at the Irish border’ (Ryan, 2001, 
p 874). Following the declaration making Ireland a Republic 
in 1949, UK legislation formalised this special relationship by 
declaring that Ireland, while no longer part of the UK, nor a 
dominion of the UK, nor even part of the Commonwealth, 
would not be treated in law as a ‘foreign country’, with all of 
the implications that would have for immigration law (Ireland 
Act 1949 (UK), section 2).
In 1952, a new administrative agreement was reached, 
‘formalising’ the Common Travel Area. This travel area covers 
both states, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. It enables 
UK and Irish nationals to be treated almost identically within 
both states. For example, UK citizens in Ireland and Irish citizens 
in the UK have the right to vote in local, national and European 
elections. Both sets of migrants enjoy access to employment, 
social welfare and health care on the same basis as citizens; they 
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are not treated as ‘aliens’. The few exceptions to this equal 
treatment are political in nature: although Irish citizens can run 
for the UK Parliament, non-Irish citizens cannot be elected 
to the Dáil, nor can they vote in constitutional referendums 
or presidential elections. The Common Travel Area helped to 
characterise a border between the two nations that was ‘highly 
permeable’ to people and ideas (Chubb, 1986, p 22), with the 
irony that with the strife of the 1970s to 1990s, the sea border 
between Great Britain and Ireland was easier to traverse than 
the increasingly militarised land border with Northern Ireland.
The GFA
The GFA marked just one step in the Northern Ireland peace 
process and much had happened before 1998. In the early 1970s, 
academics could confidently state that the UK’s sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland was ‘full and complete’ (Beckett, 1971, p 126). 
After the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Downing 
Street Declaration of 1993, however, Ireland had attained 
‘a central role in any constitutional developments regarding 
Northern Ireland’ (Morrison and Livingstone, 1995, p 148).
The meaning of some of the main GFA terms, especially 
North–South cooperation, choice of identity, cross-border 
equivalence of rights and the principle of consent, will be 
spelled out in the following chapters. However, much of this 
ground is disputed territory. Within the space of a week in 
April 2018, David Trimble characterised Brexit as all but 
irrelevant for the GFA, and presented the EU’s draft withdrawal 
agreement as a threat to the GFA’s underlying principles (Clarke, 
2018; McDonald, 2018). These positions should be mutually 
incompatible, and perhaps with regard to any other polity, 
they would be. Instead, they illustrate a key aspect of post-
GFA governance in Northern Ireland: either everyone must 
be seen to be winning, or no one must be seen to be winning. 
If constitutional upheavals affecting the 1998 peace settlement 
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are not packaged in respectable deceptions or constructive 
ambiguities, they will not work.
The EU
The GFA includes little direct mention of the EU; for the UK 
Supreme Court, the GFA ‘assumed’ but did not ‘require’ the 
UK’s continuing membership of the EU.1 The assumption was 
nonetheless particularly important for many actors in the peace 
process. Ireland and the UK both working together as EU 
member states and passing over areas of legislative competence to 
EU institutions diluted the clash of nationalisms at work within 
Northern Ireland’s society (Ritchie, 2017). Moreover, with 
the ‘completion’ of the EU’s Single Market in 1993, physical 
manifestations of the border, such as the customs posts at Newry 
and Dundalk, were closed. Once the security architecture 
linked to the Northern Ireland conflict was removed, an open 
border materialised (see Chapter Three). In the space of a few 
years in the mid-1990s, the border went from being intensely 
fortified to all but completely open, and EU law was pivotal to 
this transformation.
For all of the incidental impacts of the Single Market and the 
welcome provision of EU PEACE and INTERREG funding, 
the guiding principles of EU law have also been adaptable to 
the needs of the peace process (Godson, 2005, p 484). Anti-
discrimination law is highly developed within the EU legal 
order; it is of central importance to the functioning of the Single 
Market that Member States not be able to put rules in place 
that openly or furtively discriminate against goods, services, 
capital or individuals from other Member States (McCrudden 
et al, 2004, p 364). Therefore, when affirmative action rules 
were put in place to address the historic under-representation 
1 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [129].
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of Catholics in the police force in Northern Ireland under the 
Patten Reforms,2 there was a risk that these rules would breach 
EU law regarding non-discrimination in employment. The EU, 
however, rapidly provided exemptions to enable police reforms 
in Northern Ireland to proceed (Council Directive 2000/78/
EC, Article 15). The Northern Ireland courts consequently 
accepted that this provision blocked any legal challenge to these 
reforms under fair employment legislation (which was based on 
EU law).3 In short, the limited mention in the GFA of Ireland’s 
and the UK’s shared EU membership underplays its significant 
role in drawing together both parts of the island of Ireland.
There is, however, a dual risk in Brexit that the EU’s 
commitment is, in some respects, underestimated and, in others, 
taken for granted by the UK government. Other long-standing 
principles of EU activity (the “Interlaken Principles”) maintain 
that it will prioritise internal integration and autonomy over 
deals with non-member states (De Clercq, 1987). The UK 
government takes little account of this when it insists that the 
special provisions that the EU has so far been willing to extend 
for Northern Ireland will be superseded by future negotiations 
on the post-Brexit UK–EU relationship, which will ‘achieve a 
partnership that is so close as to not require specific measures 
in relation to Northern Ireland’ (Davis, 2018). The special 
provisions for Northern Ireland that we examine in the chapters 
ahead represent more than a place-holding deal (a ‘backstop’, as 
the UK government likes to call them). They represent a major 
concession by the EU in light of the rules of EU law, and one 
that it might be unwilling to rethink when it comes to future 
negotiations.
2 Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, section 46(1).
3 In re Parsons Application for Judicial Review [2003] NICA 20, [8] (Lord 
Carswell).
18
BORDERING TWO UNIONS
Re-bordering?
The Brexit campaign
For decades, Northern Ireland’s place within the EU has 
been understood through the lens of Nationalist and Unionist 
preoccupations with Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. 
However, positions on Europe were, at least up to the Brexit 
referendum, complex and fluid. Unionism is often portrayed 
as instinctively Eurosceptic. As a set of political beliefs based 
on the defence of the UK’s sovereignty over Northern Ireland, 
the pooling of authority together with other member states 
in EU institutions seemed to carry an existential threat for 
many Unionists. There have nonetheless been recurrent bouts 
of engagement with the EU by various Unionist leaders. 
Nationalism has often been just as divided in its approach to the 
EU. John Hume was an early adopter, coming to see the EU as 
attractive for precisely the same reasons that some Unionists were 
repelled: Europe offered a means to dilute the UK’s sovereignty, 
and meant that the nation state was a concept that was ‘dead 
and gone’. Others were not so sure. As the socialist Republican 
Bernadette McAliskey famously retorted, she had not yet had 
her nation state (Meehan, 2000, p 88). This once summed up 
the position of Sinn Féin, too.
The battles in Northern Ireland during the 2016 Brexit 
referendum had little to do with David Cameron’s renegotiation 
of the UK’s place in the EU. Divisions between the DUP and 
Sinn Féin over the EU hardened because Northern Ireland’s 
place in the EU became a proxy for something deeper about 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Since the GFA of 1998 
(and stretching back to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985), 
Northern Ireland has been held in a constitutional balance: 
part of the UK, but connected to the remainder of Ireland. For 
Brexit’s DUP backers, withdrawal from the EU was about tying 
Northern Ireland more closely into the UK, and much of their 
campaign focused on the UK as a whole. Only Brexit, Nigel 
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Dodds (2016) told Westminster, could deliver ‘control over our 
sovereignty, over our borders … [and] over our finances’. Arlene 
Foster, sometimes said to be less committed to Brexit than her 
party’s Westminster MPs, gave high-profile interviews during 
the campaign saying that the peace process was not based upon 
the EU ‘in any way’ (Foster, 2016). For their part, Sinn Féin’s 
opposition to Brexit during the campaign was less a conversion 
towards unstinting support for the EU than a direct concern that 
Brexit ‘would harden partition’ (Question Time – Kearney, 2016).
Ireland and Northern Ireland’s place in the Brexit process
The formal process of Brexit got underway on 29 March 2017 
with the UK government’s initiation of the EU withdrawal 
procedure (Treaty on European Union, Article 50). The UK 
government insisted at the time that the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU and future relationship should be negotiated in parallel 
(Davis, 2017a). By the early summer of 2017, it was clear that 
this would not be the case; even had the EU Commission (as 
lead negotiators for the EU) desired such an approach, the 
remaining EU Member States exerted powerful influence over 
the EU’s priorities (Armstrong, 2017, pp 257–9). The Irish 
border’s prominence in the negotiations that followed should 
have come as little surprise; the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, 
Michel Barnier, had assured a joint session of the Dáil Éireann 
and Seanad Éireann in May 2017 that not only would issues of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland be one of his priorities, but ‘in 
this negotiation Ireland’s interest will be the Union’s interest’ 
(Barnier, 2017).
These ongoing negotiations are also impacting upon Northern 
Ireland politics. As an outline deal on Irish issues came into focus 
in December 2017, it addressed issues such as the ‘all-island 
economy’, ‘regulatory alignment’ and even the possibility of 
Ireland being reunified within the EU without the need for the 
EU’s ‘accession’ process by which new members join (Treaty on 
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European Union, Article 49). Without these elements, the EU 
was clear, there would be no deal (Joint Report, 2017, paras 
42–56). However, the DUP became concerned that rather 
than binding Northern Ireland more closely into the UK, these 
terms would actually underline its constitutional difference, and 
perhaps set it on the path towards reunification. In the words 
of DUP deputy leader Nigel Dodds:
[I]f as a result of the Brexit negotiations for instance there 
was to be any suggestion that Northern Ireland would 
be treated differently, in a way for instance that we were 
part of a customs union and a single market and the rest 
of the UK wasn’t – if there was anything like the EU’s 
definition of the backstop arrangements that was agreed 
in December – for us that would be a red line, which we 
would vote against the Government. (Grimson, 2018)
Given the current balance of power at Westminster, in which 
Theresa May’s minority Conservative administration is reliant 
on the DUP for support, the terms by which Northern Ireland 
and the Irish border are covered in the Brexit deal have become 
central to the shape of Brexit. This situation makes brinkmanship 
inevitable. Whereas Michel Barnier’s EU Task Force presented 
their draft of how the December 2017 Joint Report could be 
embodied in a legal text in March 2018 (EU Task Force, 2018a), 
the UK government has yet to give legal form to its counter-
proposals. The UK’s position, indeed, changes almost daily. It 
has to – Brexit can mean anything, and keep as many factions 
as possible happy, for as long as it does not take specific legal 
form. As soon as hard choices are made, some of Theresa May’s 
parliamentary support base will be disappointed. However, the 
clock is ticking towards Brexit in March 2019, and with frantic 
last-minute negotiations comes the risk of a complete collapse 
in talks over the issue of Northern Ireland.
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Conclusion
Seamus Heaney returned repeatedly to a poem by W.R. Rodgers 
on Armagh in his thinking about the tangle of identities in the 
Atlantic Islands, and in Northern Ireland in particular: ‘There 
is a through-otherness about Armagh, Of tower and steeple, 
Up on the hill are the arguing graves of the kings, And below 
are the people’. What Heaney took from Rodgers was how 
untidily Armagh fitted into the conflicting narratives about 
Ireland as the island’s ecclesiastical capital for both Catholics 
and Protestants. He sought the replication of that sort of shared 
space elsewhere (Heaney, 2002, p 396). The progressive phases 
of de-bordering Ireland at the end of the 20th century seemed 
to give life to this idea, as the GFA, the Common Travel Area 
and EU membership exerted their cumulative impact. At the 
dawn of the new millennium, all of Ireland seemed destined to 
become some grand Armagh or, at least, the other side of the 
border seemed set to become a less alien and forbidding space 
(Kearney, 2010, pp 53–4).
When the UK government talks of ‘no return to the borders 
of the past’ (HM Treasury, 2017, p 4) it at once conjures up 
and seeks to dispel memories of watchtowers and militarised 
patrols. However, writing personally, Theresa May (2018a) also 
insists that ‘any deal with the EU must protect our precious 
Union’. Brexit places Ireland and the UK on opposite sides of a 
negotiating table, with Northern Ireland as a key concern. There 
is a profound risk in such circumstances that Ireland could be 
presented not as acting as a co-guarantor of the peace process, 
but as manoeuvring in an international organisation to ‘coerce’ 
an end of partition (Barrington, 1957, p 390), stoking age-old 
Unionist fears and grievances. Only by understanding Brexit’s 
key impacts for Northern Ireland can we confront such imagined 
demons. That is the task that the rest of this book undertakes.
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THREE
Trade
To provide UK business with guarantees of full and equal 
access to the single market without equal acceptance of EU 
regulatory structures would require not so much a skilled 
negotiating team as a fairy godmother specialised in trade 
law. (Martin Donnelly, Former Permanent Secretary of 
the Department for International Trade, 2018)
Introduction
Prior to Brexit, shared membership of the European Union 
(EU) had eliminated most major restrictions upon the trade in 
goods and services between Northern Ireland and Ireland. A 
‘frictionless’ or ‘open’ border has existed  since the completion 
of the EU Single Market in the 1990s, without customs checks 
or the associated infrastructure. Since the Brexit vote, the future 
of arrangements at this border has been uncertain. This chapter 
asks what is so ‘special’ about the EU Customs Union and the 
Single Market, and considers to what extent the future trade 
relationship outlined in the Phase 1 Joint Report of December 
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2017 compensates for being out of the Customs Union and the 
Single Market. In that report, the UK government pledged a 
baseline of regulatory alignment with EU law (at least in terms of 
Northern Ireland) to facilitate cross-border trade in Ireland. This 
chapter examines the UK government’s subsequent proposals 
and assesses whether they can satisfy both the commitments that 
the UK has made to the EU and the ‘red lines’ that it has set for 
itself: no land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland; 
trade that is ‘as frictionless as possible’; but also no membership 
of the Single Market and the Customs Union.
The borders of the past
Friction: less trade
One point frequently raised to suggest that keeping the Northern 
Ireland–Ireland border ‘soft’ will be achievable is that a border 
currently exists for what David Davis describes as ‘customs and 
excise purposes’ (Sparrow, 2018). However, the shape of that 
border in 2018 is fundamentally different from what those living 
in Northern Ireland and Ireland remember as a ‘hard border’ – a 
policed partition that existed for a period of almost 70 years.
The establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, and the 
Northern Ireland Parliament’s decision to not join the Free 
State, created an international border between what had been 
counties within a single jurisdiction (see Chapter Two). By 
1925, a formal, permanent border between Northern Ireland 
and Ireland was established via an intergovernmental agreement 
signed by the Westminster, Stormont and Dublin Parliaments – 
and that agreement was filed with the League of Nations on 8 
February 1926, making it a border not only for intra-UK and 
Irish purposes, but also under international law (Agreement 
Between Great Britain and the Irish Free State, amending and 
supplementing the Treaty of December 6, 1921).
The consequence of the severing of the Free State from the 
UK was that a single economic area was transformed into two 
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separate trading entities. The primary effect of this was in the 
area of customs duties: while the UK and the Free State may 
have initially charged identical tariffs on imports and exports, 
their trade policy did not stay the same, and any differences in 
customs tariffs set on products moving between the Free State 
and the UK resulted in customs declarations being levied. In 
practice, this led to goods being smuggled across the border to 
avoid having to pay customs charges, or to benefit from the 
differences among products made in either jurisdiction (Denton 
and Fahey, 1993, p 51).
Custom duties/tariffs, or taxes charged on goods that are 
imported, have historically been very common in international 
trade, and with the establishment of the Free State in 1923, 
customs controls – to ensure appropriate duties were paid on 
those imported goods – were established. The fact that the Free 
State and Northern Ireland used to be one state was recognised in 
the legislation governing trade and customs controls between the 
two parties to some extent; for instance, ‘farm produce carried 
by a farmer’ was not subject to tariffs or custom controls when 
moving across the border, which was a recognition that many 
farms operated in both jurisdictions and this should continue 
unhindered insofar as possible (Denton and Fahey, 1993, 
p 21). We would now call these arrangements – exemption of 
checks and charges on certain products – an ‘Ireland–Northern 
Ireland Free Trade Agreement’. Until the 1960s, however, such 
arrangements were less formal, involving ‘mirrored’ domestic 
policies rather than international trade treaties.1 
The agricultural exemption granted in 1923 did not result in 
a soft border. Even farmers transporting agricultural products 
had to complete administrative processes to benefit from this 
exemption, and cross-border tariffs remained applicable to some 
1 This pattern of informal and reciprocal arrangements between the UK and 
Ireland is something of a hallmark of the countries’ relationship (see Chapter 
Two).
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agricultural products. ‘Ordinary merchandise’ was subject to 
both tariffs and other restrictions, such as import and export by 
‘approved routes’ only (Denton and Fahey, 1993, p 22). Where 
the differences in tariffs set by the Free State and the UK were 
significant, the policing of the border also tended to increase 
as smuggling was made more attractive. Differences in excise (a 
tax/duty on manufactured goods at their point of production, 
usually collected at the border) rates similarly inspired smuggling 
to avoid declarations and payments at the border. A particularly 
fraught period arrived in the 1930s, when a ‘trade war’ (known 
as the Anglo-Irish Tariff Wars) resulted in the requirement for 
agricultural products to be checked and in a substantial increase 
in the tariffs charged on steel and coal (Denton and Fahey, 
1993, p 37).2 
Although the ‘trade war’ eased by 1938, the Second World 
War once again encouraged cross-border smuggling, not least 
because economic and social conditions in the Republic, which 
remained ‘neutral’ in the war, were significantly better than 
those in Northern Ireland (Denton and Fahey, 1993, pp 51, 
59–60). One further factor was differences in banned products 
in the respective jurisdictions; for example, Ireland’s legislation 
prohibiting contraceptives resulted in approximately 50 years of 
smuggling of condoms across the border (Cloatre and Enright, 
2017, p 471).
Facilitating trade
The tariff wars slowly faded from the minds of policymakers in 
the post-war era, and 1965 saw the conclusion of the Anglo-
Irish Free Trade Agreement. This committed the Republic of 
Ireland to progressively reduce its duties against UK products 
2 The key piece of UK legislation was the Irish Free State (Special Duties) 
Act 1932, which set duty rates of up to 100% on all Irish Free State goods, 
including agriculture.
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over a period of 10 years and committed the UK to removing 
all import restrictions on Irish goods by 1966. The agreement 
resulted in a ‘softening’ of the border, but it remained very much 
in existence for economic purposes. The 1960s, of course, also 
saw the beginnings of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and by 
the 1970s, the border was marked not only by customs checks, 
but also by military checkpoints (Smith, 2016).
The next big shift in the degree of smuggling and border 
policing came when the UK and Ireland both joined the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. While EEC 
membership prevented the introduction of new tariffs between 
the two countries and therefore reduced the customs-related 
work taking place at the border, it also introduced the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its farming subsidies in both 
countries. This led to an entirely new form of ‘border fraud’, 
whereby declarations surrounding the quantity, type or weight 
of agricultural products were falsified to claim fraudulent CAP 
‘refunds’, and so checks on agricultural products were once more 
increased at the border (Denton and Fahey, 1993, pp 129–30).
However, EEC membership also saw the introduction of 
measures that resulted in less potential for border controls, 
namely, similar technical standards on products. Technical 
regulations on products had not historically been the cause of 
the bulk of delays at the border between Northern Ireland and 
Ireland, but as the volume of such regulations (for health and 
safety or environmental purposes) increased in the 1980s, there 
was potential for a burdensome system of regulatory checks 
to develop. However, EEC membership meant that products 
moving between the UK and Ireland did not have to be checked 
for compliance with EEC regulations (Craig and De Burca, 
2015, ch 17).
The ‘economic border’ between Northern Ireland and Ireland 
prior to 1993 basically amounted to a hard customs border. The 
UK and Ireland operated distinct customs and tax regimes, and 
this required declarations and checks, which were primarily 
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directed at preventing the smuggling of goods. Customs guards 
have related stories of checking livestock at the border to prevent 
animal carcasses being used to smuggle alcohol, and checking 
passenger vehicles for cigarette smuggling (Denton and Fahey, 
1993, p 154). Given that the establishment of the Irish Free 
State coincided with the creation of the Common Travel Area 
(see Chapter Two), which permitted the free movement of Irish 
and UK nationals for most everyday purposes, these economic 
barriers were the most significant obstacles to free flows across 
the border.
Trade under the European Single Market
Making a single market
The so-called ‘completion’ of the EU’s Single Market project 
in 1992 had notable consequences for the border between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland. Explaining why requires 
discussion of what the EU’s Single Market aims to achieve, 
and to what extent that ‘aim’ was achieved by the end of 1992. 
Countries pass through multiple stages when attempting to 
reduce the number of trade restrictions between them (Belassa, 
2013). The first stage in ‘integrating’ the economies of two 
countries is concluding a ‘simple’ free trade agreement (FTA) 
(simple because of its coverage, not because it will be legible to 
anyone other than trade lawyers).
An FTA operates where at least two countries abolish custom 
duties on their ‘shared’ border. In other words, when a shipment 
of a product like milk moves from country A to country B, 
country B does not charge any taxes on the milk being imported, 
and vice versa.
What if we now introduce Country C, which has sold its 
milk to country A? Unless it is also part of the FTA, its milk 
will not move freely between country B and country A; there 
will be an import charge when it enters country A and another 
import charge when it moves from country A to country B. 
28
BORDERING TWO UNIONS
Only goods produced in countries A and B consequently benefit 
from the FTA and its reduced or abolished customs duties. Goods 
moving within the FTA between country A and country B are 
subject to ‘rules of origin’, which define where the good is 
‘from’ – where it was created or significantly modified – and so 
what customs duties are applicable to it. As discussed, Ireland 
and the UK operated an ‘informal’ FTA from 1923, reducing 
customs duties outside of the context of the ‘trade war’, and in 
1965, they formalised this FTA.
The next stage in economic integration is the creation of a 
‘customs union’. This is an addition to the FTA. It is formed 
when countries A and B, already in an FTA with each other, 
now agree that they would like to apply a single set of rules and 
tariffs to their external borders. In other words, when country 
C now wishes to sell its milk to either country A or B, those 
countries will charge the same import taxes on that milk – and 
once the milk is in either country A or B, it can also freely move 
to the other country.
We now encounter country D, with no FTA with country 
A or B, but that wishes to form one with country A because it 
produces computers that it would like to export to country A 
at a low tariff. Meanwhile, country A produces bicycles that it 
Figure 1: A free trade area
Free trade agreements
No customs on milk from A or B
Milk from C
(outside of FTA)
Customs into A and customs into B
A B
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would really like to export to country D at a low tariff. It makes 
sense for countries D and A to conclude an FTA as they clearly 
have something to offer each other. However, country A can 
no longer conclude such an FTA on its own because its tariff 
on country D’s computers is determined not only by itself, but 
also by country B. A customs union must therefore have, as a 
logical consequence, one external trade policy.
What will the group of countries inside the FTA do whenever 
an outside country wishes to send products into the trade area? 
In our example, the external trade policy would cover the 
negotiation of countries B and A with country D. Country 
B might have an interest in being able to export bananas at a 
lower tariff while country A is interested in lowering its bicycle 
export costs. As countries A and B represent a bigger market 
than country D, they are likely to be able to exert some pressure 
on country D in negotiations. This might mean that country 
D gets less out of the deal for its bicycle, banana and computer 
industries and consumers, but it still ultimately gets access to 
country A and B’s FTA.
This very simple overview covers the two most common 
stages of economic integration. While the EU has completed 
both these stages, it has also gone beyond them (European 
Commission, 2016). The 1957 Treaty of Rome established Stage 
Figure 2: A customs union
Customs Union
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Customs Union)
A B
One customs 
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One; since then, the charging of duties on products from the 
Member States at the EU’s internal borders has gradually become 
prohibited (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 
1957, Articles 12–15). It also completed Stage Two in 1968, 
establishing the Customs Union – of which the UK and Ireland 
have been members since 1973, alongside all other Member 
States and Monaco. However, the EU’s integration project is 
about much more than simply having no border tariffs and 
shared trade rules; it provides the institutional architecture that 
enforces and supervises such rules that differentiates a ‘common 
market’ (or Stage Three of integration) from a simpler FTA or 
customs union.
The EU’s common market project
Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EU has had a goal to create 
a ‘common market’. However, the simple negative provisions 
in the Treaty of Rome – declaring that Member States will not 
impose restrictions on the movement of goods, services, capital 
or people – did very little to actually encourage the development 
of a functional internal market. We leave the discussion of people 
(see Chapter Four) as our primary interest here is trade between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland in the context of the EU’s efforts 
to ensure genuine free movement in goods.
Prior to the 1980s, there was very little EEC law governing 
internal regulations on goods, services and capital. A product, in 
other words, could probably cross a border without incurring 
a fee, but it might incur a sales tax or, indeed, a restriction on 
sale based on health and safety, cultural differences such as the 
legal age to drink, or other grounds. These problems, rooted 
in the combined facts that the Member States did not have to 
accept products with different standards from other Member 
States and the lack of general rules setting identical standards, 
were extremely difficult to change. The EU’s decision-making 
structures were heavily biased towards the interests of individual 
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Member States, who could – and did – block proposals to 
establish common standards and regulations if their national 
interest was at issue. Domestic lobbying on matters of trade 
significantly limited the extent to which the EEC could achieve 
a genuine EEC-wide market in which all products were in direct 
competition with each other, regardless of origin.
It took an economic downturn for attitudes to change, largely 
at the behest of the UK and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 
She sent an envoy, Baron Cockfield, to the EU Commission in 
an attempt to revive the common market project. Commissioner 
Cockfield’s White Paper proposed an extensive number of 
positive laws that the EU would need to adopt to actually create 
(or ‘complete’) what he called the ‘single market’. This led to the 
EEC adopting its first new treaty in over 30 years – the Single 
European Act of 1986 – which promised the completion of the 
Single Market by the end of 1992.
The Single European Act introduced both ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ rules, as well as an overarching power for the EU 
to create new legislation where this was necessary for the 
‘establishment and functioning of the internal market’, which 
enabled integration to move faster. This new power, found in 
Article 100a of the EC Treaty, stopped Member State vetoes 
on any and all matters that they proclaimed to be of ‘national 
interest’. Instead, the system functioned under ‘qualified 
majority voting’, meaning that a single Member State opposing 
a legislative measure was no longer enough to stop it from taking 
effect. In other words, the relaxation of the Member States’ veto 
‘grip’ meant that common standards and regulations that assist 
the creation of the ‘single’ or ‘internal’ market are adopted with 
significantly greater speed and ease.
The EU’s Single Market in 1992
The EU itself estimates that by the end of 1992, 90% of the 
pre-existing issues plaguing the ‘internal market’, as identified in 
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Baron Cockfield’s White Paper, were resolved (Maciejewski and 
Dancourt, 2017). For instance, EEC regulations harmonising 
customs declaration paperwork in 1987 (EEC Commission 
Regulation No 1062/87) meant that goods started moving 
across EU internal borders – including the Ireland–Northern 
Ireland border – with significantly greater ease and at a reduced 
cost (Hayward, 2017). The free movement of services remains 
the most incomplete aspect of the Single Market, but it is less 
significant to the Ireland–Northern Ireland border because of 
the Common Travel Area’s operation. With the Single Market 
in goods finally completed in 1993, customs posts on the Irish 
border became redundant and could be removed.
What, then, defines the ‘Single Market in goods’, and why 
did this development remove the need for border checks when 
being in the EEC as an FTA and a customs union, between 
1973 and 1992, did not? The decisive factor is the extent to 
which technical regulations on trade have multiplied since the 
1990s – and what this will mean for trade post-Brexit. Returning 
to the border of 1973 or 1992 is not an option post-Brexit. 
The EU’s external borders now police a multitude of technical 
regulations that have evolved with the ‘internal market’ since 
1992. As we have seen, the primary ‘checks’ taking place at 
Ireland’s land border up until 1992 were for customs charges, 
for excise payments and to prevent smuggling due to product 
restrictions. Following Brexit, however, the UK and the EU 
will be able to operate different customs and tax policies, but 
also different regulatory policies. If this happens, a ‘hard’ border 
will be needed to process customs and tax declarations, and also 
to check products crossing the border for their compliance with 
their destination’s product regulations.
It is the latter process that would cause the most substantial 
border delays; customs and tax obligations can be largely 
electronically discharged, but product regulations will often 
require actual checks to take place (with all of the associated 
physical infrastructure). This is particularly the case with 
33
TRADE
agricultural products; the so-called sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures that the EU applies in principle require all goods 
from outside of the EU to be subjected to extensive checks as 
soon as they arrive at an EU border to ensure that they meet EU 
health and safety standards (European Commission, no date[a]). 
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) law, if the EU relaxes 
those standards to facilitate trade across the Northern Ireland 
border, it would have to relax those standards for all its trading 
partners – and consequently amend its own founding treaties as 
most of the commitments regarding the Single Market would 
no longer be achievable. Unsurprisingly, there is no chance of 
it doing so.
The fact that products (agricultural and otherwise) may need 
to be inspected before crossing the border between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland post-Brexit is therefore a consequence of the 
development that the EU has undergone since 1973. A mutual 
‘understanding’ rooted in aligned domestic laws, which the 
UK and Ireland maintained before 1965, will no longer cut it.
Brexit: what will change?
Red lines
Key to determining how the situation at the Northern Ireland 
border will change post-Brexit is the UK government’s 
negotiation ‘red lines’. Theresa May insists that exiting the 
EU will mean leaving both the EU Customs Union and the 
Single Market. This means leaving behind the ‘architecture’ 
that builds mutual trust in the EU’s rules and standards enabling 
goods to move freely between countries. If these ‘red lines’ 
are maintained, the European Commission will have no 
jurisdiction to investigate the UK’s compliance with EU law, 
and there will be no more enforcement of EU law in the UK 
by the European Commission or the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU). Whatever makes up the UK’s trade policy, these 
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will be domestic concepts rather than EU ones, and will not 
be subject to the CJEU’s interpretations.
We will now explore the consequences of the UK’s ‘red 
lines’ for the border in Northern Ireland: first, considering 
what changes if the UK and the EU are no longer in a customs 
union together; and, second, considering what changes if the 
UK leaves the Single Market.
Leaving the Customs Union
So far, the consequences of leaving the EU Customs Union have 
not been highlighted by the discussions of the pre-1993 and 
post-1993 border, for the very simple reason that that border 
has never before been an external border of the EU. As the 
UK and Ireland joined the EEC at the same time, the border 
between them has always been an ‘internal’ EU border rather 
than an ‘external’ border.
Brexit changes this. Ireland will become an entry point to 
the EU for goods travelling from Northern Ireland, and that 
means that goods leaving Northern Ireland and crossing into 
Ireland will be entering the EU Customs Union for the first 
time. What this means varies to a significant extent depending 
on what kind of relationship the UK and the EU (as a whole) 
will have following Brexit; however, given the Prime Minister’s 
insistence that the UK will leave ‘the Customs Union’, it is 
possible to make several notes on the customs checks that will 
be needed in future.
The customs duties set by the UK and the EU vis-a-vis each 
other will be regulated through an FTA. The current state of 
negotiations suggests that the EU and UK will agree, if nothing 
else, on concluding an FTA that eliminates all tariff barriers. 
As such, it does not look likely that there will be a return to 
the pre-1973 border in Northern Ireland: customs duties are 
not likely to need collecting for products that move from the 
UK into Ireland or from Ireland into Northern Ireland. What 
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is key, however, is that it applies to goods originating in the UK 
and in the EU. Once the Ireland–Northern Ireland border 
becomes an external EU border, it is also where products from 
third countries may potentially enter the EU – and those may 
have duties to be collected. Duties on goods imported from 
non-EU countries are currently collected when goods first enter 
the UK or Ireland, and they will ordinarily do so at (air)ports, 
thus leaving the Northern Ireland border unaffected; however, 
that stops being an option when the UK itself is no longer in 
the EU and the Northern Ireland border becomes a point of 
‘EU entry’ for all goods that arrive in the UK from elsewhere.
At present, an LCD TV being imported from India to either a 
port in Ireland or Northern Ireland will be charged a 14% duty 
there, and then can go anywhere in the EU without attracting 
a further charge, including across the land border. Following 
Brexit, however, let us say that the UK operates a tariff of only 
5% and the EU maintains its 14% tariff. An LCD TV from India 
arriving in Belfast will thus attract a 5% duty – and can then be 
driven across the land border for use or sale in Ireland. Without 
customs posts at the land border, the EU’s duty on that Indian 
TV will simply not be collected, which would undoubtedly 
attract complaints from those traders who are faced with the 
EU external tariff when sending a TV directly to Amsterdam, 
for instance.
As discussed earlier, EU Member States have a common 
external trade policy. Third countries, like China, which 
sign trade agreements do so with the EU, and the same ‘tariff 
reductions’ apply in all Member States. Brexit, however, carves 
the UK out of that system; therefore, we may arrive in a situation 
where the UK and the EU both have trade agreements with 
the same third country but the tariffs negotiated on products 
from that third country are not the same for the UK and the EU.
In a scenario where neither the UK nor the EU have a trade 
agreement with a third country, there are still potential problems. 
Where there are no trade agreements between states or customs 
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unions, tariffs are based on the WTO’s so-called tariff ‘schedules’ 
(basically, lists of charges on different goods). Each state as well 
as the EU maintains such a list with the WTO. Currently, the 
UK does not have a separate list of its own as it is part of the 
EU’s Single Market. Post-Brexit, the UK’s schedules may need 
to be reconsidered. Duplicating the EU’s terms for the UK 
may be unattractive to many WTO members, who may wish 
to give the UK a significantly different membership deal than 
they did the 500-million-consumer EU Single Market. Even 
if the schedule is duplicated for the UK, it is likely to change 
over time, which means that third-country goods are likely to 
experience different tariffs upon moving from the UK into the 
EU, and vice versa. This will require paperwork and checks at 
the external EU–UK borders, which will include the Northern 
Ireland border.
Unfortunately, this is only the beginning of the potential 
reasons for delays at the border; the real complications arise in 
relation to complex manufactured goods and an area of trade 
law that only specialists consider but that has suddenly become 
a significant buzzword in political circles: rules of origin.
Due to how global supply chains operate, a product that 
‘arrives’ in the EU from the UK might, in reality, have been 
sourced from a variety of worldwide locations, only being 
‘completed’ in the UK before moving into the EU. Where is 
such a product from? This might sound like a silly question, but 
it is a crucial one for determining what tariffs need to be charged 
on that product at the border. FTAs all have their own formulae 
for calculating so-called ‘rules of origin’, determining where a 
product has undergone its ‘last substantial transformation’ for 
the purposes of applying a customs duty to it.
An example provided to the Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Select Committee by Mike Hawes, Chief Executive 
of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, will make 
this clearer:
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The average car made in the UK purchases 44% of its 
components from UK suppliers, in other words 56% 
from abroad. For the purposes of free trade agreements, 
we look at something called originating content. That 
means, of that 44% that you are buying from your UK 
suppliers, how much actually comes from the UK, bearing 
in mind the supply chain, tier two, will still be buying from 
Europe, Asia and elsewhere. We are doing some work on 
that figure at the moment, and it is somewhere between 
20% and 25%, which is a long way from the 55% to 60% 
threshold you would need to qualify for any free trade 
agreement.… to move from where we currently are – let 
us say 20% to 25% originating content – to 60% will take 
many years. There is not necessarily the capability here 
in the UK. (House of Commons Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy Committee, 2017)
The way around this is ‘cumulation’, whereby countries agree 
to allow components originating from each other’s jurisdictions 
to count towards the ‘transformation’ threshold. If applicable to 
any future UK–EU trade deal, parts of a car produced in the EU 
would count towards a car being ‘made’ in the UK. However, 
cumulation becomes more complex in truly global supply 
chains, where rules on cumulation would need to be agreed 
with a wide variety of third-country trading partners by both 
the UK and the EU. Such ‘diagonal cumulation’, between a 
variety of trading partners, will require a lot of trade agreement 
coordination between the UK and the EU in the absence of 
EU Customs Union membership (Imana, 2009; World Customs 
Organisation 2012; Lowe, 2016).
It should be stressed that even if the respective rules are, in 
practice, not different, unless there is a mutual, legally binding 
commitment to operate identical rules, it is likely that controls 
will be reinstated again at Ireland’s land border simply to verify 
that identical rules are being applied – or to be able to act quickly 
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if the UK diverges from EU rules. This is the difference between 
being in a customs union with the EU, and thus committing 
to operating identical rules and having an enforcement and 
oversight mechanism to enforce that commitment, and operating 
a separate customs policy that happens to overlap with the EU’s 
rules.
Leaving the Single Market
The Single Market is the most advanced example of economic 
integration between countries in the world. There is extensive 
harmonisation of standards in EU law, but, importantly, even 
when there is no harmonisation, the EU operates on principles 
of ‘mutual recognition’, with only limited exceptions. As a 
consequence, once a product is legally sold in one Member State, 
it should be sellable in all other Member States, unless there are 
overriding specific reasons that permit a particular Member State 
to block its sale.3 This combination of harmonised EU rules and 
Member States’ mutual recognition of each other’s rules means 
that products simply do not have to be checked at the border.
In the rare situation where a product produced in Member 
State A can, for legitimate overriding reasons, not be sold in 
Member State B, this can be controlled within the Member 
States, rather than at the border – or at the point of sale, rather 
than at the point of import. Borders, consequently, might be 
there as geographical landmarks within the EU, but they no 
longer serve a trade purpose. The fact that all Member States 
continue to operate restrictions on the importation of alcohol 
and cigarettes above a set volume is not a matter that is policed at 
any of the land borders. Where there are suspicions of smuggling 
of products like alcohol and cigarettes, or of the movement of 
otherwise illegal goods (such as cocaine), this has, post-1993, 
3 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
EU:C:1979:42.
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become a matter for regular police investigation. Where border 
agents continue to operate, it is at the EU’s external land borders 
and (air)ports, where goods arriving from outside of the EU still 
require extensive verification before being allowed into the 
Single Market.
That said, there is more to the ‘Single Market’ than the 
rules that make up EU law. Rules only become meaningful 
in complex trade relations when there is significant mutual 
trust that they will be abided by. If country A promises that 
it definitely produces milk in the same way that country B 
does, that only becomes a meaningful commitment if country 
B can somehow ‘trust’ that country A is doing that – and in 
international trade, trust is heavily contingent on the ability to 
check and ensure that the rules are applied. We can see this clearly 
in the EU’s proposals for the Ireland Protocol in the Withdrawal 
Agreement: the rules are the starting point, but the enforcement 
of those rules is equally important.
Within the EU, there is an extensive architecture which 
ensures that EU law is interpreted and enforced in the same way, 
that there is appropriate supervision of commitments made by 
EU Member States, and that all the Member States ‘sincerely 
cooperate’ to ensure that EU laws function (Treaty on European 
Union, Article 4(3)).4 The EU institutions, and their ability 
to hold each other and the Member States to account if they 
do not comply, are what build the trust necessary to abandon 
border controls. Compatible and mutually recognised rules, in 
other words, are the beginning of not needing border checks at EU 
internal borders; the full extent of institutional and administrative 
cooperation and integration that make up the EU Single Market 
are an equally essential part of it (European Commission, 2018a).
Post-Brexit, the UK will move into a separate regulatory 
regime for all products, agricultural or otherwise. What this 
will mean in practice depends on what kind of ‘new’ FTA the 
4 C-397-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz EU:C:2004:584.
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UK and the EU conclude. However, both the EU and the UK 
concede that even the very ‘best’, most expansive FTA will 
not be as all-encompassing as the EU Single Market (European 
Council, 2018; May, 2018b). There will be a ‘hit’ in terms of 
coverage – trade in services will likely become subject to many 
more restrictions than currently under EU rules – but there will 
also be a hit in terms of ‘trading freedom’ even for areas included 
in a future FTA. Without CJEU and European Commission 
oversight of whatever product rules the UK operates, the EU 
cannot simply accept them into its territory: it will need checks 
to ensure that they meet the EU’s standards. Unless the UK and 
the EU either shift their negotiating positions or come up with 
some radical new solutions for complying with their global trade 
obligations, regulatory checks at Northern Ireland’s land border 
will resurface post-Brexit.
UK proposals for ‘solving’ the Northern Ireland border
Starting points for negotiations
The EU’s consistent negotiating position has been that leaving 
the Single Market and the EU Customs Union are UK ‘red 
lines’, not EU red lines, and the EU is very much open to the 
UK pursuing European Economic Area (EEA) membership 
and a customs union that will function largely in the same way 
as the EU Customs Union does for Member States. The UK 
has, however, rejected both of those solutions and the EU, 
after significant lobbying from Ireland, has therefore batted the 
ball back into the UK’s court and asked it to propose solutions 
for Northern Ireland given that the EU’s ‘solutions’ have been 
deemed unacceptable (Connelly, 2018a, pp 180–8).
The UK has obliged in the form of a set of ‘Future Partnership’ 
papers on trade and customs, wherein it sets out its vision for 
both the future EU–UK FTA generally, and what steps will be 
taken to mitigate the effect of Brexit on the Northern Ireland 
border specifically (HM Treasury et al, 2017). Here, too, the 
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UK has developed a set of red lines, which are essential to 
understanding the solutions that it has proposed:
• There will be no physical infrastructure at the Northern Ireland 
border as this would be politically, socially and culturally 
unacceptable for those living in either Ireland or Northern 
Ireland, and may bring with it security concerns.
• There will be no hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.
• There will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain.
In other words, the UK simultaneously acknowledges that a hard 
border at the EU’s new external front is completely undesirable 
and commits to avoiding it but also commits to not establishing 
what might be the obvious alternative location for a de facto 
EU external border: the Irish Sea. As explained earlier, those 
positions set a seemingly impossible task for the EU: where does 
it apply its controls on goods coming in from the UK (a third 
country) to Ireland?
To answer that question, the UK proposes three equally 
controversial but very different solutions. On the customs front, 
it offers two alternatives: a ‘Maximum Facilitation’ (‘Max Fac’) 
customs arrangement between the UK and the EU (Option 
1); or a so-called ‘Customs Partnership’ (Option 2). On the 
‘regulatory standards’ front, its position is more abstract but can 
broadly be described as being focused on ‘outcome alignment’ in 
regulation, resulting in mutual recognition of standards (Option 
3). We will explore each of these proposals in turn.
Option 1: ‘Max Fac’
The UK government has made a concerted pitch for what has 
become known as the ‘Max Fac’ arrangement:
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A highly streamlined customs arrangement between the 
UK and the EU, streamlining and simplifying requirements, 
leaving as few additional requirements on UK–EU trade 
as possible. This would aim to: continue some of the 
existing agreements between the UK and the EU; put in 
place new negotiated and unilateral facilitations to reduce 
and remove barriers to trade; and implement technology-
based solutions to make it easier to comply with customs 
procedures. (HM Treasury et al, 2017, para 27)
The customs ‘Future Partnership’ paper establishes in more 
detail what kinds of solutions, ranging from technological to 
cooperation agreements, could result in trade facilitation. We do 
not need to consider it in more detail than that, however, because 
the promises made by both the UK and the EU with regards to 
the Northern Ireland border are not about minimising the level 
of border checks done; they simply preclude border checks 
altogether. Max Fac will consequently result in something that 
has been described in terms of ‘as frictionless as possible’ a border, 
but this is not the same thing as ‘no physical infrastructure’ and 
‘no hard border’. As the House of Commons Northern Ireland 
Affairs Committee (NIAC) concluded:
The Committee has heard numerous proposals for how 
the UK and the EU could ensure customs compliance 
without physical infrastructure at the border. This is 
currently the case for enforcement in relation to fuel, 
alcohol and tobacco. These proposals address the question 
of compliance through mobile patrols, risk analysis, data-
sharing and enforcement measures away from the border. 
However, we have had no visibility of any technical 
solutions, anywhere in the world, beyond the aspirational, 
that would remove the need for physical infrastructure at 
the border. (NIAC, 2018a, para 82)
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Theresa May appears to have conceded as much in her Mansion 
House speech: ‘Option two would be a highly streamlined 
customs arrangement, where we would jointly agree to 
implement a range of measures to minimise frictions to trade, 
together with specific provisions for Northern Ireland’ (May, 
2018b). However, to date, what those specific provisions for 
Northern Ireland would be, and how they fulfil all three of the 
commitments made with regards to borders in Northern Ireland, 
has not been specified further, beyond maintaining the current 
policy of treating the island of Ireland as a single agricultural 
entity and pursuing an exemption for ‘small traders’. The 
latter, of course, will not avoid a border because if there is an 
exemption, there will also be a rule to be applied, and that rule 
will require verification to ensure that everyone claiming to be a 
‘small trader’ is actually a ‘small trader’ (NIAC, 2018a, para 71).
Option 2: the Customs Partnership
Option 2, known as the ‘Customs Partnership’, has become the 
foremost option being pursued by UK ministers who are not 
ardent Brexiteers – perhaps unsurprisingly given the limitations 
of Max Fac. However, the Customs Partnership is no less 
ambitious than using technology to try to ‘avoid’ or ‘minimise’ 
a border. The UK has been sparing on the details of what it 
imagines a Customs Partnership to look like, but the Mansion 
House speech suggests the following:
At the border, the UK would mirror the EU’s requirements 
for imports from the rest of the world, applying the same 
tariffs and the same rules of origin as the EU for those 
goods arriving in the UK and intended for the EU. By 
following this approach, we would know that all goods 
entering the EU via the UK pay the right EU duties, 
removing the need for customs processes at the UK–EU 
border.
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But, importantly, we would put in place a mechanism 
so that the UK would also be able to apply its own tariffs 
and trade policy for goods intended for the UK market. As 
we have set out previously, this would require the means 
to ensure that both sides can trust the system and a robust 
enforcement mechanism. (May, 2018b)
In theory, this appears to satisfy all the UK red lines and the 
EU–UK mutual ‘Northern Ireland’ red lines. The problem 
lies in practice, however, which is that having one country 
collect duties using another country’s tariffs and then refunding 
traders according to where the goods actually end up as a final 
destination is not done anywhere in the world. It will require 
extensive tracking of goods into the Single Market, and therefore 
a lot of EU cooperation to set up a system that is significantly 
more awkward than the Single Market.
The EU has dismissed the Customs Partnership proposal as it 
currently stands as being unrealistic, not least of all because of 
the short timescale in which it would have to be up and running 
and its overly costly and burdensome operation for both traders 
and Member States because of the endless ‘refund’ claims and 
transport monitoring that it would involve (Parker, 2018).
The Customs Partnership is also the ‘customs’ option that has 
attracted severe criticism from within the Conservative Party. 
A crunch cabinet meeting in May 2018 was intended to result 
in the ‘adoption’ of the Customs Partnership as the option to 
be pursued, but it actually resulted in the cabinet agreeing only 
that, as currently proposed, the model is unworkable. Minister 
Greg Clark conceded that getting both the UK and the EU 
ready to operate the Customs Partnership will take, at the very 
least, five years beyond the ‘exit’ day transition period (BBC, 
2018a). However, given that (as NIAC strongly suggests) a ‘Max 
Fac’ solution also is unlikely to be ready for deployment by the 
end of the transition period, this is likely to be a lesser factor in 
opposition to the Customs Partnership. Instead, Boris Johnson 
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made clear that it is the long-term consequences of being in 
the Customs Partnership itself that are causing the opposition:
It’s totally untried and would make it very, very difficult 
to do free trade deals. If you have the new customs 
partnership, you have a crazy system whereby you end 
up collecting the tariffs on behalf of the EU at the UK 
frontier. If the EU decides to impose punitive tariffs on 
something the UK wants to bring in cheaply there’s 
nothing you can do.
That’s not taking back control of your trade policy, it’s 
not taking back control of your laws, it’s not taking back 
control of your borders and it’s actually not taking back 
control of your money either, because tariffs would get 
paid centrally back to Brussels. (Doyle, 2018)
Given both of these internal and external restrictions, it seems 
that the Customs Partnership in its current form is also not the 
proposal that will find its way into the Withdrawal Agreement 
and the partnership agreement to prevent a hard border in 
Northern Ireland. However, on 8 May 2018, the Irish Taoiseach, 
Leo Varadkar, told the Dáil that EU opposition is primarily to 
the Customs Partnership proposal in its current form, ‘but it is 
something that perhaps we could make workable’ (Houses of 
the Oireachtas, 2018). In light of the intra-cabinet disagreement 
on which route to pursue, as well as the EU rejection of both 
models as currently developed, both ‘Max Fac’ and the ‘Customs 
Partnership’ are being redeveloped by the UK at the time of 
writing.
Option 3: mutual recognition and/or outcome alignment
Customs duties, however, are only one part of what causes 
border checks; the remainder, as explained earlier, is made up 
of product checks that have to do with technical regulations. It 
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might seem as though the problems posed by the UK leaving 
the EU can be rather more easily resolved here: goods crossing 
the border will become problematic only if the UK operates 
different technical regulations than the EU. Indeed, the UK 
government’s primary argument in the negotiations on Brexit 
to date has been that as long as the rules remain identical, or the 
EU and the UK recognise each other’s rules as ‘good enough’, 
trade should be able to continue without border checks between 
the UK and the EU:
The UK will need to make a strong commitment that 
its regulatory standards will remain as high as the EU’s. 
That commitment, in practice, will mean that UK and 
EU regulatory standards will remain substantially similar 
in the future.
Our default is that UK law may not necessarily be 
identical to EU law, but it should achieve the same 
outcomes. In some cases Parliament might choose to pass 
an identical law – businesses who export to the EU tell 
us that it is strongly in their interest to have a single set of 
regulatory standards that mean they can sell into the UK 
and EU markets.
If the Parliament of the day decided not to achieve the 
same outcomes as EU law, it would be in the knowledge 
that there may be consequences for our market access.
And there will need to be an independent mechanism 
to oversee these arrangements. (May, 2018b)
However, this pitch for ‘simple mutual recognition’ between 
the EU and a non-Member State UK significantly underplays 
the unprecedented achievement that is the Single Market. The 
type of ‘mutual recognition’ being asked for by the UK does 
not even exist between the Member States, where – as Stephen 
Weatherill (2014) argues persuasively – exceptions to mutual 
recognition still operate under the CJEU’s oversight.
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Mutual recognition is far from present between the EU and 
other third countries, not only because third countries operate 
significantly different rules from the EU, but also because there 
are limits to the level of ‘mutual recognition’ that the EU is 
willing to pursue internationally, where it has less control over 
how regulatory standards are adopted and enforced than it does 
within the Single Market (NIAC, 2018a , para 43). Post-Brexit, 
while the UK might start out with identical rules, it will not 
start out with identical trust as the Member States do.
Existing examples of ‘mutual recognition’ that the EU has 
accepted in international trade agreements are rare. For one 
thing, in the EU’s FTAs, what is normally called ‘mutual 
recognition’ refers only to so-called conformity assessment 
exercises, whereby the EU recognises assessments from approved 
authorities in that third country proclaiming that the products 
being exported to the EU meet the EU’s regulatory standards 
(Institute for Government, 2017). This is a world removed from 
what the UK Prime Minister asks for in her Mansion House 
speech, which is effectively the EU recognising that whatever 
the UK adopts as regulatory standards, this will be ‘equal’ to 
EU standards.
There are some policy areas in which the EU operates a form 
of ‘recognition’ of foreign regulation; however, this comes with 
significant caveats. These kinds of ‘equivalence’ decisions, where 
the EU determines that foreign rules are ‘equal’ to EU rules, 
are unilaterally extended by the EU and revocable without 
any particular appeal rights, as they are in the area of financial 
services (European Commission, no date[b]). It is difficult to 
imagine that this type of unilateral one-way recognition of 
UK standards would be seen as stable enough to avoid having 
any infrastructure at the Northern Ireland border; after all, the 
UK’s regulations may currently guarantee compliance with EU 
rules but they could stop doing so at any point in time, if ‘the 
Parliament of the day’ decided as much. It would be impossible 
not to reintroduce border controls in those circumstances.
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There are specific problems in requesting ‘mutual recognition’ 
of agri-food standards in particular. Switzerland was not exempt 
from EU border controls until, in 2009, it signed the so-called 
Veterinary Agreement, which commits it to effectively adopting 
the entire EU acquis on agricultural health and safety, as well as 
indefinitely updating it (FSVO, 2017). This arrangement permits 
agriculture to move between Switzerland and the EU but can 
hardly be described as ‘mutual recognition’.
The UK government appears attuned to the importance of 
the free movement of agri-food on the island of Ireland as it 
specifically highlights SPS measures as needing resolution to 
prevent a hard border in Northern Ireland. However, it uses 
Switzerland as an example of the EU reaching ‘deep agreement 
with near neighbours’, only to then ask for something quite 
different than what Switzerland has: recognition of ‘regulatory 
equivalence’ (UK Government, 2017a, paras 55–7). Switzerland, 
in other words, sets a precedent for something that the UK is 
not actually willing to agree to and the EU is not offering on 
‘Swiss’ terms.
‘Mutual recognition’ of equivalent outcomes pursued in the 
UK, in short, is asking the EU to operate on a level of trust 
that only exists within the Single Market. Given its insistence 
that there be no ‘cherry-picking’ of elements of Single Market 
membership, it is unsurprising that noises coming from the EU 
on this proposal of ‘outcome alignment’ have been sceptical (EU 
Task Force, 2018b, p 15).
The Phase 1 Joint Report
The art of the deal?
The Phase 1 negotiations centred on three UK proposals, all 
flawed or at the very least underdeveloped, to avoid a border 
in Northern Ireland. The EU’s response was to set out a clear 
challenge: either the UK finds ways to make these solutions 
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actually workable, or Northern Ireland will have to, in effect, 
stay in the Customs Union and the Single Market for goods.
In the Joint Report agreed by the negotiators in December 
2017, this took the shape of three alternatives to resolving the 
Northern Ireland border for trade purposes (Joint Report, 
2017, para 49). First, ideally, the UK and the EU would like 
to conclude a future trade arrangement which would mean 
that there will be no hard border (Option A). If this cannot be 
achieved, and as we noted earlier, the current ‘trade arrangement’ 
proposals do not seem to, then the UK will propose ‘island of 
Ireland’ solutions (Option B). It is very difficult to see what 
these would look like if not ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland. 
Northern Ireland could be declared an autonomous customs 
territory able to strike a trade deal with the EU that prevents 
a hard border without the participation of the rest of the UK. 
This is workable – and there are World Trade Organization 
precedents, such as Macau – but politically unacceptable to 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as it would violate the 
UK’s third promise with regards to Northern Ireland borders by 
establishing one between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.
That brings us to Option C: if all else fails, in paragraph 49, 
the UK government agreed that the UK will maintain ‘full 
alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the 
Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North–
South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection 
of the 1998 agreement’. This seems to suggest that the UK is 
promising to effectively adopt EU legislation in all those areas 
of law that have an impact on both the all-island economy and the 
Good Friday Agreement’s (GFA’s) core content. This explicitly 
goes beyond the GFA as it specifically enumerates three bases 
for full alignment, namely: (1) North–South cooperation; (2) 
the all-island economy; and (3) the 1998 agreement. The Joint 
Report thus seems to require full regulatory alignment with 
Single Market rules on free movement of both industrial goods 
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and agricultural goods, and a customs union between the UK 
and the EU that obviates the need for border controls.
Constructive ambiguity
Since December, disputes have broken out between the UK and 
the EU on what exactly ‘full alignment’ means and what parts of 
the UK it applies to; the UK has argued that it means ‘outcome 
alignment’, whereas the EU believes that it means adopting the 
relevant EU acquis (Campbell, J. 2017; Barnier, 2018; House 
of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee, 2018a, 
paras 42–50). Furthermore, when the EU’s Brexit Task Force 
drafted its proposals for the Withdrawal Agreement, it set out 
Option C as applying specifically to Northern Ireland (EU Task 
Force, 2018a, Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Article 3). 
This seems to ignore the terms of paragraph 50, and so does not 
take account of the UK government’s unilateral guarantees to 
the DUP that no new borders arise between Northern Ireland 
and Great Britain. The UK government has since maintained, 
as its DUP backers at Westminster demand, that paragraph 49 
of the Joint Report sets out an ‘all-UK’ solution – meaning that 
whatever trade arrangement is available to Northern Ireland 
should be available to the remainder of the UK as well.
In the context of Option C, the EU regards any special 
solutions for Northern Ireland as exclusive to Northern Ireland, 
meaning they cannot set a precedent for the remaining ‘future 
partnership’ negotiations (eg Joint Report, 2017, para 46). How 
the UK avoids a border between Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland has consistently been treated as an ‘internal matter’ by 
the EU. It is in that sense perhaps obvious that its proposed 
Withdrawal Agreement text applies to Northern Ireland (as part 
of the island of Ireland) alone. This suggestion moved the UK 
government to a level of outrage proportionate to its current 
reliance upon the DUP at Westminster. Theresa May declared 
that no UK prime minister could accept what the EU had put 
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into text – suggesting that Option C will only be acceptable if 
it applies to the whole of the UK (House of Commons Exiting 
the European Union Committee, 2018a , para 43). The UK 
government has since reaffirmed its commitment to the Joint 
Report, including the backstop solution, but has yet to produce 
a detailed, alternative version of Option A, B or C that satisfies 
both its own red lines and those of the EU.
Conclusion
The UK’s negotiation positions to date remain mutually 
exclusive; it is not possible to simultaneously exit both the 
EU Customs Union and the Single Market and fully avoid a 
physical border. The desire for no special treatment for Northern 
Ireland in terms of the EU Customs Union makes this more 
complicated – the Northern Ireland land border is clearly a 
distinct issue in the negotiations. To ensure no special treatment 
for Northern Ireland, the UK as a whole will have to set up 
highly EU-compliant customs arrangements – not merely a 
customs agreement, but one that obviates the need for any 
border controls. The EU does not have such an arrangement 
with any third country, and were it to establish one with the 
UK, it would probably require the UK to sign up to the EU 
regulatory regime but without any particular input into that 
regulatory regime. This is not just a customs regulatory issue; 
other questions such as data protection to ensure access to data 
sharing/information exchange and e-customs systems will also 
come into play.
Regulatory differences create borders. Differences in 
agricultural or environmental standards will have a significant 
impact on import/export ability – not only in the sense of it 
becoming more expensive, but genuinely in the sense of ‘Is it 
still going to be possible?’, as the many mentions of ‘chlorine 
chicken’ before select committees made clear over the course 
of 2016 and 2017 (NIAC, 2018a, para 43).
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At present, the UK government promises to put in place 
appropriate regulations but this is not the same as being legally 
bound to have those regulations. The EU treaties mandate that 
those regulations apply within member states. However, given 
that the UK is aiming to have regulatory independence, another 
source of law will need to replace the EU treaties but be of an 
equally binding nature in order to guarantee to the EU that UK 
products meet the agreed-upon requirements. The future UK–
EU trade agreement will consequently require a supervisory 
authority of some kind, as well as a dispute resolution mechanism 
– and the more ‘open’ the borders between the UK and the 
EU are to be in practice, the more active and expansive those 
supervisory and dispute resolution mechanisms will need to be 
to satisfy the EU.
The UK remaining within the EU Single Market and a 
customs union equivalent to the EU Customs Union after Brexit 
would therefore be the best outcome in terms of minimising 
friction at the EU’s new external border with Northern 
Ireland. The UK government currently rejects this option but 
its proposed solutions do not take account of the EU’s need to 
protect its international obligations with regard to its trading 
borders, as well as what is technically and practically feasible in 
the short period before a post-Brexit border regime has to be 
set up in both the UK and the EU.
In the alternative, a special status for Northern Ireland 
whereby it – separately from Britain – remains within the EU 
Single Market and the EU Customs Union would resolve the 
problems that may arise at the Northern Ireland land border 
observed earlier. This, of course, would result in a ‘border’ 
existing in the Irish Sea, which would then be the point at 
which the EU’s regulatory regime would be applied. Again, 
the UK government currently rejects this option but has not 
offered an alternative that can fully avoid physical infrastructure 
at the Northern Ireland land border (whether at the border or 
near the border).
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In late May, it was reported that David Davis was due to 
pitch a ‘third’ model: staying in what The Times hilariously 
reported to be a ‘Customs and Regulatory Alignment Period’ 
(‘CRAP’) until 2023, when Max Fac or a Customs Partnership 
will be ready (according to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
[HMRC]) (Wright et al, 2018). The Times has since added an 
‘Implementation’ to the title of the pitch – but that does not 
change the extent to which the original title likely captured how 
such a proposal is liable to be received by both sceptics at home 
and in the EU. Under CRA(I)P, the UK would, in effect, be 
asking for a second transition period between 2020 and 2023 
– but only for rules affecting customs and trade.
Instead of full CRA(I)P, on 7 June 2018, the UK ended up 
pitching what was only a Customs Alignment Period to the 
EU as a partial ‘backstop’ solution for Northern Ireland: until 
alternative arrangements could be made (by the end of 2021 
the government suggested), the UK would stay aligned with the 
EU Custom Union’s rules as necessary (Cabinet Office, 2018). 
The Technical Note setting out this customs ‘backstop’ proposal 
suggests that a separate proposal on ‘regulatory standards’ – and 
how those will be managed so as to avoid a border – will follow.
Though only a partial solution, does this Customs Alignment 
Period at least resolve the customs element of the Northern 
Ireland border problem? Well, yes and no. EU responses to 
the proposal make clear that in its view, the paragraph 49 ‘full 
alignment’ setup was never intended to cover the entirety of 
the UK as this would enable ‘cherry-picking’ of bits of EU 
membership and set a precedent that the EU does not want 
(Connelly, 2018b; EU Task Force, 2018c). However, this is 
not the only problem that a ‘customs and regulatory alignment 
implementation period’ faces as a proposal: it will be staunchly 
opposed in Westminster by those wishing to make a clean break 
from the EU as soon as possible. Furthermore, to make matters 
worse, even if they are assuaged by the fact that this is only a 
temporary situation, the EU certainly will not be: the conditions 
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in the Joint Report demand a Northern Ireland solution to be 
there come what may, not come 2021 (EU Task Force, 2018c).
Something will have to give either on the UK side or the 
EU side to keep the Northern Ireland land border as it is. To 
summarise the situation at the end of June 2018, either the 
UK needs to come up with a workable ‘solution’ to the border 
situation or the EU has to accept the UK as a whole staying 
in the Single Market for goods and the EU Customs Union 
(though only temporarily, until a workable ‘solution’ can be 
found). Who is most likely to budge? Some are hopeful that 
it will be the EU: a complete version of CRA(I)P, even if 
ultimately destined to be replaced, may sound like permitting 
the kind of cherry-picking of the Single Market that the EU 
has categorically ruled out, but it does not amount to the UK 
getting to have its cake and eat it. The Protocol proposals do not 
cover trade in services, which make up the vast majority of the 
UK’s exports to the EU and economy as a whole. A temporary 
‘UK as a whole stays in’, as such, comes with a UK price to 
pay, is unlikely to be attractive to other EU Member States and 
pushes the ‘real’ negotiations on movement of people (which 
the UK is opposed to) and movement of services (which the 
EU is opposed to) into the future talks (Smith, 2018).
The EU may move on these issues, but the negotiations to 
date show more ground being ceded by the UK. The UK 
government has already abandoned its determination to be out 
of the EU Customs Union and Single Market by 2020. There 
remains an opportunity for the two negotiating positions to 
coalesce. 
The alternative to finding a solution to the land border, even 
if temporary, is dire. Even if we ignore the security implications 
of reintroducing border controls, from a purely economic 
perspective a failure to reach an agreement would not simply 
mark a return to the pre-1973 border in trade terms; ‘red tape’, 
delays and costs will all be more extensive. These burdens 
will fall on businesses that have, in many cases for decades, 
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been seamlessly building up supply chains between the UK 
and Ireland. Worse, uncertainty over the shape of any deal 
undermines forward planning by such businesses.5 Reaching 
agreement on the trade aspects of the Northern Ireland land 
border is therefore essential to a workable Brexit. A trade 
agreement is not, however, sufficient to achieve this outcome. 
The focus upon trade to-date has distracted from the citizenship 
and rights implications of Brexit, despite the significance of these 
issues for Northern Ireland.
5 For many stories covering a wide variety of agri-food and industrial goods 
producers who are extremely worried about this prospect, see Tony Connelly’s 
(2018) Brexit and Ireland: The Dangers, the Opportunities, and the Inside 
Story of the Irish Response.
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FOUR
Citizenship
I’m not lost for I know where I am. But, however, where 
I am may be lost. (A.A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh, 1926)
Introduction
For some people, citizenship is little more than a logo on the 
front of a passport or a dropdown box on a form. It is possible 
to go through the whole of life without really thinking about 
what it means to be ‘British’ or ‘Irish’, let alone what it is to 
be a European Union (EU) citizen. Indeed, about 19% of 
Northern Ireland’s population have no passport (The Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2012, p 16). However, 
even within that group, many continue to attach symbolical 
importance to their national identity. For others, whose 
livelihood and residency depend on their status, rules around 
citizenship assume pressing practical significance.
Since the Brexit referendum, however, questions of citizenship 
have become more pressing for more people within Northern 
Ireland; there has been a growing realisation that different 
passports carry with them distinct benefits. When speaking 
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about EU citizenship, derived from being a national of one of 
the EU’s Member States, the most prominent of these advantages 
is the freedom to move and work across the EU. Post-Brexit, 
Irish citizenship will continue to confer EU citizenship rights, 
but UK citizenship will not. Calculations about the value of 
EU citizenship have moved many in Northern Ireland to apply 
for Irish citizenship, even when they would not previously 
have considered doing so. For some Unionists, such steps can 
be difficult to reconcile with personal identity; Ian Paisley Jr 
famously, and not entirely convincingly, sought to explain away 
an Irish passport as merely ‘a European document with an Irish 
harp stuck on the front posing as a passport’ (Rogers, 2016).
From flags to anthems and rituals to patron saints, national 
symbols are a pervasive feature of life in Northern Ireland, 
and Brexit increasingly intertwines aspects of citizenship and 
personal identity. The revival of the blue-covered UK passport 
is as much about nostalgia as it is an expression of separation 
from the EU. National identity – a nation’s understanding of 
itself – underpins such changes. Think, for example, of the 
French national identity, developed around the revolutionary 
motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, or the devotion to the ‘American 
dream’ within the US. A sense of a distinctive national identity 
can provide a premise for independence movements (currently 
exemplified by Catalonia and Scotland). This is not a force to 
be trifled with; for all the talk of an increasingly interconnected 
world, the last century has been blighted by multiple bouts of 
destructive nationalism, not least the clashing national visions 
of Unionism and Nationalism in Northern Ireland (see Chapter 
Two).
The significance of citizenship in Northern Ireland
A core feature of the Northern Ireland peace process was a 
drive towards parity of esteem for personal identity choices, 
exemplified by the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) principle 
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that it is the ‘birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland 
to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or 
both’ (GFA, 1998, section 2, para 1(vi)). It was not a new 
feature of the GFA that people born in Northern Ireland could 
choose to take a UK or Irish passport (or both); Ireland had 
explicitly extended its provision of its passports to Northern 
Ireland since the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956. 
However, in this provision, the Unionist parties that signed up 
to the GFA accepted that Ireland’s passport law is not a threat 
to the integrity of the UK (Ryan, 2004, p 177). It affirms that 
individuals must have their choices of symbolism and identity 
respected, and secures equal practical rights for UK and Irish 
citizens (see Chapter Five).
This equality has been essential to the peace process. However, 
the GFA’s approach to protecting the ‘two communities’ (the 
Nationalist and the Unionist) has neglected other groups living 
in Northern Ireland. The needs of those holding neither a 
UK nor an Irish passport have frequently been subordinated 
to the interests of balancing Unionist and Nationalist concerns 
(Crangle, 2018, p 36). The Roma and Traveller communities 
have, in particular, fallen between the cracks in a system of legal 
protections fixated upon citizenship (Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission, 2018). Brexit risks reinforcing this process.
Multiplying the categories of rights holder
In pre-Brexit Northern Ireland, EU passport holders have often 
been the objects of neglect, xenophobia and even violence: 
recorded racist crimes against EU nationals in Northern Ireland 
rose by 48% between 2012 and 2017 (PSNI, 2018, Table 2.6). 
Nonetheless, their legal rights have been guaranteed by shared 
EU rules. Non-EU nationals, on the other hand, are subject to 
a greatly different set of rules and rights. This means that there 
have been two main categories of rights holders before Brexit:
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1. UK/Irish/EU citizens.
2. Non-EU citizens.
As a consequence of Brexit, these two categories will multiply. 
Not only will non-EU nationals receive different treatment in 
Northern Ireland, but there could be important distinctions 
between many more kinds of citizens. There will be additional 
complexities because of individuals’ date of birth, residency and 
family relationships. If the terms of the December 2017 Joint 
Report are to be given legal form, two broad classes of rights 
holder within Northern Ireland could multiply into as many 
nine different categories:
1. Irish citizen.
2. UK citizen.
3. Dual Irish–UK citizen (who has no Northern Ireland connection).
4. Dual Irish–UK citizen (who is part of the ‘people of Northern 
Ireland’).
5. Non-UK citizen who is entitled to Irish citizenship (eg a Canadian 
citizen).
6. Non-Irish EU national (eg a Polish citizen).
7. Non-EU, non-UK national (eg a Jamaican citizen).
8. ‘Worker’ in Ireland with EU/UK citizenship (eg who works in 
Dublin and lives in Belfast).
9. ‘Worker’ in the UK with EU/UK citizenship (eg who works 
in Armagh and lives in Dundalk).
The all-important symbolism and practical consequences of 
citizenship are thrown into disarray by the creation of so many 
technical categories. The potential for administrative confusion is 
obvious, especially when people living side-by-side in Northern 
Ireland will have very different rights based on sometimes 
subtle differences that place them in one category or another. 
Residency, for example, is a significant complicating factor over 
and above the basic categories; the category of rights holder that 
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applies to individuals will sometimes depend on where they are 
resident at the end of the Brexit transition period (currently the 
end of 2020, but with an extension on the cards). This is more 
complex than where one happens to be on a certain date; if an 
individual is usually resident in the UK but is abroad for work 
or a holiday on the day the transition ends, that would not affect 
their status. However, if an EU citizen takes up residence in the 
UK after Brexit, then their rights will likely be different from 
those of EU citizens resident before Brexit.
Everyday citizenship
For those who have the ‘right’ citizenship status, belonging to 
the group of rights holders who enjoy the broadest range of legal 
protections available in a country, the significance of citizenship 
can be frequently overlooked. One impact of EU citizenship has 
been to extend the number of people for whom these issues are 
not a pressing concern by reducing everyday differences between 
‘home’ citizens and those able to say ‘civus europeus sum’ (‘I am 
an EU citizen’).1 The same benefits, however, do not extend 
to Syrian refugees reaching the borders of EU Member States. 
Citizenship acts as a club, where the members get benefits and 
outsiders must pay a higher price for the same benefits or are 
entirely excluded. As outsiders to the EU club, Syrians have 
been subject to a morass of legal rules applicable to refugees, 
notwithstanding the conflict that they are fleeing (Trauner, 
2016, pp 313–14). This same pattern occurs every day across 
the EU in less extreme situations. Non-EU and non-European 
Economic Area (EEA) citizens, be they from the Philippines, 
Egypt or Peru, enjoy fewer legal protections than EU citizens 
as a consequence of their status (Halleskov, 2005, p 181). UK 
citizens will soon find themselves outside the club.
1 C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt [1993] ECR 
1-1198, 1212 (AG Jacobs).
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In the UK, non-EU migrants have long been subject to a 
particularly stringent immigration regime. A UK Home Office 
policy to establish a ‘hostile environment’ makes life difficult for 
migrants awaiting official decisions on their status, who lack the 
correct paperwork or who do not have a right to be in the UK 
to carry out everyday administrative tasks. The potential for 
this policy to go wrong was recently highlighted by the poor 
treatment of the Windrush Generation of Commonwealth 
Caribbean migrants to the UK. These individuals had a historic 
entitlement to live in the UK (some of them as UK citizens and 
some as Commonwealth citizens under the British Nationality 
Act 1948 reforms); however, few could show paper evidence of 
that entitlement many decades later. The hostile environment 
policy means that such individuals face regular checks at banks 
(Home Office, 2017a) and in tenancy applications (Bate and 
Bellis, 2017), can have their details passed to immigration 
enforcement if they witness a crime (Bloomer and Jeraj, 2017), 
incur high official fees (Home Office, 2017b),2 attract an 
‘immigration health surcharge’ (UK Government, no date),3 and 
face the prospect of indefinite detention pending deportation if 
found – sometimes incorrectly – to be living in the UK illegally 
(Amnesty International, 2017).
These checks, often delegated to private and unqualified 
citizens such as landlords, impose considerable strain on all 
migrants, as well as people who appear to be migrants, and can 
hound people legitimately in the UK out of the country. The 
hostile environment can cause such anxiety that even those 
legally entitled to live in the UK avoid official channels for fear 
of deportation, detention or fees they cannot afford. Migrants are 
2 For example, in 2018, an application for Indefinite Leave to Remain costs 
£2,297 (per person), and an application for a two-year visa can cost £337 
(per person).
3 This surcharge amounts to £200 per year, per person (the charge is not 
applicable to those applying for Indefinite Leave to Remain).
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thus often informally employed, rent homes on the black market 
and can avoid seeking health care or reporting crimes. This 
puts them at risk of abuse in employment (without protections 
like the minimum wage or workplace pension), trafficking and 
dangerous housing. It also produces wider societal impacts. 
Tackling crime becomes more difficult, rogue employers get 
away with undercutting the labour costs of legitimate businesses 
and public health issues can result from sizeable groups avoiding 
the health service.
The use of such administrative processes could extend to EU 
citizens following Brexit. The range of checks currently being 
discussed would amount to the hostile environment policy on 
steroids. Bodies such as schools, hospitals, employers, banks and 
landlords look set to be required to apply these checks across 
multiple categories of rights holder. There is significant potential 
for ordinary citizens obliged to conduct these highly bureaucratic 
immigration checks to get them wrong, to rely on their own 
prejudices or, indeed, to face punishment for not enforcing the 
rules stringently enough.
The likelihood of increased administrative checks stems from 
two UK government priorities. The first is the need to avoid 
a border between the UK and Ireland. Without checking who 
is crossing the border from Ireland, the UK cannot be sure 
who has entered the country by this route. Checks on people 
entering Ireland were discussed, but the idea was rejected 
because such checks would be patchy, would call for very high 
levels of cooperation from the Irish authorities and would need a 
greater harmonisation of Irish and UK immigration policy (UK 
Government, 2017a, paras 32–3). The second factor that shapes 
the push for further administrative checks is the desire to reduce 
immigration to the UK. There is no inherent need to monitor 
who is in the UK in such comprehensive and intrusive ways, 
and a different approach to immigration rules could monitor 
elements (eg employment) without checking so many aspects 
of an individual’s life.
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There will therefore be significant practical benefits for those 
who can circumvent the need for these checks. These include 
EU citizens resident in the UK before the end of the Brexit 
transition/implementation period (currently envisaged as 
December 2020), and Irish citizens in the UK (even if they take 
up residence or citizenship after Brexit). Such individuals will 
continue to hold their current social security rights, either under 
the plethora of UK laws that are part of the Common Travel 
Area or through the citizens’ rights chapter of the negotiated 
Withdrawal Agreement. They will also have education rights, 
tax advantages, employment rights (Joint Report, 2017, para 31; 
UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 2017, row 19) and health-care 
rights (Joint Report, 2017, para 29; UK–EU Joint Technical 
Note, 2017, row 47). The right to equal treatment remains 
enforceable by such individuals in the UK courts after Brexit, 
prohibiting discrimination between UK and these EU citizens 
based on nationality (Joint Report, 2017, para 11).
The rights of those non-Irish EU citizens who become 
resident in the UK after the Brexit implementation period will, 
however, be as susceptible to restrictive immigration policies 
as non-EU citizens are today. Rather than being based in the 
Withdrawal Agreement, and therefore backed by the EU, their 
rights will depend on UK government policy. Ministers, in 
relation to the forthcoming Immigration Bill, have ruled out a 
points-based immigration system for EU nationals (BBC, 2016) 
and the UK and EU have stated that the movement of people is 
a shared aim for their post-Brexit relationship. These aspirations, 
however, guarantee little and there is nothing currently agreed 
that would prevent the UK government from applying its 
panoply of hostile environment measures to new EU migrants 
after the transition period.
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Keeping the peace
Brexit’s reshuffling of citizenship entitlements and rights could 
reshape community identities in Northern Ireland. The GFA 
describes Northern Ireland citizens’ right to choose a UK 
or Irish citizenship as a ‘birthright’ (GFA, 1998, section 2, 
para 1(vi)). Although such identity choices have long been 
important to many individuals, there have been few practical 
implications of one’s choice of citizenship. This is not to say that 
everything has been rosy for all since the GFA; complete parity 
of treatment has not been achieved. Among numerous (and 
often contentious) examples, shortcomings in social housing in 
North Belfast, recognised by United Nations experts, continue 
to disproportionately affect Catholic communities (Human 
Rights Council, 2014, para 73). However, these problems do 
not stem directly from the legal architecture around citizenship. 
The GFA’s major organising principle, that British or Irish 
identity should not affect a person’s opportunities, has held. 
Brexit threatens this position.
Post-Brexit, an individual’s choice between the citizenships 
available to them will have practical consequences: Irish 
citizenship will also bring with it some of the benefits of EU 
citizenship. These choices will therefore not be primarily 
exercises in self-understanding. At best, the functional 
implications of citizenship choices will create split identities, 
in which individuals feel obliged to claim Irish citizenship for 
practical and administrative reasons, even if they self-identify 
as British. At worst, this change will see UK and Irish citizens 
living side-by-side with very different rights; a certain way to 
erode the consensus built around ‘parity of esteem’. All of these 
post-Brexit effects are also landing in a Northern Ireland that 
has already been affected by Brexit campaigning itself, ‘built on 
a narrative of Britishness’ (Human Rights Consortium, 2018, 
p 10).
65
CITIZENSHIP
All sides in the negotiations have been clear that Irish citizens 
should not have their rights as EU citizens affected by the Brexit 
process. For those Irish citizens living in the Republic of Ireland, 
this is straightforward. However, Irish citizens in Northern 
Ireland will almost certainly enjoy particular protections in the 
final agreement between the UK and the EU. The EU Task 
Force’s draft Withdrawal Agreement provides special recognition 
of the rights of Irish citizens who are part of the people of 
Northern Ireland (EU Task Force, 2018a, preamble). Protecting 
the rights of Irish/EU citizens in Northern Ireland, which will 
be territory outside of the EU following Brexit, will nonetheless 
be a particularly difficult task.
Many EU rights are only operational when inside of EU 
territory. Consider, for example, the position of Spanish citizens 
in Canada. They cannot use their rights as EU citizens to 
establish businesses in Canada with automatic access rights to 
the EU Single Market, as they could if they were based in an 
EU Member State. It is not clear what will happen with regard 
to businesses set up by Irish citizens in Northern Ireland after 
Brexit – the integrity of the Single Market implies that these 
rights could be lost. Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter Three, 
the EU is pushing a solution in its draft Agreement that would 
see Northern Ireland treated as a separate regulatory area with 
special status, so it is conceivable that Irish citizens’ establishment 
rights in Northern Ireland would be protected under such an 
arrangement. Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney 
has termed this the ‘Hong Kong’ solution (Boffey, 2017).
Moreover, there are a range of personal rights that can and will 
apply to Irish citizens in Northern Ireland even when it becomes 
a non-EU territory. These include protections under the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), the principle of non-
discrimination between EU nationals and UK nationals, and 
the ability to seamlessly travel throughout the EU and provide 
services in the other Member States. Such rights will not be 
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held by everyone in Northern Ireland; they are EU citizenship 
rights, and thus conditional on Irish rather than UK citizenship.
Brexit therefore creates significant incentives for people to 
take Irish citizenship. As a result, some people will take Irish 
citizenship to access EU rights, even if doing so is at variance 
with their core identity. Indeed, the strain on the Irish passport 
service after the Brexit vote indicates that many in Northern 
Ireland and beyond are already taking this option (Peyton, 2016). 
This is a significant change in the Northern Ireland context. 
In the last census, only 1.7% of individuals responded that they 
had both a UK and an Irish passport (The Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency, 2012, p 16).
Those who do not take Irish citizenship, because they are 
unaware of its benefits or their eligibility to do so, or because of 
how they conceive of their own British identity, will enjoy fewer 
rights in post-Brexit Northern Ireland. These rights can manifest 
in quite concrete and material ways. EU law offers enhanced 
employment rights, for example, having driven forward equality 
and maternity rights (TUC, 2016). Such protections could, by 
contrast, be eroded in the UK post-Brexit (see Chapter Five). 
The ultimate Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the 
EU will establish mechanisms to monitor and protect such rights 
for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland. These arrangements could 
leave two workers at the same Ballymena office with starkly 
different protections depending on their UK or Irish citizenship, 
threatening the idea of parity of esteem. After Brexit, the two 
communities will not be equally protected by law and only Irish 
citizenship will grant access to certain rights. This creates the 
potential for identity to once again become a highly divisive 
issue in Northern Ireland.
There are three possible responses to these disparities. The 
first is to try to ignore them and risk the build-up of resentment 
and the undermining of the current consensus. The second is 
to attempt to tackle them through ad hoc domestic laws, so 
that each time it becomes apparent that the non-Irish citizens 
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of Northern Ireland are losing out, an amendment could be 
made in domestic law to equalise their rights. In this regard, 
embedding the EU’s CFR in Northern Ireland’s law is of 
particular importance. Although the CFR would be insufficient 
on its own (eg it would not allow non-Irish citizens of Northern 
Ireland to move freely across the EU), it would guarantee some 
of the most important rights to all (see Chapter Five). The third 
approach is a more formal, and much more satisfactory, route: 
the UK and EU could formally guarantee full EU citizenship 
rights to all of those born in Northern Ireland, whether they 
hold Irish citizenship or not. Only this approach fully addresses 
the problem of disparities in rights undermining the GFA’s 
choice-of-citizenship provisions.
Beyond British/Irish
Northern Ireland is home to relatively few people who are 
not UK or Irish citizens. At the 2011 census only 3.37% of 
people reported having neither a UK nor an Irish passport 
(The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2012, 
p 16). Despite the small percentage, this amounts to over 60,000 
individuals. Finding a place for these citizenships in post-Brexit 
Northern Ireland will be a challenge. As already outlined, such 
individuals will be at an increased risk of getting caught up in 
administrative checks of citizenship and entitlements. There will 
also be difficulties in agreeing the rights of non-British, non-
Irish citizens relative to the ‘two communities’. With the focus 
on developing equivalence between UK and Irish citizens, there 
is a risk that non-British, non-Irish citizens are disregarded or 
afforded only minimal protections.
This becomes all the more concerning when the details 
emerge. Under the proposed Withdrawal Agreement, for those 
EU citizens resident in the UK at the end of the transition 
period, their current rights will be maintained. This further 
isolates those individuals who either do not have EU citizenship 
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or who become resident in the UK after the Brexit transition. 
There has been little attention to whether, 10, 20 or 30 years 
down the line, the UK authorities really want the task of 
distinguishing between the Irish people of Northern Ireland, 
‘other’ Irish people resident in Northern Ireland, UK citizens, 
EU citizens who were in Northern Ireland before Brexit, EU 
citizens who arrived later, non-EU citizens and so forth.
Modes of citizenship protection
Brexit’s likely creation of multiple different categories of 
rights holder in Northern Ireland therefore poses considerable 
challenges. Much of this complexity derives from how the 
outline Agreement between the UK and the EU seeks to protect 
different interest groups alongside legacy categories of rights 
holder. The Common Travel Area will continue, permitting UK 
and Irish citizens to move between the two countries and claim 
most social security benefits. Some EU citizens in Northern 
Ireland will continue to be afforded residual EU citizens’ rights. 
These are rights that derive from EU citizenship, and that will be 
maintained for those EU citizens resident in the UK before the 
end of the transition phase. Another group known as ‘frontier 
workers’ – individuals who live on one side of a border and 
work on the other – are given special protections (especially tax 
simplifications). Anyone not protected by one of these specific 
arrangements, however, will have to rely on UK domestic law 
for their protections. These rights will be in the control of the 
UK government and Parliament, leaving such individuals in a 
more uncertain position.
Common Travel Area
The Common Travel Area across Ireland and the UK will 
continue to facilitate movement by Irish and UK citizens across 
these islands after Brexit (Joint Report, 2017, para 54). The 
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outline Agreement between the UK and the EU allows for 
the continued operation of the Common Travel Area (Joint 
Report, 2017, para 47). The UK has noted that its Ireland 
Act 1949 will continue to apply to the interpretation of Irish 
citizens’ rights after Brexit and that the Irish will not be subject 
to UK immigration law, though this could be subject to policy 
changes (UK Government, 2017a, para 22). The Act provides 
that Ireland is ‘not a foreign country’ and Irish citizens are not 
included as ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’ (Ireland Act 1949, section 2). In 
particular, the UK government has indicated that the Common 
Travel Area’s arrangements will exempt Irish citizens from having 
to apply for settled status or a temporary residence permit in 
the UK (DExEU, 2018, para 6).
The Common Travel Area gives Irish citizens in England, 
Scotland and Wales an enhanced bundle of rights not available to 
other non-UK citizens. The rights provided under the Common 
Travel Area for Irish citizens in the UK (and vice versa) are not 
identical to EU rights, but substantial overlaps do exist, and the 
Common Travel Area is often more generous. For instance, the 
right to work without obtaining permission, to education, to 
health care and to social security are all covered by the Common 
Travel Area (UK Government, 2017b). The EU and UK have 
promised to continue to coordinate social security to ensure that 
these rights are obtainable (Joint Report, 2017, paras 28, 30). 
This is of particular relevance for Ireland, which must continue 
to grant any EU citizens living in the UK and then moving to 
Ireland the same social security coverage that a UK citizen in 
a comparable position would enjoy. In other words, EU rules 
prevent Ireland relying on the Common Travel Area to give UK 
citizens a better deal than EU citizens. The picture that emerges 
from the Common Travel Area is a positive one for Northern 
Ireland residents with Irish or UK citizenship.
For other EU citizens, possession of temporary residency 
will allow for the full suite of EU citizens’ rights until that 
temporary residency is lost, for example, by losing one’s status 
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as a ‘worker’ (Council Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7(3)). 
For most, this would lead to the individual being subject to 
the standard UK legislation on temporary residence permits 
or having their rights determined under the new category 
of settled status. Irish citizens are theoretically also subject to 
these rules, but they will possess the additional protections of 
the Common Travel Area even if UK immigration policy on 
temporary residency were to be tightened after Brexit. A note 
of caution is, however, necessary. The Common Travel Area 
is scattered across many domestic laws, treaties and informal 
understandings (see Chapter Two), and its provisions have 
become closely intertwined with EU law. It is therefore an 
uncertain and vulnerable framework on which to rely in its 
current state and desperately needs consolidation and to be 
placed on a solid international law footing (NIAC, 2018a, para 
36). The Ireland Act could, moreover, be subject to change by 
the UK Parliament, for example, to require the registration of 
Irish citizens in the UK, without breaching the Withdrawal 
Agreement (Joint Report, 2017, paras 16–17).
EU rights
The citizens’ rights agreement outlined between the EU and 
the UK is a significant milestone, setting out who will be able 
to have continued access to EU citizens’ rights after Brexit and 
what those rights will be. The protections provided to those 
with ‘citizens’ rights’ are wide-reaching. Eligible individuals will 
keep nearly all of their current EU citizens’ rights as they are at 
the end of the transition period. This includes the right of EU 
citizens to be treated equally, regardless of their ‘home’ member 
state (Joint Report, 2017, para 11). Importantly, however, their 
rights will not evolve with new EU protections that emerge after 
Brexit, nor can these rights necessarily be transferred to another 
EU country (eg under current proposals, UK pensioners in Spain 
will retain their rights in Spain post-Brexit, but they would be 
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extinguished if they subsequently move to France). Nonetheless, 
citizens’ rights explicitly include the right to social security for 
workers, students, the self-employed and economically inactive 
citizens. Education rights, tax advantages, employment rights 
(Joint Report, 2017, para 31; UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 
2017, row 19) and health-care rights (Joint Report, 2017, para 
29; UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 2017, row 47) are maintained. 
The right to equal treatment set out in EU law is maintained 
(Joint Report, 2017, para 31; UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 
2017, row 47) and discrimination in respect of UK and EU 
citizens based on nationality is explicitly prohibited (Joint 
Report, 2017, para 11).
EU citizens resident in the UK on Brexit day, and UK citizens 
resident in the EU on Brexit day, will be entitled to continuing 
citizens’ rights. This residency requirement is critical. These 
rights will only be available for those resident on Brexit day. 
People seeking to relocate for the first time or return after 
their residency permissions have expired will not be entitled 
to residual EU citizens’ rights. These rights are not afforded to 
all on an unlimited basis, but only for as long as an individual’s 
residency continues to be valid. Valid residency for the purposes 
of the Joint Report and EU law can be either permanent or 
temporary. Those who already have permanent residency are 
entitled to have it converted free of charge to a document 
conferring citizens’ rights (Joint Report, 2017, para 21). There 
is even an app to assist with the process (Colson, 2018). Those 
who do not already have recognised permanent residency are 
entitled to claim recognition on the basis of the Withdrawal 
Agreement if they have had five years of continuous residence 
as a worker, student or self-sufficient person (Joint Report, 
2017, para 12; Council Directive 2004/38/EC, Articles 7, 16).
The continuity of this residence is not broken by absences of 
six months a year, or a single 12-month break for an important 
reason such as illness or pregnancy (Joint Report, 2017, para 
25; Council Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 16(3)). In addition, 
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a worker who reaches the state age of retirement as a resident 
is entitled to reside without having been resident for five years 
(Joint Report, 2017, para 21; Council Directive 2004/38/
EC, Article 17(1)a). So, too, is a worker who has two years’ 
residency who stops work due to permanent incapacity (Joint 
Report, 2017, para 21; Council Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 
17(1)b). The UK is calling these permanent residencies ‘settled 
status’. Once acquired, this permanent residence is lost due to 
an absence of at least five years, otherwise permanent residents 
under the Withdrawal Agreement terms are entitled to citizens’ 
rights for life.
Those EU or UK citizens resident for less than five years on 
Brexit day, and who are not otherwise entitled to permanent 
residency, will be granted temporary residence. As a mirror of the 
current EU citizenship rights, to stay longer than three months, 
residents will need to have worker status, be self-employed, be 
self-sufficient or be in education (Council Directive 2004/38/
EC, Article 7). If one of these statuses is maintained (and changes 
in status are permitted (Joint Report, 2017, para 20), then, it 
appears, temporary residency with citizens’ rights can continue 
for up to five years before permanent residency is acquired 
(UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 2017, row 20).
For those resident prior to Brexit, the Joint Report also 
provides for temporary residence of up to three months with 
no work or self-sufficiency requirements placed upon them. 
However, in light of the two-year application window following 
Brexit day (plus the six-month grace period after that), this 
category is likely to be of limited relevance. Citizens’ rights 
cease to apply for temporary residents when their residency 
ends, though there may be other rights afforded by national law. 
EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU on Brexit 
day without a legal right to be there will have no residual EU 
citizens’ rights. National laws will take centre stage. The UK has 
not ruled out rejecting applications from those EU citizens in 
the UK (including Northern Ireland) prior to Brexit day who 
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do not meet the requirements of even temporary residency (eg 
someone who has been unsuccessfully seeking work for some 
period of time and who has no means of supporting themselves). 
Those whose application is rejected will have until the end of the 
administrative/application period specified by the UK (at least 
two years) (Joint Report, 2017, para 17e) to secure residency 
status through another route or lose their rights to work and 
to access services.
EU law has allowed, and the Withdrawal Agreement will 
continue to allow, the UK to require EU residents who are not 
economically active or studying to hold comprehensive sickness 
insurance, and also allows them to apply ‘a genuine and effective 
work test’ to some (O’Brien et al, 2016, pp 15–18). The UK has 
claimed that it will do neither of those things in assessing settled 
status applications (UK Government, 2017c, para 11), but it has 
a track record of applying a version of this ‘genuine and effective 
work’ test to low-income EU citizens seeking to claim social 
security benefits (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014).
Citizens’ rights will be equivalent to full EU citizenship rights 
when the UK departs from the EU but they will not evolve 
with any new EU law. This will create a disparity between 
two types of EU law: the rights frozen in time on exit day, 
and those that will evolve and are exercised across the EU. For 
those relying on the citizens’ rights provisions that are available 
to EU citizens, these are locked down in several places. First, 
the whole agreement is framed by the provision that ‘EU law 
concepts used in Withdrawal Agreement [will be] interpreted 
in line with case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) by the specified date’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 
9; see also UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 2017, row 1). An 
additional provision requires UK courts to pay due regard to 
‘relevant’ decisions of the CJEU made after withdrawal (Joint 
Report, 2017, para 38). Relevant decisions are those providing 
clarification of pre-Brexit EU citizens’ rights. Second, the 
Agreement notes that the rights that eligible citizens are entitled 
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to are those contained in ‘Articles 18, 21, 45 and 49 TFEU, 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation (EU) No 
492/2011’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 31), but it does not make 
provision for similar directives or regulations passed in the 
future. Third, the draft agreement notes that citizens’ provisions 
establish ‘rights for citizens following on from those established 
in Union law during the UK’s membership of the European 
Union’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 38). This can be contrasted 
with the position taken in relation to future social security 
arrangements, on which the EU and UK will ‘decide jointly 
on the incorporation of future amendments to those regulations 
in the Withdrawal Agreement’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 30).
Within the UK, both of these legal positions will operate 
at the same time. EU citizens in the UK on Brexit day will 
enjoy the frozen benefits of their EU citizenship through the 
citizens’ rights provisions (and will retain their full evolved 
EU citizenship for use when in the EU area). However, the 
provisions regarding Ireland and Northern Ireland (which are not 
otherwise contained within the citizens’ rights section) guarantee 
that the people of Northern Ireland with Irish citizenship ‘will 
continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they 
reside in Northern Ireland’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 52). It 
continues that the Agreement is ‘without prejudice to the rights, 
opportunities and identity that come with European Union 
citizenship’ (Joint Report, 2017, para 52).
This provision is intended to ensure that Irish citizens in 
Northern Ireland will be entitled to the full range of evolving 
EU citizenship rights, and not have them frozen in time as a 
result of Brexit (see Chapter Five). This will, however, require 
that mechanisms be developed to ensure that the law in force 
in Northern Ireland, at least as far as the people of Northern 
Ireland with Irish citizenship are concerned, keeps pace – in 
perpetuity – with EU citizenship provisions. So far, little has 
been published on the nature of such post-Brexit arrangements. 
The terms agreed to date with regard to protections for EU 
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citizens’ rights post-Brexit are, however, restricted in nature 
and time-limited. For instance, under Article 151 of the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement, there looks set to be an eight-year 
deadline for CJEU oversight of citizens’ rights, and other 
oversight mechanisms might also conclude at that point. There 
are not, at present, separate special arrangements to cover 
Northern Ireland’s permanent population of EU citizens.
The final frontier (workers)
The rights of frontier workers are given special mention in the 
Phase 1 Report. Frontier workers live on one side of a border 
and work on another. They are defined within EU law as ‘any 
person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed 
person in a Member State and who resides in another Member 
State to which he returns as a rule daily or at least once a week’ 
(Council Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 1(f)). In 2001, estimates 
suggested that around 9,000 Northern Ireland residents were 
working in Ireland and 9,000 Irish residents were working in 
Northern Ireland (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). As business 
has become increasingly integrated across the Irish border, these 
numbers have expanded to around 30,000 frontier workers 
crossing the Irish border daily (NIAC, 2018a, paras 5–7). On 
top of these figures, there are further Great Britain residents 
travelling to Ireland for work and vice versa.
This status will more generally apply to an individual living 
in the UK who is a ‘worker’ within another EU Member State 
and EU citizens living in a remaining EU Member State and 
working in the UK at the date of withdrawal. Frontier workers 
are defined under EU law and a Joint Technical Note as ‘a UK 
national or an EU citizen pursuing genuine and effective work 
as an employed or self-employed person in one or more States 
and who resides in another State’ (UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 
2017, row 4a). Such people have their current rights to work and 
residence protected (UK–EU Joint Technical Note, 2017, rows 
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4, 4a). In the Irish context, this will require the UK to uphold 
the existing rights of EU citizen workers resident in the UK who 
work in Ireland, and the existing rights of EU citizen workers 
resident in Ireland who work in the UK. For example, someone 
who is a ‘worker’ in Cork at the date of Brexit and who lives in 
Belfast is protected (providing they have UK or EU citizenship). 
Ireland will have to protect their existing rights as a worker and 
the UK must protect their existing rights as a resident.
These requirements go beyond the ‘Ireland and Northern 
Ireland’ and the Common Travel Area commitments as they 
extend working rights to a wider number of individuals. 
Most Northern Ireland residents are entitled to dual UK–Irish 
citizenship and can maintain these rights through that route. Irish 
citizens are also entitled to ‘ongoing’ EU rights within Northern 
Ireland. However, there are certain categories of individual for 
whom the frontier worker classification is especially important, 
including those living and working in border communities 
without an Irish (or EU) citizenship entitlement. For example, 
as a result of the frontier workers provision, a UK citizen with 
no entitlement to EU citizenship will be able to continue living 
in Strabane in Northern Ireland and working across the border 
in Lifford with the same rights. These rights only remain for 
as long as the individual’s frontier worker status is maintained. 
Therefore, any gaps in cross-border employment could cause 
some individuals to lose their right to work under EU terms 
except in some limited circumstances (UK–EU Joint Technical 
Note, 2017, row 4a). These include for reasons of illness, 
involuntary unemployment after a year or more employment, 
or the undertaking of vocational training (Council Directive 
2004/38/EC, Articles 7(3)a, b, d).
Frontier workers, however, will only be entitled to a six-
month cross-border employment gap where they are on a fixed-
term contract of less than one year long or are involuntarily 
unemployed after less than a year of employment (Council 
Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7(3)c). This potential for the 
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loss of ‘worker’ status, and, with it, the ability to work on the 
other side of the border as a consequence of unemployment, will 
lead to increased precarity and fewer employment options for 
those living near the border. The point at which individuals are 
determined to be frontier workers is at the end of the transition 
period; those whose short-term contract ends or who are made 
involuntarily unemployed from short-term employment, at 
any point until six months before the end of the transition, are 
currently at risk of losing the right to work under EU terms.
This leaves a number of cross-border industries vulnerable. 
For businesses that rely on a turnover of EU workers, the impact 
will be especially acute. For those frontier workers who are in 
a settled pattern of cross-border working, rights will continue, 
and this will be critical for the small number of businesses who 
actually straddle the border. However, after the transition cut-
off point, it will be much more difficult for businesses to attract 
new cross-border labour as individuals will be subject to many 
more personal checks, and increased barriers to living in two 
countries. This will have a disproportionate impact on border 
communities, which are likely to effectively lose access to a 
flexible EU workforce (Connelly, 2018a, p 44). It is possible that 
a bifurcation of the labour market on either side of the border 
will occur. Those with Irish citizenship will have an ongoing 
entitlement to employment rights on either side of the border 
(Joint Report, 2017, para 52), while UK citizens’ access to 
employment on the Irish side of the border will be subject to 
the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and the continuation 
of Common Travel Area terms.
Post-Brexit manoeuvring
EU citizens who arrive in the UK after Brexit day will be 
reliant upon the UK’s domestic law. This is an unpredictable 
situation to be in. The UK can unilaterally and without much 
notice change policy. In the current anti-immigration climate, 
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xenophobic clamouring can quickly seep into national law (as 
has occurred with the Windrush Generation).
The UK has yet to set specific conditions, but it has sought to 
reassure EU citizens in the UK that they are ‘valued’ and that the 
UK is one of the ‘most tolerant … places in the world’ (Home 
Secretary, 2017, p 3). However, the UK government’s June 2017 
Policy Paper also noted that those EU citizens who arrive in 
the UK after Brexit ‘should have no expectation of guaranteed 
settled status’ (Rudd, 2017, p 4). Some anti-immigration 
rhetoric of the Brexit referendum and the emphasis on border 
control would suggest harsher conditions for EU citizens 
arriving in the UK after Brexit. The UK may impose different 
immigration terms upon different EU nationalities arriving. This 
might involve, for example, minimal immigration processes for 
Spanish citizens but much stricter processes for Polish citizens. 
There are dangers for Northern Ireland in general, and border 
communities in particular, that they will get caught up in a 
national immigration debate that ignores the impact of having 
a policy that only allows a majority of EU workers to go as far 
north as the Irish border.
The Withdrawal Agreement might yet establish a relationship 
between the UK and EU that restrains the UK from acting 
entirely on the basis of its domestic law, and that prevents it 
from differentiating between EU nationals. In any case, UK 
government action in this respect would be restrained by the 
need to maintain good relationships with other countries that 
UK nationals prize access to (eg imposing harsh immigration 
terms on Dutch citizens might be reciprocated by the 
Netherlands imposing harsh terms on UK citizens). It is also 
possible that UK policymakers could eventually be forced to 
recognise the economic and social necessity of inward EU 
migration and develop a more open policy.
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Conclusion
Citizenship and identity are prized and sensitive propositions. 
Brexit negotiations reflect at least some of these sensitivities. 
However, this has led to a complex array of categories of 
status for Northern Ireland. A significant concession was to 
guarantee to Northern Ireland residents holding Irish passports, 
or entitled to them, to continue their EU citizenship and to 
exercise those rights as far as is practicable. This concession is 
a significant departure for the EU as residence within an EU 
country is normally a prerequisite to exercising most EU rights. 
The accommodation of the continuing Common Travel Area 
is also an important concession for Northern Ireland, the UK 
and Ireland.
At the time of writing, these citizenship guarantees are of 
various legal strengths. The rights for Irish and EU citizens 
must be implemented in the UK in an Act of Parliament 
that has constitutional status.4 It would be preferable for the 
Common Travel Area to be placed in a treaty between the UK 
and Ireland, but for now, the Common Travel Area is legally 
informal, consisting of a series of reciprocal arrangements 
between the UK and Ireland, which are liable to change. Many 
(including EU nationals arriving in the UK after transition and 
non-EU nationals) will be reliant on the UK’s domestic law for 
residence rights, which will not have the same protected status 
as EU citizens’ rights and can be changed at the will of any UK 
government in the future.
This leaves two main concerns. First, although citizens’ rights 
protections under the draft Agreement are appropriately robust, 
there are many who do not qualify or who will struggle to 
bring themselves within a category of rights holder with secure 
residency. This will leave non-Irish EU citizens in Northern 
Ireland (and the remainder of the UK) especially vulnerable 
4 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195.
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as they struggle to establish legal temporary residency before 
the end of the transition period. They will be under pressure 
to find employment or study by Brexit day (or at least during 
the implementation period) to avoid relying on rights afforded 
only by UK law. A second major concern is the overlap and 
disparities between categories of citizen. In the Northern Ireland 
context, this is likely to be highly divisive and could undermine 
the political consensus around ‘parity of esteem’ and the equal 
treatment of the two communities.
In sum, if the parties to the negotiations are serious about 
protecting the GFA, they must pay much more attention to what 
have been treated as ‘technical details’ on residence arrangements. 
Such ‘technicalities’ will have fundamental implications for 
Northern Ireland. In a sensitive context, decisions made now 
will shape the region’s views of citizenship and identity in the 
long term. Yet, even with substantial changes to the proposed 
jumble of post-Brexit citizenship categories, one thing is clear: 
citizenship(s) will become much more central to everyday life 
in Northern Ireland.
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FIvE
Justice and rights
The peace process was built on a shared vision of equal 
rights and equal respect on the island of Ireland, as framed 
by the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.… We are now 
seeking assurances from the UK and Irish Governments 
that no rights are diluted as a result of Brexit. (Emily 
Logan, Chief Commissioner of the Irish Human Rights 
and Equality Commission, 2018)
Introduction
Many commentators acknowledge that Brexit will have 
implications for trade and economics, as well as for citizenship 
and their ability to live in the European Union (EU). However, 
what does the EU and Brexit have to do with human rights 
protections? This chapter explains how Brexit will impact the 
intricate human rights protections in Northern Ireland. Human 
rights were a contentious part of Northern Ireland’s governance 
even before Brexit. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 
provided a baseline of domestic human rights protections, drawn 
from the European Convention on Human Rights and put into 
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operation through the Human Rights Act 1998 and Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 (NIA). The ambitions of the GFA were 
also greater, requiring the development of Northern Ireland-
specific human rights and a – so far, unmet – requirement that a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights should be prepared. Finally, the 
GFA introduced rights to ‘equivalence’ and ‘non-diminution’ 
of rights across the island of Ireland. Equivalence means that 
rights across the island must largely be the same (though there 
are obviously some differences, such as marriage equality, 
which have been accepted as not breaching the GFA). Non-
diminution requires that these rights must retain their current 
levels of protection and evolve positively in future. These two 
principles ensure the same general commitments to rights in 
both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, even if 
there are some local deviations.
Figure 3: The Brexit process and human rights
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Beyond re-categorising the holders of certain rights (see 
Chapter Four), Brexit could radically alter the nature of human 
rights protections in Northern Ireland. This chapter addresses 
what Brexit means for human rights in terms of principles, 
commitments and practice (see Figure 3) – although some 
elements of those will inevitably remain fluid until Brexit 
negotiations end. First, we explain the principles laid down by 
the GFA and the EU’s human rights architecture. Second, we 
evaluate how these principles have shaped the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement and its Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Third, 
we evaluate how these principles and commitments will shape 
any future agreement on the post-Brexit EU–UK relationship, 
the UK Parliament’s withdrawal legislation and a potential 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.
Principles
The EU and human rights
The EU’s significance for human rights in Northern Ireland, 
and the UK as a whole, was difficult to appreciate until the 
aftermath of the Brexit referendum, even for human rights 
experts. On a day-to-day basis, most human rights cases are 
brought under the Human Rights Act. This meant that despite 
the EU rights system always being there in the background 
and giving many of the same protections as the Human Rights 
Act, the cases that relied on EU rights tended to be in areas 
where the Human Rights Act was weaker. In the UK at least, 
the EU rights system has been most used in specific areas such 
as environmental law (Brennan et al, 2017) or data protection 
(De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2017). The EU rights system 
has nonetheless had a considerable stabilising effect upon a 
wide range of rights that is only beginning to be appreciated. 
This system developed as part of the EU’s efforts to make its 
organisational values explicit (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Relevant aspects of the Treaty of the European Union, Articles 
2 and 3
EU values EU goals
Human Dignity To promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
citizens
Freedom To offer freedom, security and justice without internal 
borders
Democracy Sustainable development based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive market economy with full employment 
and social progress, and environmental protection
Equality To combat social exclusion and discrimination
Rule of Law To enhance economic, social and territorial cohesion 
and solidarity among member countries
Human Rights To respect the rich cultural and linguistic diversity of 
its citizens
Within the network of treaties, regulations, directives and Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decisions that make 
up its legal system, the EU presents itself as an organisation that 
operates on the basis of human rights (which it calls ‘fundamental 
rights’). Although, for the EU, rights were historically linked 
directly to participation in the Single Market, as the powers 
and responsibilities of the EU have expanded, so has the extent 
of the rights protected. The creation of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFR) in 2000 gave human rights further 
importance within EU law. The CFR complements the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
(ECHR) (which has been around since 1950) and provides a sort 
of ‘ECHR-plus’ for the EU and its Member States. Although 
the ECHR and other international human rights treaties that the 
UK has signed duplicate many of these rights, others are specific 
to EU law. It is also especially important that the EU’s legal 
system provides effective structures for enforcing rights (an area 
where many other human rights systems struggle). Also crucial 
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is the way in which the CFR sets a tone for the development 
of policy in areas such as asylum, data protection, health care, 
social security, environmental protection and equality, where 
protections are developed and extended by EU law.
There is nothing in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status 
or the GFA that requires the UK to be a member of the EU’s 
human rights institutions or directly signed up to its standards. 
However, what is needed is equivalence with Ireland. After 
Brexit, that equivalence will need Northern Ireland to be closely 
aligned with the standards of the EU’s human rights regime, as 
well as its various methods of enforcement. This is the basis on 
which the draft Withdrawal Agreement and Phase 1 Report are 
composed. Even after Brexit, therefore, EU human rights will 
remain relevant to Northern Ireland’s human rights landscape.
The GFA’s non-diminution and equivalence principles
The GFA’s conclusion necessitated a major overhaul of Northern 
Ireland’s human rights landscape. The GFA is binding under 
international law and is part of Irish Constitutional law. Following 
the Withdrawal Agreement, the GFA will likely become 
something that the CJEU will take into consideration when 
interpreting law, and the European Commission will similarly 
pay attention to it when proposing new law that touches upon 
Northern Ireland. However, the relationship between the GFA 
and Brexit has been hotly contested. The UK government has 
repeatedly pledged to honour its GFA obligations (Brokenshire, 
2017) but has often been evasive when it comes to identifying 
the extent of those commitments, falling back on mantras like 
‘no one wants to see a return to the borders of the past’ (May, 
2017a, para 4.2). While such statements are intended to reassure, 
as no one really expects a return to a border patrolled by the 
military, promising that there will be no return to this past is a 
guarantee that fails to engage with reality.
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The UK government has rejected efforts to put the GFA 
principles in domestic law following Brexit, saying that a raft of 
legislation has already fulfilled the UK’s law-making obligations 
and that Brexit does not undermine these measures (Raab, 
2017). However, the GFA has only partially been incorporated 
into the UK’s domestic law. For some, the UK government’s 
evasiveness is disconcerting when it comes to such a fundamental 
agreement. Lady Sylvia Hermon MP and Lord Patten have led 
efforts in Parliament to add a declaration on the GFA principles 
into the Brexit legislation. Their argument has been that the 
GFA ‘has to be kept at all costs’ (Patten, 2018).
Others, however, seek to portray the GFA as an irrelevance, 
coalescing around the claim of former First Minister David 
Trimble (2017) that ‘[i] t is not true that Brexit in any way 
threatens the peace process’. The Shadow Trade Secretary, 
Barry Gardiner, was forced to apologise after claiming it was 
little more than a ‘shibboleth’ (Allegretti, 2018). Recognising 
the risk that the GFA poses to their desired Brexit outcomes, 
leading Brexiteers, including Kate Hoey MP and Daniel Hannan 
MEP, have instead sought to portray the GFA as an outdated 
inconvenience that needs to be abandoned (NIAC, 2018b, 
Q302). These interventions either fail to appreciate the GFA’s 
implications or actively seek to downplay them and mire them 
in doubt.
Certain parts of the GFA are, however, particularly difficult 
to wish away. The GFA and the later agreements, which mark 
milestones in the Northern Ireland peace process, are peppered 
with human rights commitments (Smith et al, 2016, pp 82–3). 
The GFA explicitly identifies human rights as sustaining 
Northern Ireland’s democratic institutions, as a platform for 
building a harmonious society and as an important aspect of 
cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The GFA 
does not require the UK’s or Ireland’s membership of the EU, 
nor does it explicitly require the UK’s adherence to rights 
provided under EU law. However, it does assume continued 
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membership and, as we will show, its terms are more easily 
realised within the EU’s common frameworks. The peace 
agreement requires the implementation of rights that go beyond 
the ECHR (sometimes known as ‘ECHR-plus’) and that speak 
to Northern Ireland’s particular circumstances. Rights provided 
under EU law clearly deliver this ECHR-plus ambition.
The GFA also requires that Ireland, which had yet to build 
the ECHR into domestic law in 1998, to have at least an 
equivalent level of protection as Northern Ireland. The idea 
of imposing human rights obligations upon the Republic of 
Ireland emerged from misunderstandings during the peace 
process. The then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, misinterpreted 
Loyalist human rights proposals as demands upon the Republic 
rather than as a statement of rights to be enacted in Northern 
Ireland (Mallie and McKittrick, 1997, p 224). In the aftermath 
of the GFA, this requirement upon Ireland was presented as a 
Unionist victory: the ECHR was not exactly popular with the 
Ulster Unionist Party’s rank-and-file, but at least Ireland was 
being obliged to take ‘comparable’ steps (Morgan, 2001, p 241). 
However, this part of the Agreement has a long-term impact 
because it links the two legal systems in Ireland; keeping the legal 
orders in line in rights terms prevents a barrier to the eventual 
unification of Ireland (Harvey, 2001, p 252). Only 20 years 
later did the consequences begin to unfold as the Conservative 
Party sought to alter the Human Rights Act and Brexit started 
being negotiated.
The extent of GFA commitments are not always easy to 
figure out. The Agreement can be interpreted as requiring 
equivalent North–South rights protections, and mandating 
the extension (and, by implication, non-diminution) of rights 
protections in Northern Ireland. Whether the Agreement should 
be interpreted in this way, however, is both a legal and political 
question. Equivalence has not, to date, been interpreted as 
requiring complete alignment (as seen by different arrangements 
on reproductive rights and equal marriage between Ireland and 
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Northern Ireland). The GFA is, moreover, a peace agreement as 
much as it is an international treaty, and many of its provisions 
rely upon ‘constructive ambiguity’; they can be read and 
presented in different ways to different audiences (Bell and 
Cavanaugh, 1998, pp 1345–6). Brexit might not alter these 
commitments, but it does focus renewed attention on their scope 
given their capacity to shape the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
Commitments
UK–EU Phase 1 Report
It is important to reflect on the December 2017 Joint Report 
as it gives clear insight into the intentions of the UK and EU as 
they attempt to give legal form to their post-Brexit obligations. 
Paragraph 53 draws directly upon the GFA’s rights provisions:
The 1998 Agreement … includes important provisions 
on Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity for 
which EU law and practice has provided a supporting 
framework in Northern Ireland and across the island of 
Ireland. The United Kingdom commits to ensuring that 
no diminution of rights is caused by its departure from 
the European Union, including in the area of protection 
against forms of discrimination enshrined in EU law.
This passage identifies several key connections between the GFA 
and Brexit: the EU’s rights architecture; the need for a whole-
island approach to rights; and the UK’s commitments to both 
the non-diminution of rights upon Brexit and retaining the 
prohibitions upon discrimination currently found within EU 
law. These commitments could be fulfilled by law applicable 
specifically to Northern Ireland or to the entire of the UK. 
This paragraph should be read alongside the UK government’s 
commitment to ‘full alignment’ if no other solutions will 
maintain an invisible border (see Chapter Three). That ‘full 
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alignment’ commitment extends beyond trade to touch on this 
human rights paragraph of the Joint Report. Full alignment also 
covers key rights protected by EU law, including workers’ and 
environmental rights, where their removal would impinge upon 
North–South cooperation, the all-island economy or the GFA.
Although these commitments do not need to be written into 
the UK withdrawal legislation under the terms of the Joint 
Report, they will become flashpoints after Brexit if the UK seeks 
to back away from its commitments. They make it necessary 
to retain EU law that touches upon these aspects of Northern 
Ireland law, and prevent such provisions from being subsequently 
repealed or marginalised. This backstop commitment remains in 
place no matter the outcome of the ongoing negotiations and 
this will restrict post-Brexit law-making by both the Westminster 
and devolved institutions, at least as far as Northern Ireland is 
concerned.
Draft Withdrawal Agreement: Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland
In its draft Withdrawal Agreement, the EU proposes a human 
rights framework to apply to Northern Ireland post-Brexit (EU 
Task Force, 2018a). Although negotiations over this text are 
ongoing, these proposals reflect the picture established by the 
UK and EU in their Joint Report. The draft legal text includes 
an annex which features provisions relevant to Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. This annex, the Protocol on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland, has a lengthy Preamble and lists several texts previously 
agreed or issued by the UK and the EU. All of these documents 
draw upon the common core provided by the GFA.
Treaty preambles are not legally binding under international 
law, though they can be used to decipher the purpose of treaties 
and therefore remain important tools of treaty interpretation 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 31.2). The 
Preamble to the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol addresses 
seven overarching areas. First, it notes that the situation in Ireland 
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is unique and Brexit presents specific challenges in the context 
of the peace process. Second, it states that the implementation 
of the GFA and later agreements is vital to sustaining the peace 
process. Third, reconciliation between communities and the 
normalisation of life within Northern Ireland is recognised as 
essential and requires that the GFA’s ‘institutional’ arrangements 
be sustained. Fourth, Ireland’s EU membership – and, by 
extension, its human rights commitments under EU law – 
must be respected. Fifth, Irish citizens in Northern Ireland 
‘will continue’ to enjoy, exercise and have access to the rights, 
opportunities and benefits derived from their EU citizenship (see 
Chapter Four). Sixth, EU law will provide a ‘rights, safeguards 
and equality framework’ in Northern Ireland. Seventh, the 
Protocol can be replaced by a ‘future agreement’ between the 
EU and the UK, but this must address the unique circumstances 
on the island of Ireland and protect all of the GFA.
The draft Protocol confirms the UK’s existing commitments 
under the GFA and demonstrate the concrete links between the 
GFA and EU law. Besides the UK’s commitments, the EU also 
acknowledges its own commitments to Ireland, the UK and the 
Northern Ireland peace process. The Ireland Protocol’s provision 
on rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity are directly 
related to the GFA and reaffirm the GFA’s baseline requirement 
that the ECHR is part of Northern Ireland’s law. This will 
mean that the UK will have to keep the Human Rights Act 
for Northern Ireland unless a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
can be passed that does the same job. The Protocol also clearly 
states that there must be no diminution of rights and that the 
UK must continue to facilitate the GFA’s institutions. This is 
also important as it commits the UK to maintaining a range of 
monitoring and democratic bodies for Northern Ireland.
Beyond the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, there are 
other aspects of the draft Withdrawal Agreement that address 
human rights. Other than provisions relating to citizenship (see 
Chapter Four) Article 11 – which has been agreed between the 
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UK and EU – states that non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality is prohibited in the host state and the state of work 
for those EU citizens affected by Brexit. Article 33 – also agreed 
– requires that Member States and the UK undertake a publicity 
campaign about rights and obligations following Brexit. These 
provisions provide general protections covering all of the UK 
but will be practically useful to Irish and other EU citizens who 
live in Northern Ireland.
In summary, the Joint Report and the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement combined do not impose new human rights on 
the UK, but they do require that rights standards are consistent 
across Ireland. Post-Brexit Northern Ireland’s human rights 
landscape ought to remain substantially the same, with changes 
only to increase rights rather than curtail their content. This 
commitment will bind the current UK government and its 
successors.
Non-diminution of rights
The draft Withdrawal Agreement makes a commitment to the 
non-diminution of rights in Article 1 of the Ireland Protocol. 
Non-diminution is sometimes described as non-retrogression 
or non-regression; however, while these are similar terms – also 
requiring a state to avoid backwards steps in human rights – it 
is important to be clear about non-diminution and the way it 
is used in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. The principle of 
non-retrogression is an established idea in international human 
rights law (Wills and Warwick, 2016), but it has not previously 
been used in EU human rights law. Critically, a non-diminution 
guarantee prohibits backwards steps, whereas non-retrogression 
permits them if they are justified according to set criteria. 
Following Brexit, it will be essential that this difference is 
recognised. These non-diminution clauses will require that the 
CFR and all of EU non-discrimination law remain in effect 
for Northern Ireland.
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This guarantee is essential because the EU has been an 
important source of some human rights in Northern Ireland 
law: first, where the CFR goes further than other human rights 
in Northern Ireland; and, second, where the EU has agreed to 
international treaties that the UK has not. As described earlier, 
the UK tends to get much of its human rights protections from 
the ECHR. EU rights protections, however, extend beyond the 
ECHR in areas including marriage and family rights, education, 
asylum, data protection, health, social security, environmental 
rights, and protections against discrimination. Some of these 
rights come from the EU’s CFR but many are also scattered 
across general EU law. No matter the source of the rights, the 
non-diminution guarantee is intended to protect them after 
Brexit.
The guarantee also covers some rights that are not rooted in 
EU law that Brexit stands to undermine. For example, the EU 
has signed up to a number of international treaties on behalf 
of its members. Legally, when the UK leaves the EU, it will 
no longer be signed up to these treaties, but it nonetheless is 
required by the non-diminution commitment to replace these 
rights. The treaties that the UK will have to replicate or sign 
up to include the Convention on the International Recovery 
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, and 
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (the Aarhus Convention).
Both the draft Withdrawal Agreement and the Phase 1 Report 
are imprecise about the meaning of non-diminution, but it could 
come in two forms:
• Interpretation A – A snapshot at the end of the transition 
period.
• Interpretation B – The ongoing incorporation of additional 
rights.
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The snapshot interpretation would freeze the rights available 
when the UK leaves the EU and ensure that there is no retreat 
from the standards as they exist at the end of the transition 
period. The ongoing-incorporation interpretation, by contrast, 
would mean that there will be no diminution of the human 
rights associated with being an EU member state into the 
future. This approach requires the UK to continually integrate 
new developments, adding new human rights instruments 
developed in the EU and making amendments to existing rights. 
Interpretation A requires the UK to protect only those EU 
human rights laws in force on the day of Brexit. Interpretation 
B would sign the UK up to protecting all of the human rights 
protections that the EU develops in the future, at least with 
regard to Northern Ireland.
Interpretation A, in practice, fails to protect against non-
diminution. Increases in EU law rights protections would be 
enjoyed by those in Ireland and the rest of the EU but not by 
those in Northern Ireland. This outcome would potentially 
undermine the Joint Report guarantees for the ‘people of 
Northern Ireland who are Irish citizens’ that Brexit will be 
‘without prejudice to the rights, opportunities and identity that 
come with European Union citizenship’ (Joint Report, 2017, 
para 52). It would be all-but unworkable to have different rights 
protections between Irish citizens in Northern Ireland, who would 
have full and continuing accrual of EU rights, and UK citizens 
within Northern Ireland, who, under Interpretation A, would 
only enjoy those EU rights in force on Brexit day (see Chapter 
Four). Interpretation A of the non-diminution provisions in 
the Joint Report and the draft Withdrawal Agreement would 
also undermine the GFA’s requirements of equivalent rights 
protections in both parts of Ireland.
In summary, the non-diminution provisions of the outline 
Brexit deal try to keep the ties between the law in Northern 
Ireland and Ireland, as the GFA requires. This is tied to the 
aim of reducing the significance of the Irish border for rights 
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protection. An interpretation of the non-diminution provisions 
based on a snapshot of rights in place on the day of Brexit would 
not satisfy this aim as this would freeze rights in Northern Ireland 
while rights in Irish law would continue to develop because of 
its connection to EU law. Only Interpretation B, requiring the 
ongoing adjustment of Northern Ireland’s rights protections to 
keep pace with EU standards, secures this goal. This reading 
of the Joint Report highlights just how distinctive the legal 
framework affecting Northern Ireland is set to become after 
Brexit and is another example of the significant complexities 
that remain to be addressed in the agreements between the UK 
and the EU.
Enforcement and monitoring of human rights
The GFA demands specific arrangements for monitoring and 
enforcing its human rights standards. In terms of monitoring, 
the GFA underpins the work of the Northern Ireland Equality 
Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC), and their equivalent in Ireland, the 
Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). The 
NIHRC and the IHREC are given special powers to work 
together as a Joint Committee where rights issues have a cross-
border element. In terms of enforcement, the GFA requires 
that individuals are able to challenge breaches of the ECHR, or 
the as-yet-unrealised Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, through 
domestic courts and also requires that the courts must have the 
power to strike down Northern Ireland Assembly legislation 
that breaches human rights laws.
At present, the rights protections under EU law are monitored 
by several EU institutions, including the Fundamental 
Rights Agency, the European Ombudsman, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor and, ultimately, the European 
Commission. They can be enforced by mechanisms such as 
the European Parliament petition procedure (Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the European Union, Article 227) and particularly 
by Commission enforcement action before the CJEU (Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, Article 258). Brexit will 
see the UK withdraw from these institutions and mechanisms, 
which results in a loss of human rights enforcement. This 
potentially marks a diminution of rights in breach of the GFA. 
It also demonstrates a contradiction in the Joint Report and draft 
Withdrawal Agreement: both insist upon the non-diminution 
of rights protections and yet seemingly facilitate the diminution 
inherent in Brexit. To follow through on the non-diminution 
promise, a Northern Ireland-specific solution to Brexit must 
once more be found: the UK will be able to withdraw from the 
EU, but it will have to maintain alternate mechanisms for rights 
protection in Northern Ireland. In the negotiations to come 
the GFA will continue to condition the substance of Brexit.
Separate to the UK’s non-diminution guarantee, it has 
undertaken to respect the rights, opportunities and identity 
of the people of Northern Ireland who are Irish citizens (see 
Chapter Four). This promise is significantly diminished if it 
excludes procedural rights or rights to complain to EU agencies 
and institutions. To respect the full range of EU rights that 
Irish citizens (as EU citizens) in Northern Ireland are to have, 
they must genuinely have the same rights and opportunities in 
Northern Ireland as they would within the EU. This needs EU 
institutions’ continued monitoring of their enjoyment of rights 
in Northern Ireland and their ability to complain to EU agencies 
and institutions. Such arrangements are not directly addressed 
in the Joint Report or the draft Withdrawal Agreement. This 
might be because of the sensitivities around the ‘red lines’ set out 
by Theresa May’s government. The EU negotiators might well 
see no need to emphasise the logical consequences of certain 
promises made in the Joint Report until Theresa May has been 
able to secure cabinet acceptance of the main terms of the deal.
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From rhetoric to reality
If the relationship between Brexit and the GFA has been slow 
to come into focus in the UK’s political debate, this is largely 
the product of the UK government’s fudging of the issue. 
For much of 2017, Northern Ireland was addressed by Brexit 
ministers almost exclusively in terms of trade and maintaining 
the Common Travel Area: ‘[W] e are wholly committed to the 
Belfast agreement [GFA] and its successors. We will work with 
the Irish Government to maintain the common travel area on 
the island of Ireland and not return to the borders of the past’ 
(Jones, 2018).
The GFA’s role in this picture was limited, seen as relevant only 
to individuals’ choice of citizenship and some scattered issues of 
cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland. A greater 
role for the GFA was repeatedly denied. There has been much 
talk of ‘close cooperation’ with Ireland over Brexit. However, 
when the Irish government presented their GFA concerns in 
mid-2017 (in line with their role as co-guarantors of the peace 
process), the UK government actively briefed the press and 
other EU governments that Leo Varadkar was an inexperienced 
Taoiseach looking to make his mark (Connelly, 2018a, p 350). 
All of this boosted Unionist narratives of a meddling Irish 
government seeking to subvert UK sovereignty over Northern 
Ireland. For Ian Paisley Jr, the GFA issue could be dismissed 
as little more than ‘a made-up grievance by the Irish’ that did 
not need to affect the shape of the UK’s withdrawal legislation 
(Paisley, 2017).
The UK and EU’s agreed position in the December 2017 Joint 
Report shows up such claims as misguided. As we discussed 
earlier, the GFA’s equivalence and non-diminution provisions 
are not mere aspirations; they are shaping the Withdrawal 
Agreement proposals and the EU’s plan for Brexit. The UK 
government has therefore, belatedly, been obliged to start 
engaging with the Joint Report’s requirements during the 
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passage of the Withdrawal legislation. The problem with moving 
from principles and concepts into hard law is that the UK 
government has adopted the mantra that ‘nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed’ as a way of procrastinating over detailed 
legal arrangements (and keeping all of the disparate elements of 
its House of Commons majority on side). Ministers have not yet 
fully explained how the agreed principles on Northern Ireland 
will translate into practice. We therefore need to explore how 
the GFA’s human rights principles are influencing the UK’s 
Withdrawal legislation, and how the UK’s negotiating position 
has repeatedly been overtaken by events.
Practice
Human rights and the future UK–EU relationship
This section evaluates options for protecting human rights after 
Brexit. Foremost among these are the UK government’s plans 
for ‘a new deep and special partnership between Britain and 
the European Union’ (May, 2017b). This relationship would 
extend beyond a free trade agreement, with the deal extending 
into areas like security cooperation. With regard to Northern 
Ireland, this policy has even stretched to proposing that the EU 
continue to provide funding under its PEACE programme after 
Brexit (UK Government, 2017a, para 8). This begs the question 
of whether the UK government would be able to satisfy all of 
the GFA’s requirements through such an arrangement.
The UK government has not been keen to recognise that 
a human rights provision is a standard feature of EU trade 
agreements (Bartels, 2013, p 297). The EU is, indeed, under 
treaty obligation to conduct its foreign policy with respect to 
the principles of ‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect 
for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity’ 
(Treaty on European Union, Article 21(1)). These elements of 
the EU’s trade agreements have often received bad press, being 
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regarded as means by which the EU pressurises developing 
countries. However, they are also present in the EU’s dealings 
with advanced economies; the EU and Canada, for example, 
made reciprocal human rights commitments as part of the 
Preamble to the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA).
For the EU, any comprehensive agreement will likely have 
to involve data protection, human rights and possibly workers’ 
rights in order to minimise the potential that companies 
operating in the UK and trading with the EU under any Brexit 
agreement could use a lack of such safeguards to undercut their 
EU-based competitors. This could manifest itself in an eventual 
agreement as clauses tying the UK into particular elements of EU 
law, or even basing the trade deal on a requirement that the UK 
remain part of the ECHR system of rights protections. Ireland, 
as a co-guarantor of the human rights elements of the GFA, will 
likely push for the deal to be comprehensive in these regards. The 
UK’s commitments with regard to Northern Ireland will have 
to be particularly far-reaching to match the level of protection 
that it has already guaranteed in the Joint Report. Of course, 
while negotiations remain stuck at the withdrawal stage, the UK 
government does not have to contemplate how much ground it 
will have to give to secure its cherished trade deal. We therefore 
need to consider the other arrangements that will need to be put 
in place to secure the GFA’s rights and equality commitments.
Human rights and the UK’s withdrawal legislation
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (once called the 
‘Great Repeal Bill’) is fundamental to Brexit. Its first function 
is as a piece of UK law that will delete (‘repeal’) the European 
Communities Act 1972, the link that makes EU law part of UK 
law, on the day the UK leaves the EU. The gaps which will this 
repeal will produce within the UK’s legal arrangements post-
Brexit are sizeable, and there is not enough time or capacity 
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to develop the thousands of new domestic laws necessary to 
replace EU law ahead of the UK’s withdrawal. Therefore, the 
Bill has a second function: to copy existing EU law into a 
form of ‘retained’ UK law (but calling it the ‘Great Repeal and 
Retain Bill’ would have been less catchy). The Bill enjoyed a 
relatively clear run through the House of Commons, with the 
Government managing to block amendments which attempted 
to keep the CFR or which sought to clarify its relationship 
with the GFA. These issues, however, returned to haunt the 
UK Government in protracted battles in the House of Lords 
through the spring of 2018, sapping time and legislative energy 
that Theresa May could little afford.
Generally, EU law rights that are recognised in UK law 
immediately prior to Brexit will continue in UK law after 
Brexit day. However, section 5 of the Withdrawal Act will 
remove the CFR from UK law. This means that the CFR’s 
protections cannot be relied on post-Brexit to challenge new 
laws which would be harmful to the rights it contains. The UK 
government has downplayed concerns, insisting that ‘it does 
Figure 4: The separation of UK and EU law by the Withdrawal Bill
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not intend that the substantive rights protected in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights will be weakened’ (DExEU, 2017, 
p  4). The CFR, however, is the backbone for many rights, 
and removing it makes abolishing those protections easier. The 
CFR aside, under sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Withdrawal Act 
there will be many EU rights that are clear and/or do not need 
domestic implementing action that will remain part of UK law. 
These provisions provide a ‘sticking plaster’, maintaining rights 
equivalence in the short term. Under the Withdrawal Act, the 
UK Parliament will, following Brexit, be able to use the normal 
processes of UK law-making to change the EU laws that have 
been retained. Over time, this will mean that the UK will 
customise and remove retained EU laws and the country will 
move gradually further away from the EU model. 
This approach to EU rights has the potential to create 
confusion. Take data protection as just one example. EU law’s 
right to protection of personal data (Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, Article 8) is more extensive than the rights 
found in other UK and European rights instruments. As the 
CJEU states: ‘Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental 
right which is distinct from that enshrined in Article 7 of the 
Charter and which has no equivalent in the ECHR’.1 However, 
the right to protection of personal data is also part of the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (EU Parliament and 
Council Regulation 2016/679/EU, Article 1(2)), which the UK 
government has committed to retaining under the Withdrawal 
Act. On the one hand, the UK is cutting the right out and, 
on the other hand, is committing to keeping it. Are these data 
protection rights going, or are they staying?
Post-Brexit, the UK Parliament will be able to alter any 
retained EU law and thereby diminish such rights protections. 
The EU, conversely, could develop rights protections that 
1 See C-203/15 and C-698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department 
v Watson [2017] 2 CMLR 30, [129] (Grand Chamber, CJEU).
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exceed its current baseline. Either of these developments 
would introduce divergences between the standards of rights 
protection in the law of Northern Ireland and Ireland. Such 
divergence is all the more likely in the context of calls for Brexit 
to result in less so-called EU red tape. For example, the ‘red 
tape’ klaxon is often sounded in relation to workplace rights and 
gender-equality protections, and even though the relevant EU 
law protections are initially retained through the Withdrawal 
Act, such complaints could pave the way for future divergence 
between the UK and Ireland.
Some rights – such as children’s rights – will be culled much 
more swiftly. Children’s rights are included within the EU 
treaties and the CFR. However, as they are not directly effective 
under EU law (because they set out ambitions, rather than 
clear, specific individual rights), they will not become part of 
‘retained EU law’ under the Withdrawal Act.2 By contrast, the 
right to equal pay for men and women doing equivalent work 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 157) is 
directly effective and will become retained law, even though the 
equivalent CFR provision is not retained (Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, Article 23). Although the CFR 
protections for asylum rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, Article 18) and victims’ rights (Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 47) will not be 
kept, both have detailed EU directives, which mean they will 
initially be retained in the UK’s law. These examples demonstrate 
just how complex the picture of “retained rights” will become 
after Brexit, making it difficult to track the UK’s compliance 
with the GFA’s commitment to rights equivalence.
2 Under EU law, for EU treaty obligations to have direct effect within Member 
State legal orders, they must be precise, clear, unconditional and not 
require additional implementing measures (see C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1).
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Moreover, although the Withdrawal Act does an initial copy-
and-paste job on substantial parts of EU law, Parliament has 
also given the UK government sweeping powers to make later 
edits to this retained law. Sections 8 of the Withdrawal Act 
grants ministers far-reaching authority to amend almost any 
legislation which ministers consider to have become in some 
respect faulty as a result of Brexit. These have been called ‘Henry 
VIII powers’ in a nod to the many-wived monarch’s preference 
for ruling by proclamation. Under the terms of section 8(2), 
‘Regulations … may make any provision that could be made 
by an Act of Parliament’. In other words, ministers can change 
swathes of law with minimal involvement by Parliament, even 
if those changes involve amendments to statutes (and not just 
to existing regulations). In theory, measures such as the equal 
pay provisions enshrined in the Equality Act 2010 (and in the 
Sex Discrimination Order 1976 applicable to Northern Ireland) 
could be rapidly changed with limited scrutiny.
There are some restrictions upon these sweeping Henry VIII 
powers within section 8. They cannot be used to increase or 
introduce taxes, to change the law retroactively, to create new 
criminal offences or new public bodies. The powers, moreover, 
cannot be used to alter the Human Rights Act 1998 or the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. These protections are significant, 
but do not fully protect the UK’s GFA commitments against 
accidental or deliberate breach. In the course of convincing 
Lady Sylvia Hermon MP to withdraw an amendment seeking 
more clarity about the position of the GFA, the Brexit Minister, 
Robin Walker (2017), maintained that the UK government’s 
‘commitment to the Belfast agreement is absolutely clear … 
[t] he Government absolutely support those principles, which are 
enshrined in the Northern Ireland Act, which is protected under 
the Bill’. However, the NIA is only one of the ways in which 
the UK’s GFA commitments have been made part of domestic 
law, and some of these commitments are not covered by statute 
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at all. The GFA therefore became a contested issue during the 
passage of the Withdrawal Bill. 
For many parliamentarians, led by Lord Patten and Lady Sylvia 
Hermon MP, protecting only the Human Rights Act and NIA 
against rapid change by statutory instrument did not sufficiently 
safeguard the GFA’s broader principles (Patten, 2018). In the 
final stages of the legislative process the UK government made 
concessions to these concerns, introducing section 10 into 
the Withdrawal Act. This provision builds upon the NIA’s 
protections by also requiring that ministers ‘have due regard’ to 
the terms of the December 2017 Joint Report. The implications 
of this turn of phrase might not be immediately clear, but if this 
provision is to mean anything, it must be treated as obliging 
the UK government to respect the commitments made to the 
GFA within the Joint Report when ministers use their powers 
under the Withdrawal Act. This amendment is therefore a 
specific fix; section 10 does not prevent future legislation being 
advanced by the UK government which conflicts with the GFA 
principles (even if they are affirmed in the Joint Report which 
this provision covers). It only prevents ministers from using their 
special powers under the Withdrawal Act to affect such changes 
by statutory instrument. Under this provision the Joint Report’s 
principles play no larger role in UK domestic law. Further UK 
legislation will be needed to secure any final special provisions for 
Northern Ireland in any ultimate UK-EU deal (see Chapter 6). 
The Withdrawal Act’s removal of the CFR, and lack of 
safeguards around individual rights found in retained EU law, 
are significant. These developments mean that there is no 
effective legal safeguard in place to prevent a post-Brexit UK 
government from eroding rights protections, even if doing 
so would undermine the GFA’s principle of equivalence. 
Suspicions around the Conservatives’ intentions are fuelled by 
the party’s attitude towards the Human Rights Act. Although 
this legislation is currently the main way in which the UK 
fulfils its human rights commitments under the GFA, the 2017 
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Conservative Manifesto gives notice of the party’s intention to 
reconsider its operation after Brexit (Conservative Party, 2017, 
p 37). Since the 2017 election Conservative ministers have 
maintained that the UK government will ‘further consider 
our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving 
the EU concludes and consult fully on proposals in the full 
knowledge of the new constitutional landscape’ (Lee, 2017). 
This underscores the importance of looking at the position of 
human rights in Northern Ireland into the medium and long 
term. While there might not be an immediate issue with rights 
equivalence, the Withdrawal Act’s terms risk the possibility of 
later diminution and potentially leave the door open to very 
different rights protections across the island of Ireland.
A Northern Ireland Bill of Rights
One way to buttress the commitment to the Joint Report in the 
UK’s withdrawal legislation would be to revitalise discussions 
around a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. The introduction of 
a comprehensive Northern Ireland Bill of Rights could resolve 
some – but not all – of the human rights issues post-Brexit. The 
UK government has said that it thinks imposing a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights in a top-down way from Westminster 
would breach the GFA (Bridges, 2016). Many Secretaries of 
State for Northern Ireland have insisted that any progress on a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights requires the Northern Ireland 
Assembly’s consent (Villiers, 2013).
However, given the Phase 1 Report’s recognition that special 
arrangements must be made for Northern Ireland, a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights offers a bespoke vehicle for addressing these 
requirements. The NIHRC’s 2008 draft proposals on a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights should not simply be pulled off the shelf 
and dusted down, without thinking about the Brexit context. 
The non-diminution guarantee requires continuous integration 
of EU rights and full access to the remedies of EU institutions, 
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but as it stands, the 2008 draft of the Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights would probably not meet these needs. As Ireland’s rights 
protections evolve with the EU’s, the Bill of Rights as it is would 
struggle to integrate changing standards. Revising the Bill of 
Rights in the context of Brexit would allow this new situation 
to be taken into account through a system of monitoring and 
updating law to keep pace with Ireland (Hermon, 2017).
There was some mention of the rights arrangements for 
Northern Ireland in the negotiations to restore devolution in 
early 2018, even if there was little detail beyond the recognition 
that the UK’s withdrawal legislation could impact on rights in 
Northern Ireland and that there would need to be attention to 
Northern Ireland’s ‘particular circumstance’ (Draft Agreement 
Text, 2018). However, these sentiments provide a launch pad 
from which to revisit the drafting of a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland in the post-Brexit context. It may be the best option 
for ensuring non-diminution and equivalence on the island.
Cooperative justice arrangements
A love–hate relationship
The EU’s cooperative justice arrangements showcase the UK’s 
difficulties with EU membership and highlight another aspect 
of Brexit’s human rights problems. The EU’s arrangements for 
cooperating on justice and policing matters stress how far the 
organisation has expanded beyond its initial aim of establishing 
the Single Market. The UK has historically pushed for more 
extensive cooperative justice arrangements. In tussles that 
provided small-scale precursors to Brexit, however, Conservative 
ministers have increasingly sought to opt out from specific 
arrangements with which they take issue (Mitsilegas, 2016).
The CJEU’s increased oversight of cooperative justice 
arrangements has been particularly problematic for the UK 
(House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 2013). 
The measures that the UK continues to apply, however, are 
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seen by the UK government as vital elements of its post-Brexit 
relationship with the EU. In particular, the government is keen 
to retain the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and policing 
cooperation.
Theresa May, when Home Secretary, argued that withdrawing 
from all EU justice and security measures ‘would seriously 
harm the capability of our law enforcement agencies to keep 
the public safe’ (May, 2014a), and during the Brexit referendum 
campaign, the soon-to-be Prime Minister explicitly highlighted 
cooperative justice arrangements as a major benefit of EU 
membership (May, 2016). The Joint Report between the UK 
and EU provides only a few details of the future of cooperation 
regarding crime or policing (Joint Report, 2017, para 92). 
Little of the EU’s draft legal text of the Withdrawal Agreement 
touches on these issues. This is because, despite the continued 
importance that the Prime Minister has placed on security 
cooperation (May, 2018c), the UK government’s insistence 
that Brexit will ‘bring to an end’ to the CJEU’s jurisdiction 
regarding all elements of UK law (DExEU, 2017, para 2.3) makes 
continued justice cooperation much more difficult. The land 
border on the island of Ireland only heightens the importance 
of resolving this difficulty to ensure cooperation between the 
criminal justice systems of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
EAW
The EAW became operational in 2004, replacing traditional 
procedures used to transfer individuals facing criminal 
prosecution or prison sentences between justice systems.3 The 
UK uses the EAW extensively, transferring roughly 1,000 
individuals out of the UK under the EAW, and issuing over 200 
of its own EAWs annually. With regard to Northern Ireland, the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland’s (PSNI’s) Chief Constable, 
3 EU Council Framework Decision, 2002/584/JHA, Article 1(1).
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George Hamilton, told a House of Commons Committee that 
the arrest warrants ‘are essential in tackling terrorism, organised 
and volume crime across the island of Ireland’ (NIAC, 2016, 
Q162). The EAW process and the CJEU’s protection of human 
rights in relation to the warrants have been subject to criticism. 
Some have argued that there are issues around fair hearing rights 
and that there is not a proper test to check whether issuing 
an EAW is a reasonable step (House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Committee, 2013, para 124). Nonetheless, the UK 
government has consistently emphasised the value of the EAW 
in protecting victims of crime (May, 2014b).
The operation of the EAW system is overseen by domestic 
courts, and since 2009, they can refer questions to the CJEU 
regarding the relevant EU law provisions (Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, Article 267). A recent important court case 
indicates that the CJEU will apply the CFR to the operation 
of EAWs when it is deciding on the meaning of fair hearing 
rights, the right to liberty and the rights to private and family 
life.4 Further, the EAW operates ‘on the basis of the principle 
of mutual recognition’5 and on the presumption that EU 
Member States maintain equivalent protections for defendants 
in their systems (Extradition Act 2003 (UK), section 21). These 
two factors will make it difficult for the UK play a role in the 
EAW system if it does not maintain the standards of the CFR.
The UK’s withdrawal legislation potentially undermines 
efforts to engage meaningfully with the EAW system. Section 
6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 expressly 
prohibits UK courts from referring issues of the interpretation 
of EU law (in terms of those aspects which continue to apply 
to the UK) to the CJEU. The Joint Report in part reflects 
this stance – at least in the citizens’ rights context – where the 
4 See C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43, [54] (Grand 
Chamber, CJEU).
5 EU Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, Article 1(2).
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jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK will end after an eight-
year transition period (Joint Report, 2017, para 38). CJEU 
oversight, however, is built into the EAW system, and without 
compromise over the CJEU’s involvement there is no route to 
retaining the system which could be compatible with EU law. 
The UK government’s express desire to maintain the EAW 
could therefore be frustrated by its resistance to aspects of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction and to the CFR’s protections. The UK is 
sleepwalking away from the EAW system, and some individuals 
across the EU have noticed. They have used Brexit as a pretext 
to challenge their transfer to the UK under the EAW, arguing 
that the UK is not likely to protect their rights in an equivalent 
way in the medium term. In Ireland, Thomas O’Connor has 
argued that there was a real risk to his rights because of Brexit if 
he is transferred to the UK under the EAW system. In February 
2018 the Irish Supreme Court referred the issue to the CJEU, 
effectively slowing down other EAW cases in the interim.6 
One way to square the circle that currently exists on 
cooperative justice could be for the UK to follow Norway and 
Iceland. Neither country is an EU Member State, but both 
have concluded ‘suspect surrender’ agreements with the EU. 
These agreements create a similar arrangement to the EAW, 
though parties can still refuse to transfer their own citizens.7 
An alternative arrangement to the EAW that was negotiated 
sensitively could improve the rights protections for individuals 
within the system (House of Lords European Union Committee, 
2016a, para 145). Critically, the Norway/Iceland arrangements 
do not come under the remit of the CJEU as disputes are sent 
to a meeting of governmental representatives. However, this 
dispute process only works on the assumption that few disputes 
will arise as the courts of Norway and Iceland will interpret the 
6 Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor [2018] IESC 3, [5.25] (Clarke 
CJ).
7 EU Council Decision 2014/835/EU (27 November 2014), Article 6.
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arrangements in line with legal developments before the CJEU.8 
Therefore, although the UK might escape the direct control of 
the CJEU, it would have to follow closely in the Court’s wake 
as divergences would cause a breakdown in the system.
Any excitement over this avenue, however, needs to be 
tempered by reality: first, Norway and Iceland are in the 
Schengen free movement area, making these arrangements more 
straightforward than they would be for the UK; and, second, 
the agreements have taken over a decade to work up and are still 
not operational.
The old Council of Europe extradition system that pre-dated 
the EAW is not an option either.9 Although these arrangements 
continue to cover some non-EU countries, other countries 
(including Ireland) have removed or altered their domestic 
legislation based on the old system following the establishment 
of the EAW.10 This means that new legislation would be needed 
in the UK, and compliant legislation reintroduced in other 
European countries, to restart the Council of Europe system 
(House of Lords European Union Committee, 2016b, para 147).
Policing cooperation
Europol is the EU’s police cooperation agency. Its primary 
function is to support the law enforcement authorities of EU 
Member States in tackling serious cross-border crime. Only 
EU Member States are entitled to full membership of Europol, 
though many other states enjoy strategic and operational 
partnerships. Some non-EU partners operate bureaux of law 
enforcement offices within Europol’s headquarters. Such a 
partnership arrangement does not, however, substitute for full 
involvement in Europol (Campbell, L., 2017, p 4). It would, 
8 EU Council Decision 2006/697/EC, Article 36 and 37.
9 European Convention on Extradition (13 December 1957).
10 European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (Ireland), s 50.
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much like the Norway/Iceland suspect surrender agreement, 
take time to conclude and be subject to the approval of the 
European Parliament. Historically, the UK government has 
wanted Europol to remain an intergovernmental tool for 
policing cooperation. It has resisted moves towards more 
integrated policing and autonomous capacity to tackle cross-
border crime (Weyembergh, 2017). However, with Brexit 
removing the UK from the equation, it is likely that further 
integration of European policing will proceed speedily. This 
makes the UK’s demands for inclusion from the outside seem 
all the more unlikely, with its demands for inclusion in Europol 
while having a series of opt-outs likely to receive a frosty 
reception from other members.
Local arrangements can supplement these EU policing 
arrangements in some respects. Prior to Brexit, the two-way 
relationship between law enforcement authorities on the island 
of Ireland was strengthened by a Joint Agency Task Force 
(Northern Ireland Executive, 2015). The Task Force consists 
of officers from the PSNI, An Garda Síochána, the Revenue 
Commissioners and HM Revenue and Customs, and enhances 
cooperation on specific areas of cross-border crime (Northern 
Ireland Executive, 2015, para 3.2). However, the operations of 
this Task Force will become a pressing problem post-Brexit as 
much of the legal basis for the sharing of information between 
police forces rests upon EU law. Post-Brexit, the PSNI and the 
Gardaí will likely have to devote more resources to cross-border 
crime, including smuggling and people trafficking. Should 
the legal movement of goods or people across the land border 
become more difficult, criminals will likely find it increasingly 
lucrative to develop ways to circumvent these restrictions (House 
of Lords European Union Committee, 2016a, para 150).
These cooperative justice arrangements have yet to receive 
much detailed attention from the UK government in the 
run-up to Brexit. Negotiation updates show that, at the time 
of writing, there is at best partial agreement on the draft 
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Withdrawal Agreement with respect to police and judicial 
cooperation during the Brexit transition period. That even less 
has been achieved on the future, post-Brexit relationship only 
emphasises how much of the legal landscape is still uncharted 
while discussions on trade policy drag on.
Conclusion
Northern Ireland is entwined in human rights provisions from 
international, EU and UK law. As Brexit looms, the difficulties of 
trying to wrench Northern Ireland from a complex landscape of 
human rights protections are becoming clearer. This complexity 
is not, however, an excuse for shortcuts that will have very real 
impacts on people’s lives. As we have demonstrated, Brexit 
threatens the GFA’s requirements for equivalence of rights in 
both parts of the island of Ireland and for the non-diminution of 
rights in Northern Ireland’s law. It does this by eroding human 
rights protections based entirely or partially in EU law and by 
undermining the current mix of official human rights oversight 
bodies. It also cuts across Ireland and Northern Ireland’s current 
cooperative justice arrangements, with no real sign of what will 
replace these (if anything).
In this chapter, we have explored the emergence of the 
principles of non-diminution and equivalence within the 
withdrawal negotiations. This appearance was not accidental, 
but drew on the GFA. These two key principles mark an effort 
to address some of the risks inherent in Brexit by preventing a 
gap opening between rights provisions applicable in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. They could also spur a re-engagement with 
the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights project in order to produce 
human rights arrangements that address the needs of Northern 
Ireland’s distinctive post-Brexit position. Such measures could 
offer real – if controversial – solutions to the human rights issues 
raised by Brexit (that is if politics surrounding Northern Ireland 
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and Brexit ever manages to move on from what ‘full alignment’ 
means for trade).
Many have disagreed about the degree to which the GFA 
justifies the path that negotiations are taking. However, for all 
the talk of a peace process in Northern Ireland, a peace agreement 
like the GFA exerts a powerful push towards the status quo. 
The peace process unfolds incrementally, and the overarching 
deal is implemented and tweaked as circumstances demand (for 
instance, changes brought about by agreements from St Andrews 
to Stormont House). However, the GFA is still the overarching 
agreement and is very much operative. This means that the 
tools of the GFA must work to counteract changes that would 
be an undue ‘win’ for one side or the other, or the conditions 
necessary for peace cannot hold. The inclusion of the GFA’s 
non-diminution and equivalence requirements in the Brexit 
process is in part down to the strong bargaining position of the 
EU, but in any case, it is impossible to ignore such an important 
peace agreement in the midst of such huge upheaval.
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SIx
Constitutional change
I always maintained that our loyalties had an order – to 
Ulster, to Ireland, to the British Archipelago, to Europe; 
and that anyone who skipped a step or missed a link 
falsified the total. (John Hewitt, 1964)
Introduction
Brexit will not simply reshape the UK’s relationship with the 
European Union (EU); it will upset what the Belfast poet 
John Hewitt understood as multiple interdependent layers of 
governance and identity. In so doing, it could trigger wholesale 
reform in the legal and political rules by which the UK and 
Ireland are governed. This chapter examines these constitutional 
implications and explores how these countries’ constitutions are 
shaping the negotiation and delivery of Brexit. We first examine 
how a narrative of friction between the UK Constitution and 
EU membership produced ideas of the UK ‘taking back control’ 
through Brexit, and the ramifications of this mantra for the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU. We then assess how Brexit 
impacts upon the ‘territorial’ aspects of the UK Constitution: 
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its devolution arrangements, and the shared rules holding the 
UK together. Finally, in relation to the UK, we consider how 
well the UK Constitution protects the terms of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) that are threatened by Brexit.
We then examine the Irish Constitution and its relationship 
with Northern Ireland, particularly changes that have been 
made to the Irish Constitution by developments in Northern 
Ireland (including to the foundations of the state, citizenship and 
religion). These frequent adaptations to the Irish Constitution 
in light of Ireland’s relationship with Northern Ireland open up 
the possibility of changes to electoral laws post Brexit giving 
Irish citizens in Northern Ireland the ability to vote in European 
Figure 5: Nested governance in the pre-Brexit UK context
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elections. Another prospect is the passing of measures to reflect 
the possibility of the eventual unification of Ireland within the 
EU. This chapter closes with a review of mechanisms by which 
the GFA could be amended to facilitate certain aspects of Brexit, 
and what could happen if the UK sought to unilaterally alter or 
abandon its obligations.
Governance, disordered
Prior to Brexit, some theorists liked to imagine that a neat 
hierarchy of governance applied to territories within the EU 
(Ostrom, 1990, p 90). The constitutional orders of many EU 
states, and particularly larger ones like Germany and Spain, 
conform to this multi-level governance ideal, maintaining 
central, regional and local institutions. The EU operates over 
the top of these, providing a set of common rules that apply 
in areas in which the Member States have agreed to pool their 
powers (competences). Further EU harmonisation is driven by 
the promise that it is worth sacrificing some autonomy for the 
increased prosperity that cooperation brings across Member 
States (Della Sala, 2010, p 5).
Brexit pulls apart this orderly picture. The central feature of 
EU law is removed, to potentially be replaced by one or more 
two-way agreements on future EU–UK relations. Moreover, 
the relationship between national (Westminster) and devolved 
institutions (Northern Ireland Assembly, Welsh Assembly and 
Scottish Parliament) in the UK is unsettled. The big idea, in 
constitutional terms, is to restore the freedom of action of UK-
based institutions, but this depends on an unrealistically rigid 
view of these governance layers, where higher layers always 
exert control over lower ones (Della Cananea, 2010, p 307).
Two parts of the UK (England and Wales) voted to leave the 
EU in June 2016, while the other two (Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) voted to remain. Against the backdrop of the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014, and the weaknesses of 
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power-sharing in Northern Ireland, Brexit increases the stresses 
upon the Union. These cracks will deepen further if Brexit does 
not deliver benefits across the UK. Without some sort of shared 
benefit, it will be very difficult to rebuild a national discussion; as 
one senior UK minister recognised, ‘[w] e could leave as a nation 
divided; a country split; an economy disjointed – struggling to 
forge a unified consensus’ (Liddington, 2018).
Brexit will, at the very least, alter the UK’s devolution 
arrangements. The first stage of this redefinition has involved 
clashes over whether powers coming back from EU institutions 
should go to the UK’s central government or be transferred 
to devolved governments. This has involved arguments 
over transport, fisheries and agriculture powers (which have 
traditionally been devolved). The umbrella nature of EU law 
has meant that any internal borders (including within the UK) 
have been prohibited. However, with EU law being removed 
in the era of devolution, there is a real possibility that the UK’s 
constituent parts could take different paths and disrupt the 
smoothness of the UK’s own internal market. As Brexit looms, 
this means that brand new constitutional arrangements will be 
needed to cover areas that will soon become shared or mixed 
responsibilities between central and devolved governments.
Moreover, Brexit’s constitutional upheavals do not stop 
at the UK’s borders. If Northern Ireland is to keep facing 
towards the EU in some way, as suggested by the Joint Report, 
then constitutional thinking in the Republic of Ireland will 
also be affected. The most talked-about aspect of this is how 
the unification of Ireland as an EU member state could take 
place. The Preamble of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland makes specific reference to how Brexit sits within 
a domestic constitutional backdrop and the constitutional 
arrangements that have been made cross-border between 
Ireland and the UK. It underlines the need to respect, post-
Brexit, Ireland’s membership of the EU (which is written into 
Ireland’s Constitution). The agreement by the UK and the EU 
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also highlights the constitutional importance of the GFA, in 
particular, the principles of consent, power-sharing in Northern 
Ireland, North–South cooperation and the ability of the people 
of Northern Ireland to choose Irish or UK citizenship.
The UK Constitution
Hooked on a feeling: parliamentary sovereignty and Brexit
Much of the debate ahead of the 2016 Brexit referendum was 
framed in constitutional terms. Indeed, the Vote Leave slogan 
of ‘Take Back Control’ spoke directly to returning the EU’s 
law-making competences and enforcement powers to UK 
institutions. The message was that EU membership undermined 
the UK Parliament’s ability to make laws as it pleased, and instead 
gave the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) the 
final say over the compatibility of UK law with EU law. In 
short, EU membership was presented as incompatible with the 
UK Constitution. This alleged misfit has continued to define 
the Brexit debate as Theresa May’s government has sought to 
fulfil the promise of the Vote Leave slogan, despite rejecting the 
premise of the Vote Leave argument: ‘Whilst Parliament has 
remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it 
has not always felt like that’ (May, 2017a, para 2.1).
The feeling that EU law is incompatible with the UK 
Constitution grew out of A.V. Dicey’s influential 19th-century 
writings. Dicey presented Westminster as a sovereign Parliament, 
able to make or alter any law it chose through the ordinary 
process of passing a statute. This pure account of parliamentary 
sovereignty rejected the notion that any other body could 
challenge Parliament’s laws (Dicey, 1885, pp 39–40). Leading 
Brexiteers such as Michael Gove have therefore insisted that 
for as long as the CJEU can rule that EU law is superior to 
UK statutes that conflict with it, this established account of the 
sovereign UK Parliament has been toppled (Wade, 1996, p 575).
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In reality, this search for the feeling of sovereignty was always 
somewhat misguided. The UK’s senior judiciary, schooled in 
Dicey’s traditional approaches to the UK Constitution, took 
some time to accept that the law required them to ‘disapply’ 
UK statutes that conflict with European law. Long after other 
countries had recognised these obligations in full, European 
lawyers continued to fret about ‘the delicate problem of Britain’ 
(Weiler, 1990, p 19). This all changed with the Factortame case, 
in which the UK’s courts finally acknowledged that ‘it has always 
been clear’ under the European Communities Act 1972 that 
enforceable rules of European law would have priority even over 
more recently passed conflicting domestic statutes.1 The ‘always’ 
saved the Court’s blushes over not having been previously clear 
on this crucial point.
The Factortame judgment was nonetheless grounded in the 
reality that the UK Parliament had authorised the UK to join the 
EU, and that its authority could always be restored if it revoked 
that authorisation. It still held the strings and, as such, there 
was no fundamental incompatibility between EU membership 
and the UK Constitution (Gordon, 2016, pp 341–2). After the 
Brexit referendum, the UK Supreme Court confirmed in Miller 
that EU law would only be a source of UK law for as long as the 
European Communities Act 1972 was operative, and that the 
UK Parliament had to authorise the process of leaving the EU.2
Concerns over the role of EU law nonetheless continue to 
dominate the UK government’s thinking over Brexit. They are 
the motivation behind the following ‘red line’ in Theresa May’s 
Lancaster House speech:
1 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 
AC 603, 659 (Lord Bridge).
2 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [65], [121].
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[W]e will take back control of our laws and bring an end 
to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in 
Britain. Leaving the European Union will mean that our 
laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and 
Belfast. And those laws will be interpreted by judges not 
in Luxembourg but in courts across this country. Because 
we will not have truly left the European Union if we are 
not in control of our own laws. (May, 2017c)
For a hard core of Brexiteers, these concerns would rule out 
the UK joining the European Economic Area or accepting the 
jurisdiction of the European Free Trade Association Court (on 
the basis that it usually follows rulings of the CJEU). This led 
David Davis (2017b) to downplay these options when he was 
Brexit Secretary.
These rows have a long and convoluted backstory. 
Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party was galvanised 
by the battles over the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. For 
the Eurosceptics, the transformation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) into the EU was a step too far, extending 
the reach of the European project beyond its proper goal of 
removing barriers to cross-border trade. Just a few decades 
later, many of the same politicians refuse to envisage continuing 
membership of much of the Single Market by exiting the EU 
into the European Economic Area, despite its more restrictive 
focus. This is despite the fact that the supposedly ‘unimaginative’ 
(May, 2017d) European Economic Area option would, at a 
stroke, address some of the most pressing issues of citizenship, 
cross-border trade and rights that Brexit creates for the island 
of Ireland (House of Commons Exiting the European Union 
Committee, 2018b, para 181).
The fantasy of control not only dominated the referendum 
debate, but has come to artificially constrain the shape of Brexit. 
It thrives on the assumption that a bilateral UK–EU free trade 
arrangement will allow much more control over domestic 
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policymaking by UK institutions than alternative options 
such as European Economic Area membership would. This 
attraction towards free trade arrangements neglects the fact that 
such arrangements (when they eventually take shape) would 
be so central to the UK economy that they would, in fact, be 
extremely constraining on UK law and would be difficult to 
alter in practice. The difficulties in creating such an arrangement, 
not least in terms of reconciling it with the GFA’s requirements, 
must ultimately prompt the question of just what is worth giving 
up for the feeling of sovereignty.
Devolution and the UK Constitution
The UK Constitution, unlike most others around the world, is 
famously not presented in a single document that is superior to 
other rules in its legal order. In this ‘uncodified’ Constitution, 
there are a number of conventions – political rules that regulate 
the relationships within and between public institutions. 
Although these conventions are not enforceable in courts, 
breaches of them can be described as unconstitutional.3 Some 
of these constitutional conventions apply to the relationship 
between Westminster and the devolved legislatures in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, and they could significantly 
complicate the process of Brexit.
These devolution conventions are relatively new elements 
within the UK Constitution. Between the 1920s and the 
early 1970s, the Westminster Parliament had a practice of not 
interfering when it came to matters that had been entrusted to the 
Northern Ireland Parliament. This practice was never elevated 
to the level of full constitutional convention. There was never 
any sense that the UK Parliament was prevented from making 
law for Northern Ireland (Calvert, 1968, pp 90–1). Devolution 
3 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [148].
122
BORDERING TWO UNIONS
after 1998 was different. Lord Sewel, a minister responsible for 
getting the 1998 devolution legislation through Parliament, 
made a commitment during the process that was to stick. He 
promised that once devolution was operational, ‘Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters 
in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’ 
(Sewel, 1998). This promise (which became a constitutional 
convention) also covers Wales and Northern Ireland (Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister, 2001, para 13) and has more recently 
been recognised in the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017. 
When Westminster wishes to pass law in devolved areas, it asks 
for the permission of the assemblies, and consent is granted by 
the devolved legislature passing a Legislative Consent Motion.
This is the same for Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Assembly 
Standing Orders, 2016, 42A, para 10). Westminster legislation 
that covers a ‘devolution matter’ needs a Legislative Consent 
Motion. There are two main categories of devolution matter: 
(1) a measure touching on a power that has been transferred to 
Northern Ireland’s institutions (eg an attempt by Westminster 
to change health-care provision in Northern Ireland law); and 
(2) a measure that tries to alter the Assembly’s powers (eg one 
which changes the Assembly’s powers to make law concerning 
policing).4 Therefore, in ordinary circumstances, because the 
UK Parliament’s European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, 
Trade Bill and its proposed agriculture and fisheries legislation 
will all change aspects of the Assembly’s powers, Lord Sewel’s 
convention would trigger the need for a Legislative Consent 
Motion. With the additional complexities of the Assembly’s 
power-sharing arrangements, such consent would undoubtedly 
require cross-community support (Northern Ireland Act 1998 
(UK), section 42).
4 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [140].
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The collapse of the Assembly in early 2017, however, 
undermines these constitutional safeguards for devolution. 
There is no functioning body to provide a Legislative Consent 
Motion, so the UK government can avoid this hurdle. While 
the Assembly is inoperative, the UK government has pledged 
to inform the Northern Ireland parties regarding withdrawal 
negotiations. In practice, however, this consultation has been 
uneven. Immediately before the Joint Report between the UK 
and the EU was concluded, the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) enjoyed a virtual veto over the UK negotiating position 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland issues. This was a direct result of 
the confidence-and-supply agreement between the Conservative 
Party and the DUP at Westminster; the DUP were propping 
up a minority Conservative government. This close relationship 
calls into question the UK government’s ability to deal with the 
parties in Northern Ireland equally, as is required by the GFA.
However, as uncomfortable as the Prime Minister’s current 
position is, it is not without its benefits. Undoubtedly, the 
Conservative Party would rather it did not need to rely 
upon the DUP to govern. The government has also publicly 
insisted that it finds the collapse of the Assembly in Northern 
Ireland ‘incredibly frustrating’ (House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Committee, 2018, Q336). However, it still likely finds 
the current state of affairs preferable to the alternative of an 
operative Assembly. If the Assembly was functioning, the need 
for a Legislative Consent Motion would be undeniable and the 
Nationalist parties would, in all likelihood, have the votes to 
frustrate it.
In May 2018, the Scottish Parliament voted overwhelmingly 
to reject a Legislative Consent Motion for the withdrawal 
legislation, and a battle over its alternate legislation is set to 
be played out before the UK Supreme Court. Although the 
UK government will consider that the law remains stacked in 
its favour in light of the clause in the devolution legislation 
that confirms Westminster’s sovereignty (Scotland Act 1998 
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(UK), section 28(7)), this struggle consumes considerable UK 
Government attention at a key stage in the Brexit process, and 
threatens to create an image of Scotland being bullied into 
Brexit. These factors enable the Scottish National Party, in 
office in the Scottish Parliament, to extract either concessions 
or profit electorally from the UK government’s failure to 
compromise. For as long as its power-sharing institutions are 
broken, Northern Ireland is instead reliant upon backroom 
dealings between the UK government and the DUP.
Establishing rules for the UK’s common market
In the early 20th century, borders as barriers to trade were 
largely thought of in terms of tariffs (see Chapter Three). 
Therefore, when Northern Ireland gained a measure of devolved 
governance under the terms of the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920, sections 21 and 22 prevented its institutions from 
exercising any authority over customs and excise duties. These 
measures were intended to ‘secure uniformity’ across the UK and 
were seen as essential to the functioning of the UK economy 
as a common market (Newark, 1954, p 552). However, as new 
borders went up across Europe with the collapse of old empires at 
the end of the First World War, things moved on from concerns 
about tariffs. Economists took increasing notice of a wider range 
of barriers to trade (Slobodian, 2018, p 42) and borders came 
to be seen as dividing up systems of regulation, not simply as 
places at which tariffs were applied.
An early acknowledgement of this issue came in the 1920 
legislation, which prevented the Northern Ireland Parliament 
from enacting measures to affect trade ‘with any place out of the 
part of Ireland within its jurisdiction’ (Government of Ireland Act 
1920 (UK), section 4(7)). This awkwardly phrased restriction 
applied to measures adopted towards other countries, including 
Ireland, and to trade with other parts of the UK. It was an effort 
to stop the Northern Ireland Parliament from setting up its own 
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set of regulatory arrangements to protect Northern Ireland’s 
businesses against external competition. The efforts were, at 
best, only partially successful.
The 1930s were partly characterised by an old-fashioned 
trade war between the UK and Ireland, involving a tit-for-tat 
imposition of tariffs on each other’s produce. The Northern 
Ireland Parliament joined in, opening up a more novel front 
in this skirmish through the introduction of special regulations 
governing the sale of milk (Milk and Milk Products Act (NI), 
1934). It was said that the purpose of the legislation was to 
protect public health, but its impact was really to shield Northern 
Ireland’s farmers against external competition. Businesses from 
the Irish Free State, which were not entitled to licences to 
sell dairy products in Northern Ireland under the legislation, 
resorted to a legal challenge against the measures.
In Gallagher v Lynn, the UK’s highest court accepted that 
this measure was not taken to restrain trade. It adopted a 
clearly hands-off approach to the legislation, accepting that 
since the ‘pith and substance’ of the enactment was a matter of 
public health, an area within the Northern Ireland Parliament’s 
competence, it should not intervene simply because of incidental 
effects upon trade.5 Indeed, the Court would only accept that 
a direct prohibition on trade would raise issues of compatibility 
with the 1920 Act. However, what the Court did not consider 
was that the terms of the legislation, requiring inspections by 
authorities within Northern Ireland, prevented the supply of 
milk by farms in other parts of the UK into the Northern 
Ireland market.
Perhaps the Court would have been more alive to this barrier 
had a less perishable commodity than milk been at issue, but the 
effect of this short judgment was to let the Northern Ireland 
Parliament away with it; the legislation ‘seemed to run very near 
to protectionism in its effect, and it is hard to credit that this 
5 Gallagher v Lynn [1937] AC 863, 870 (Lord Atkin).
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effect could not have been foreseen’ (Calvert, 1968, pp 128–9). 
Gallagher v Lynn has nonetheless remained highly influential 
in the current era of devolution. In Martin v Lord Advocate, 
a majority in the UK Supreme Court endorsed the ongoing 
relevance of the ‘pith and substance test’.6 They did so, notably, 
over a vigorous dissent led by Lord Rodger,7 who viewed this 
approach as overly generous to the devolved legislatures and not 
supported by the language of the devolution legislation.
The sudden denial of access for Donegal dairy farmers from 
their long-established market in Derry/Londonderry in the 
1930s brings into focus some of the risks that borders can pose. 
It also shows the importance of ‘regulatory alignment’ post-
Brexit and says much about the difficulties in maintaining a UK 
common market post-Brexit. When powers were devolved to 
institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998, 
the boundaries of EU law were all expressly secured against 
adverse devolved legislation, including the rules of the European 
Single Market. After Brexit, a new legislative superstructure will 
be needed to prevent disruptive differences in regulation from 
appearing across the UK.
The UK government’s solution to this issue is to return all EU 
oversight functions to central government through the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act, and then later decide how to divide 
up these powers within the UK:
[S]ome powers are clearly related to the UK as a whole and 
will need to continue to apply in the same way across all 
four nations in order to protect consumers and businesses 
who buy and sell across the UK, in all parts of what we 
might call the United Kingdom’s common market. That 
market is one of the fundamental expressions of the 
6 Martin v Lord Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, [13]-[15] (Lord Hope).
7 Martin v Lord Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, [140].
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constitutional integrity that underpins our existence as a 
union. (Liddington, 2018)
The UK government, in other words, wants a window of 
time to work out how a UK common market will function. 
The Scottish government, however, regards this approach as 
an insult to the devolution settlement. As we saw earlier, the 
Scottish Parliament refused a Legislative Consent Motion for 
the Withdrawal Act on the basis of this issue, and the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) might well have the leverage to squeeze 
concessions out of the UK government. Until the new rules 
supporting a UK common market are devised, retained EU law 
will, ironically, continue to provide the backbone of the UK 
common market.
This can be illustrated by a more recent example of how 
regulation can cause borders; this time, though, the drink 
in question is a little harder than milk. When the Scottish 
government introduced minimum pricing for alcohol, drinks 
manufacturers launched a challenge on the basis of EU law 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 34–36). 
They argued that a measure supposedly adopted for health 
purposes was actually a disguised restriction upon trade. The 
UK Supreme Court recognised that the Scottish Parliament and 
government put a greater weight upon ‘combatting alcohol-
related mortality’ than it did upon ‘the benefits of free EU trade 
and competition’.8 The Court’s conclusion was that it ‘was a 
judgment which it was for [the Scottish authorities] to make, and 
their right to make it militates strongly against intrusive review by 
a domestic court’. This outcome is entirely justifiable in this case, 
but the Court’s reasoning is still very hands off where devolved 
legislatures are at issue. More active judicial engagement will 
8 Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate [2017] UKSC 76, [63] (Lord 
Mance).
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be necessary in future cases if the UK common market is not 
to be undermined from the outset.
Constitutional instruments in an uncodified constitutional system
Brexit throws up another difficulty with the uncodified UK 
Constitution. Sometimes, it has appeared that the Constitution 
‘is no more and no less than what happens’ (Griffith, 1979, 
p 19). This implies that all statutes are simply ordinary law and 
no law enjoys special protection. This creates a difficulty for laws 
that we regard as particularly important to running the UK. In 
other words, is it sensible to discuss the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 (NIA), which was the foundation of much of Northern 
Ireland’s devolution, as a ‘constitutional statute’? Likewise, 
can we discuss the GFA as a ‘constitutional treaty’ in order to 
suggest that it has a meaningful special status within the UK’s 
legal order? Moreover, once Brexit is done and dusted, what 
protections in domestic law will protect any special provisions 
put in place within the Brexit deal to cover Northern Ireland?
The NIA might have provided ‘in effect a constitution’ for 
Northern Ireland,9 but the UK constitution does not give it 
any court-enforceable protections against ordinary processes 
of deletion and change. At best, if the courts do treat it as a 
constitutional statute, the NIA could be subject to special rules 
of interpretation.10 This might involve judges refusing to allow 
its terms to be altered by words in a later statute that are not 
specific. However, this is a limited protection; it does not prevent 
the UK Parliament taking clear and direct steps to repeal the 
NIA or alter its terms (in the language of UK constitutional 
law, to effect an ‘express’ repeal). Under a ‘pure’ account of 
parliamentary sovereignty, then, even the principle of consent, 
9 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [11] 
(Lord Bingham).
10 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [60] (Laws LJ).
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by which the people of Northern Ireland have to approve 
any change in its status as part of the UK (Northern Ireland Act 
1998 (UK), section 1), could be ignored by the Westminster 
Parliament if a majority of MPs insisted on doing so.
For some Brexiteers, the NIA provides the whole story when 
it comes to the UK’s GFA commitments:
[A]ll the substantive protections that were intended after 
1998 to protect the Belfast agreement in Northern Ireland’s 
domestic law were introduced either in the Northern 
Ireland Act, or in specific statutes that still apply or will 
apply in retained law as a consequence of this legislation. 
(Cox, 2017)
In short, for as long as the NIA remains on the statute books, 
the UK’s GFA obligations have been fulfilled. The NIA is, 
however, a partial translation of the GFA’s terms into domestic 
law. The principles of non-diminution and equivalence that can 
be extrapolated from the GFA are nowhere to be found in this 
statute (see Chapter Five). Under UK constitutional law, the 
NIA, at best, amounts to a ‘constitutional’ statute which reflects 
parts of a broader treaty. Senior UK judges have long sought 
to interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent with the 
UK’s international obligations.11 However, it should be possible, 
even within the terms of the UK’s dualist Constitution (which 
separates out domestic and international law), for the courts 
to go further and to recognise that in certain circumstances, 
treaties, and not simply incorporating legislation, can carry 
constitutional significance.
Such a ‘constitutional treaties’ concept could apply directly to 
the GFA’s special significance for Northern Ireland, and even to 
the terms of the final EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement (and, in 
11 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [27] 
(Lord Bingham).
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particular, its Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland). Under this 
approach, the courts would have to accept that the GFA, and not 
parliamentary sovereignty, is the ‘ultimate political fact’ (Wade, 
1955, p 188) of Northern Ireland’s system of governance. If it is 
accepted that the GFA’s terms provide the true foundations of 
this system, how could this proposition affect future litigation 
over Brexit? First, these issues have not been fully explored in 
any case to date. In the Miller case, the NIA and GFA were a 
bit of a ‘sideshow’ before the UK Supreme Court (McCrudden 
and Halberstam, 2017, p 343). The Court did not have to rule 
on their legal impact on the UK government’s efforts to trigger 
Brexit because it had already concluded that Parliament would 
have to approve starting the withdrawal process.12 Much remains 
that could be litigated. Second, it is arguable that Brexit does 
not necessarily undermine the GFA; it is just (very) difficult to 
accommodate within the GFA’s terms. Therefore, nothing in 
the Miller judgment prevents a future challenge if the final Brexit 
terms do not make an adequate accommodation. For as long as 
the GFA remains in force, we would argue that the UK Courts 
should be receptive to challenges to Brexit developments that 
undercut its terms.
The UK government has repeatedly confirmed its commitment 
to the GFA as a whole. However, with some of its implications 
unclear (or subject to conflicting interpretations), and the 
stakes in Brexit so high, pressure could mount to not comply 
with certain GFA provisions. In such circumstances, the 
lack of safeguards provided by the UK’s domestic law puts 
considerable emphasis on the good faith of the current and 
future UK governments when it comes to securing the UK’s 
GFA obligations. Parliament can, however, play a key role in 
ensuring that the UK government sticks to its commitments. In 
the course of enacting the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
12 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [129].
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2018, parliamentarians have already obliged the UK government 
to limit the scope of ministerial powers to revise statutes post-
Brexit in light of the UK’s undertakings in the December 2017 
Joint Report (see Chapter 5). If the Brexit negotiations produce 
a deal on Northern Ireland issues, the UK government will be 
expected to embody the key requirements of its Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland in domestic law. This will arguably 
require a statute which cannot be repealed for as long as any 
EU-UK deal remains in place (much as other laws which conflict 
with the European Communities Act 1972 will be disapplied 
by the courts, in line with the Factortame ruling, for as long as 
the UK remains in the EU). In other words, if any EU-UK 
deal is to be struck, Parliament is likely going to have to accept 
restrictions on its sovereignty where Northern Ireland is at issue.
This analysis assumes that UK domestic law will ultimately 
provide adequate protections for Northern Ireland’s special 
constitutional status post Brexit. There are certainly considerable 
incentives to take such steps; if UK legislation does not provide 
adequate safeguards, any deal over the future of UK-EU relations 
will be jeopardised. Later in this chapter, however, we consider 
other routes to protecting the GFA under international law.
A border poll
A further constitutional concern raised by Brexit is the principle 
of consent. As discussed earlier, the idea that it is for the people 
of Northern Ireland to determine its constitutional status as 
part of the UK or part of a united Ireland is central to the GFA 
(GFA, section 2, para (1)(i)).13 It proceeds to state that ‘it would 
be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland 
save with the consent of a majority of its people’ (GFA, section 
13 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (with annexes) (Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement) (1998) 2114 UNTS 473.
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2, para (1)(iii)). As we have seen, this commitment is front-and-
centre within the NIA, and its importance is reaffirmed in the 
context of the Brexit negotiations in the Phase 1 Report (Joint 
Report, 2017, para 44).
These commitments are ordinarily interpreted as applying to 
a ‘border poll’ on the status of Northern Ireland as part of the 
UK. Indeed, in the Miller case, the UK Supreme Court made 
short work of the argument that the GFA required the assent 
of the people of Northern Ireland to trigger Brexit: section 1 
did not cover ‘any other change in the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland’.14 This majority position is emphatic, but 
neither supported by reasoning nor necessary for the judgment. 
It could be arguable that should the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland within the UK be significantly changed 
by any Brexit deal, for instance, establishing a Hong Kong-
style ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland such as a customs 
territory separated from the remainder of the UK (see Chapter 
Three), then the principle of consent could arguably become 
operational. Control over economic affairs is a vital marker of 
sovereignty in international law.
These questions could therefore theoretically boomerang back 
to the UK Supreme Court once the Brexit deal is concluded, 
with less room for the judges to sidestep fundamental questions 
about Northern Ireland’s constitutional arrangements, as they 
did in Miller. However, even if Miller indicates that such claims 
might be unfavourably received, there is a much greater chance 
that if Brexit goes awry for Northern Ireland, pressure for a 
border poll will grow. Theresa May is reported as not being 
confident of the Unionists winning such a poll if Brexit brought 
with it a hard border (Helm and Savage, 2018). Any question 
of such a border poll, moreover, also requires us to reflect upon 
14 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [135].
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Ireland’s Constitution, and the need for the people of Ireland 
to also consent to unification by referendum.
The Irish Constitution
Ireland, the UK and Northern Ireland
The 1937 Irish Constitution and its predecessor, the 1922 Free 
State Constitution, both set out the ways in which Ireland 
has dealt with Northern Ireland and the wider UK. The 
consequences of the 1921 Treaty, which ended the Irish War 
of Independence and created the Free State, and the evolution 
of both the UK and Irish constitutional infrastructures continue 
to have significance for Northern Ireland and are relevant to 
understanding the post-Brexit landscape.
The GFA led to a referendum in Ireland to replace Articles 2 
and 3 of the Irish Constitution. New Articles 2 and 3 recognise 
the diversity of identities and traditions on the island and 
enshrine the principle of consent for any changes to the status 
of Northern Ireland. The amendment also requires consent in 
both Ireland and Northern Ireland for any move towards a united 
Ireland. Emerging directly from the GFA, the Irish Constitution 
distinguishes between the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’, though neither 
is expressly defined. Broadly, the nation is understood as the 
island as a whole, including Northern Ireland, while the state 
is the political unit, which excludes Northern Ireland. Some 
argue that the nation under the constitution could encompass 
Irish people living abroad (Forde and Leonard, 2013).
There were previous attempts at rewording these Articles. 
The 1967 Committee on the Constitution suggested alternative 
wording for Article 3.1: ‘The Irish nation hereby proclaims 
its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and 
brotherly affection between all Irishmen’ (Informal Committee 
on the Constitution, 1967, pp 5–6). Although it is unclear 
whether their harmonious vision included sisterly affection(!), 
it is interesting to consider whether brotherly affection in this 
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context would be much different to, or extend beyond, the 
principle of consent currently in the Constitution.
Under Article 5 of the Sunningdale Agreement, which was 
a first and ultimately failed attempt at a peace settlement in 
Northern Ireland in 1973, the Irish government accepted that 
any change of status for Northern Ireland would require a 
majority decision of the population. However, this guarantee 
was lessened by the decision in Boland v An Taoiseach,15 where 
the Supreme Court stated that Article 5 of Sunningdale did 
not negate the claim to sovereignty over the Northern Ireland 
territory claimed under the original terms of Articles 2 and 3 
(Dorr, 2017, chs 13 and 19). In the wake of the Boland case, a 
clear statement regarding the meaning of consent was necessary 
(O’Duffy, 1999). This influenced the decision to align the 
words of the new Articles 2 and 3 with the terms of the GFA. 
These provisions of the Irish Constitution expressly affirm that 
a referendum will be needed in both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland to authorise unification:
Article 2
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born 
in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, 
to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement 
of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law 
to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation 
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry 
living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.
Article 3
1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and 
friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory 
15 Boland v An Taoiseach [1974] IR 338.
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of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities 
and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be 
brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of 
a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both 
jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by 
the Parliament established by this constitution shall have 
the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted 
by the Parliament that existed immediately before the 
coming into operation of this constitution.
2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are 
shared between those jurisdictions may be established by 
their respective responsible authorities for stated purposes 
and may exercise powers and functions in respect of all or 
any part of the island.
Article 3.2 sets the basis for existing cross-border bodies that 
make decisions relevant to the entire island. This was essential in 
the creation of bodies in the areas of tourism, energy or health 
care, and may again become important to any new institutions 
that are set up post-Brexit.
Earlier, we discussed how the UK Constitution affords 
few protections to some of the fundamental aspects of the 
governance order (such as the GFA, devolution and EU law). 
The Irish Constitution is more proactive. The 1998 referendum, 
in addition to amending Articles 2 and 3, also introduced 
Article 29.7, which gives the GFA constitutional status in 
Ireland. Article 29 is the same provision that contains Ireland’s 
commitments to the EU and its other international obligations:
Article 29.7
1˚ The State may consent to be bound by the British–Irish 
[Good Friday] Agreement done at Belfast on the 10th day 
of April, 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement.
136
BORDERING TWO UNIONS
The GFA referendum also introduced Article 29.8, which 
enables the Irish state to extend citizenship beyond Ireland, as 
well as other extraterritorial rights, including potentially voting.
The relationship between the UK and Ireland has influenced 
other parts of Ireland’s Constitution in more subtle ways. For 
instance, a 1996 Constitutional Review Group noted that Article 
44 contains provisions directly related to historical constitutional 
settlements between Ireland and Britain. The non-endowment 
clause in Article 44.2.2° and the non-discrimination clause in 
Article 44.2.3° find their basis in Article 8 of the Free State 
Constitution, Article 16 of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Government of Ireland 
Bills of 1886 and 1893 (Constitutional Review Group, 1996). 
Further, the Intermediate Education (Ireland) Act 1878 and the 
1831 ‘Stanley letter’ are directly related to Articles 44.2.4˚– 6˚, 
which are the basis of the Irish education system. In contrast, 
Article 44.1 (respect for religion), Article 44.2.1° (freedom 
of conscience and free practice of religion) and the repealed 
provision Article 44.1.3˚ (the special position of the Catholic 
Church and recognition of the other Churches) emerged in the 
deliberations on the 1937 Constitution.
Referendums to remove or replace sections of the 1937 
Constitution in reaction to developments in Northern Ireland 
pre-date the GFA. For example, Articles 44.1.2˚– 3˚, whose 
original aim was to contrast Ireland with the UK, also recognised 
the importance of the Protestant minority so as to remove any 
suggestion of discrimination in the new Irish state. Article 
44.1 noted the special place of the Catholic Church while also 
recognising the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian, Methodist 
and Quaker congregations, and Jewish congregations (critical 
in 1937) as existing. This provision was repealed in 1972 by 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, by a vote of 84% 
(Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local 
Government, 2016), in a move partly conceived as an olive 
branch towards Protestants in Northern Ireland (Daly, 2012). 
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As the 1967 Constitutional Review Group stated, these sections 
were:
a useful weapon in the hands of those who are anxious to 
emphasise the differences between North and South … 
[t] he deletion of this provision would, in particular, dispel 
any doubts and suspicions which may linger in the minds 
of non-Catholics, North and South of the Border, and 
remove an unnecessary source of mischievous and specious 
criticism. (Informal Committee on the Constitution, 
1967)
Today, the Preamble and Article 44.1 are the only sections of 
the Constitution that invoke a specific Christian and natural 
rights basis to the Irish state.16 The 1996 Constitutional 
Review Group recommended that the Preamble be replaced 
with a simple statement or wording that removed religious 
references in order to reflect the modern Irish state. The latter 
option included a section recognising the diverse origins and 
traditions, ethnic, historical, political and spiritual, their varying 
social and cultural heritages, and the sacrifices and sufferings, 
as well as the achievements, of the people’s forebears, and that 
any aspirations to unity should be achieved peacefully through 
reconciliation and consent (Constitutional Review Group, 1996). 
Currently, there are no plans to alter the Preamble, albeit that 
Article 3 now recognises some of the sentiments suggested by 
the Constitutional Review Group in 1996.
16 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284, The State (Healy) v Donoghue 
[1976] IR 325, King v Attorney General [1981] IR 233, Norris v Attorney 
General [1984] IR 36, and Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.
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voting rights post-Brexit
In Ireland, voting law is a mix of constitutional and statutory 
regulation, which, at the moment, limits voting to those resident 
and present in the state at the time of the vote. This excludes 
those in Northern Ireland with Irish passports. The franchise 
for the election of members of Dáil Eireann under Article 
16.1.2˚ includes ‘(i) all citizens and (ii) others in the State as 
determined by Law who are 18 and above’. This provision is 
also followed for local and presidential elections. Elections to 
the European Parliament are not covered by the Constitution 
except through the EU law adopted by it. Article 39 and 40 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights outline the voting 
rights of all EU citizens:
Article 39
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament 
in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State.
2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected 
by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.
Article 40
Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member 
State in which he or she resides under the same conditions 
as nationals of that State.
Article 22(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union furthermore states that:
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[E]very citizen of the Union residing in a Member State 
of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote 
and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament in the Member State in which he resides.17
These Articles establish voting and democratic rights as central to 
the EU’s understanding of itself and ensure that this is the same 
throughout Member States. Beyond these common standards, 
each EU state adopts its own arrangements, creating differences 
across the EU. For instance, only five states (including the UK 
and Ireland) have broken their states into multiple constituencies. 
Denmark and Italy grant a right to vote for European elections 
for some non-resident nationals living in third countries. 
Currently, Ireland has one of the most restrictive arrangements 
(alongside Bulgaria and Slovakia) in confining votes to EU 
citizens who are domiciled in Ireland. Each state imposes its 
own rules on who can be a candidate, but these must comply 
with non-discrimination, minimum age and EU citizenship 
requirements (the UK currently enjoys an exception for some 
Commonwealth citizens) (European Parliament, 2018).
As the Oireachtas Committee on EU Affairs stated, Ireland is 
among a minority of states that does not extend the right to vote 
to its citizens abroad and the severity of that restriction could be 
subject to challenge at the CJEU (Joint Committee on European 
Union Affairs, 2014). The Oireachtas Committee recommended 
that the Irish government should accept the principle that voting 
rights in EU elections should be extended to Irish citizens 
abroad. The Committee recognised that this would require 
Ireland to define citizenship more clearly. Following the use 
of ‘people of Northern Ireland’ as a category of importance 
during the Brexit process, this need for clarity is heightened. 
The recent Irish Constitutional Convention recommended 
the extension of the vote in presidential elections to citizens 
17 See also EU Council Directive 93/109/EC.
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living abroad, and, as a result, the government plans to hold a 
referendum on that question in the coming years. This process 
may provide a trigger for Ireland to re-examine all of its voting 
rules, including those for the European Parliament. However, it 
is important to note that the requirement of being ‘in the state’, 
which prevents many of the diaspora voting in Dáil, local and 
presidential elections before a constitutional amendment, does 
not apply to EU parliamentary elections. Changes to Ireland’s 
voting rules for the European Parliament could take account of 
the Brexit process through ordinary legislation.
The European Parliament Elections Acts 1997 to 2013 cover 
voting in Ireland for MEPs. Under sections 6 and 8 of the 
European Parliament Elections Act 1997, to be on the register, 
one has to be a national of an EU Member State, Ireland or, 
currently, the UK. Post-Brexit this statute will need to be revised 
to exclude the specific references to UK citizens (unless they 
also hold the citizenship of an EU Member State). It would 
appear that it would be open to Ireland to grant the right to 
vote to Irish citizens outside of Ireland in EU elections without 
the need to change the Irish Constitution or EU law. It would 
only require Ireland to amend its European Parliament Elections 
Acts. While the case is strongest for an extension of EU voting 
rights to Irish citizens in Northern Ireland, such a change could 
cover all Irish citizens living in any part of the UK.
Citizenship and the benefits that come with it are about to 
become a critical part of the post-Brexit landscape in Northern 
Ireland. The idea of Irish citizenship originated in Article 3 
of the Constitution of the Irish Free State, and whoever had 
citizenship in the Free State carried this entitlement over to the 
1937 Constitution. Under the Irish Free State Constitution, 
individuals are citizens if they: (a) had been living within the 
Irish Free State and born in Ireland; (b) had a parent who was 
born in Ireland; or (c) had been ‘ordinarily resident’ in the 
‘area of the jurisdiction’ of the Irish Free State for at least seven 
years. The Constitution’s reference to the ‘jurisdiction’ of the 
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Free State was interpreted to mean the entire island (Articles 
of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland 1921, 
Articles 11–12). This caused its own controversy and meant 
that the Northern Ireland Parliament gave notice to London 
and Dublin that it did not wish to come under the jurisdiction 
of the Free State (Parliamentary Papers of Northern Ireland, 1922, 
pp 191–2). It did this on 13 December 1922, but the Free State 
Constitution had already come into operation on 6 December 
1922. This seven-day delay caused the Court in the case of In re 
Logue to conclude that the Free State could give citizenship to 
everyone on the island (Ó Caoindealbháin, 2006).18 This rule 
was not given a legislative basis until the Irish Citizenship and 
Nationality Act 1935. Later, this wider island-based citizenship 
was reinforced under both the original text of Article 2 of the 
1937 Constitution and its 1998 replacement. Until the British 
National Act 1948 and the Ireland Act 1949, Irish citizens could 
also claim UK citizenship.
Nonetheless, to exercise the right to vote would mean that 
‘the people of Northern Ireland’ would have to prove their 
Irish citizenship (see Chapter Four). The Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1956 (amended in 2004) implements Articles 2 
and 9 of the Constitution. Article 2 of the Constitution states:
[I]t is the entitlement and birthright of every person born 
in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, 
to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement 
of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law 
to be citizens of Ireland.
This creates two categories: those who are part of the Irish nation 
and those who are citizens, with the latter the only ones bearing 
citizenship rights. Historically, the Constitution left questions of 
citizenship to regular law; however, the insertion of Article 9.2 
18 In re Logue [1933] 67 ILTR 253.
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ended what had previously been a generous citizenship regime. 
It now does not give citizenship to a person born on the island 
who does not have at least one parent who is, or is entitled to 
be, an Irish citizen. This is a change from the previous rules, 
which entitled all who were born on the island to citizenship 
regardless of parentage, and will have implications for some 
people in Northern Ireland after Brexit.
Other than processes of naturalisation and applying for a 
passport, there are few paths to manifest citizenship. Many 
amongst the diaspora have taken the opportunity to obtain 
Irish citizenship post-Brexit because asserting Irish citizenship 
enables the exercise of EU citizenship rights. This ambiguity 
which surrounds claims of Irish citizenship is addressed in the 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001 (section 3). It sets 
out the parameters for citizenship, including for those born 
in Northern Ireland. Similar parameters were tested in the 
Irish Supreme Court case of McGimpsey v Ireland, where the 
Court stated that two brothers, both of whom were Unionist 
politicians from Northern Ireland, were citizens of Ireland even 
though only one had an Irish passport and neither had made 
any claim to citizenship.19 Arguably, this scenario is not changed 
by the updated law (Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001 (as 
amended), section 6). That Act states:
[A] person who is entitled … to be an Irish citizen shall 
be an Irish citizen from the date of his or her birth if –
(i) he or she does any act that only an Irish citizen is 
entitled to do
It goes on to require individuals to have a parent who was 
an Irish citizen or was entitled to be so, or who was a UK 
citizen, or who was entitled to reside in Ireland or in Northern 
Ireland. This ensures that those born in Northern Ireland 
19 McGimpsey v Ireland [1990] IR 110.
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or Ireland to individuals with UK passports are still entitled 
to Irish citizenship. However, the difficulty that McGimpsey 
highlighted remains. The law requires an individual to do an 
act that only an Irish citizen is entitled to do, but to do such an 
act, surely one has to be proven to be an Irish citizen? This all 
means that in extending the voting franchise to Irish citizens 
in Northern Ireland, and potentially Great Britain, Ireland 
would have to devise a method by which to identify citizens. 
This, of course, could be via a passport; however, obtaining 
a passport is expensive and it may work more smoothly to 
administer a different system. Doing so would go some way to 
ameliorating the democratic deficit created by the extension of 
EU citizenship rights and their operation in Northern Ireland 
without representation in the EU Parliament.
Ireland’s ongoing EU membership
Ireland’s membership of the EEC followed a referendum in 1972 
with an overwhelming vote in support (83.1%).20 Article 29.4.3˚ 
of the Irish Constitution provided for EEC law to become 
part of Irish law and to have primacy over the Constitution 
(compare this to the UK Constitution’s understanding of 
Parliamentary sovereignty). The evolution of the EEC into the 
EU and its expanding realm of operation led to a shift in Irish 
practice regarding new EU treaties. In Crotty v An Taoiseach,21 
the Supreme Court decided that the Single European Act 
significantly developed the authority of the EEC beyond that 
envisaged by Article 29.4.3˚. Since then, all new EU treaties 
have been put to referendum in Ireland. This continuous (re)
insertion of the EU into the Irish Constitution means that 
Ireland’s democratically expressed commitment to the EU is 
regularly reaffirmed. The nature of the engagement of the Irish 
20 Third Amendment of the Constitution Act 1972 (Ireland).
21 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] 1 IR 713.
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electorate with EU law has sometimes been questionable, as the 
double referendums on the Nice Treaty (in 2001 and 2002) and 
the Lisbon Treaty (in 2008 and 2009) showed (Cahill, 2008). 
Ireland’s regular constitutional interaction with its membership 
nonetheless contrasts with the UK, where the pressure created 
by limited engagement built towards Brexit.
Ireland is both domestically and internationally required to 
fully implement EU law and it takes priority over Irish law, 
including the GFA-based provisions in Articles 2, 3 and 29.7. 
EU case law has also placed EU law obligations above any other 
international obligations, including those to the United Nations 
(UN) and the Council of Europe.22 Both EU law and the GFA 
come under Article 29 of the Irish Constitution. Under the Irish 
Constitution, EU law would therefore legally take precedence 
over the GFA. 
Although this scenario is hypothetical while all parties to 
Brexit accept the significance of the GFA, it is important to 
consider a situation where Ireland may have to choose between 
complying with the GFA and its EU obligations. At the domestic 
level, EU law would take legal precedence. At the international 
level, Ireland would have to choose. In the case of a dispute, the 
case could not come before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) due to exclusions that Ireland has submitted regarding 
Northern Ireland. Should Ireland choose the GFA, it is likely 
that the CJEU would find Ireland in breach of its EU obligations. 
A helpful option to see off this potentially awkward situation 
would be for Ireland to negotiate a protocol on the GFA with the 
EU. It has done so previously regarding abortion and neutrality, 
and the UK and Ireland have agreed a similar protocol regarding 
the Common Travel Area.23
22 C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, European Commission v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi (19 March 2013).
23 Protocol on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon 2.3.2013 
Official Journal of the European Union L 60/131.
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The time required to negotiate such an agreement potentially 
makes the exercise politically urgent. Nonetheless, the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement incorporates the GFA into its Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Although the Protocol is still 
subject to negotiation, the GFA is explicitly affirmed by both the 
UK and EU as needing ‘to be protected in all parts’. For that to 
hold true, the settlement arrived at between the UK and the EU 
must comply with the EU treaties and the principles stemming 
from them. If there is a clash between the core EU treaties and 
any future UK–EU treaty that ‘protects’ the GFA, the CJEU’s 
existing case law suggests that EU law would ‘win’ that clash 
(if it cannot be interpreted away). The likely outcome of such 
a clash would be the CJEU requiring the EU to renegotiate its 
agreement with the UK, if not to disapply it outright.
Modifying the GFA under international law
One eventuality, which we have yet to cover, is amending 
the GFA to reflect Brexit priorities. Successor treaties, treaty 
amendments and fundamental changes in circumstances all 
provide avenues for altering a treaty. International law allows 
treaties to be suspended or ended by another treaty, and this is an 
option that is available to both governments (Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 59). The same principles of 
international law also allow for subsequent treaties to change 
the provisions of an earlier treaty (Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969, Article 59). This is a route that the Irish and 
UK governments have used since the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921.24
If a new bilateral treaty was agreed between London and 
Dublin, the GFA could be terminated (just as the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985 was terminated by the GFA). However, 
it is all-but-inconceivable that such an alteration would occur 
24 Government of Ireland Act 1920 (UK); Treaty between Great Britain and 
Ireland, 1921.
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without the consent of Northern Ireland’s political parties. 
While standard international law allows for changes to treaties, 
the GFA is not a standard agreement. The major part of the GFA 
treaty was agreed between Northern Ireland’s political parties, 
meaning that not only is the political viability of amendments 
doubtful, but such changes would also strike against the special 
nature of the GFA as a peace agreement.
The citizenship referendum in Ireland is a useful case study 
of how constitutional changes can be incorporated while 
respecting the GFA. The referendum approved the Nineteenth 
Amendment, partly reversing changes that had been made to 
Ireland’s Constitution in response to the GFA. To maintain its 
international obligations, the Irish government first asked for 
the UK government’s agreement to the changes through an 
Interpretative Declaration to the effect ‘[T] hat this proposed 
change to the Constitution is not a breach of the … Agreement 
or the continuing obligation of good faith in the implementation 
of the said Agreement’.25 Through this declaration, the Irish 
government reaffirmed its responsibility for safeguarding the 
GFA’s institutions and principles (Flanagan, 2015). The UK 
government could seek a similar declaration at this important 
point for the GFA to demonstrate that it remains legally 
committed to the Agreement and intends to continue in good 
faith.
What all of this means is that the UK government cannot act 
unilaterally. Any changes must be done through renegotiation 
with the Irish government and, given the circumstances, with 
the parties in Northern Ireland. It would be very difficult to 
reopen parts of the 1998 settlement in isolation. If the UK 
acted unilaterally, several options would be available under 
international law (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
25 Citizenship Referendum: Interpretative Declaration by the Irish and British 
Governments regarding the British Irish Agreement, Dáil Debate, Vol. 583 
No. 6 (21 April 2004).
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1969, Article 60). If the Irish government considered the UK’s 
unilateral act to be a ‘material breach’ of its obligations, Ireland 
would be entitled to respond. An ‘internationally wrongful 
act’ can be an act or omission that can be traced to a state and 
that is a breach of its international obligations (International 
Law Commission, 2001). The internal political conditions or 
domestic law of a country are irrelevant to whether or not there 
has been a breach. Any claims that may be made about the need 
for UK institutions to breach the GFA to address the demands 
of the electorate in the Brexit referendum are irrelevant to this 
area of international law.
Although the GFA includes no rules for settling disputes 
between the UK and Ireland, some other options remain 
open to Ireland in these circumstances. One option would be 
to terminate or suspend the whole or part of the treaty. It is 
difficult, however, to see how this response would aid the Irish 
government’s efforts to apply pressure upon the UK to maintain 
its GFA obligations. Another option – the ICJ – would likely 
not, however, provide an avenue for redress. Both states, in 
making declarations of compulsory jurisdiction (recognising 
the ICJ’s authority), included qualifications that likely exclude 
the other. Ireland allows for all disputes to be heard at the 
ICJ, except those that arise between it and the UK regarding 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s declaration excludes ‘any dispute 
with the government of any other country which is or has been 
a Member of the Commonwealth’.26 Although it is debatable 
whether Ireland was ever part of the modern Commonwealth, 
together, these declarations prevent the ICJ option. The most 
likely option, however, lies with the Withdrawal Agreement 
itself. As we have already seen, the draft Withdrawal Agreement’s 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland builds the GFA into its 
terms. If the UK government or Parliament did act in a way 
26 International Court of Justice (2018). Both states’ declarations are available 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations.
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that threatened the GFA’s terms, it would be a breach of the 
GFA and the Withdrawal Agreement and could lead to the issue 
being tackled by whatever dispute resolution process results from 
the Brexit negotiations.
Conclusion
For large parts of the past century, the drivers for constitutional 
change in the Northern Ireland context have often been 
bleak. Against the backdrop of partition and sectarian conflict, 
Brexit might seem to rank as a relatively benign force for 
change. However, it is one that has unsettled an already-fragile 
governance order. To borrow a line from Tony Blair (2001): 
‘the kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux’. By 
itself, this is nothing new. The interactions between Ireland’s 
and the UK’s constitutional orders over the centuries have 
frequently been characterised by dynamism (Carty, 1996, p 158). 
It nonetheless emphasises the need to keep some anchors in 
these arrangements, which explains why Brexit negotiations 
keep coming back to the GFA as a benchmark. Moreover, 
while Ireland, like other countries, will need to adapt to Brexit, 
the strains upon the UK Constitution will be much greater. 
Constitutional adaptation must take place at a time when the 
policymaking organs of the UK’s governance order are already 
stretched by the enormity of the task of making Brexit a reality. 
It is little wonder that since the Joint Report was concluded, 
talk has turned to the UK stretching the length of transitional 
periods in which EU law will continue to apply in full and 
constitutional change can, at least, be paced.
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SEvEN
A place apart
[T]he exact same benefits. It’s bollocks. It always has been 
bollocks and it remains it … (Barry Gardiner, MP, quoted 
in BBC, 2018b)
The special status of post-Brexit Northern Ireland
The Phase 1 Joint Report sets up a special status for post-
Brexit Northern Ireland, providing for distinct regulatory 
arrangements, citizenship rules and rights protections (which, 
in some instances, could be extended to cover the whole of 
the UK). These special arrangements are bolted onto a peace 
process that Tony Blair (2006) famously characterised as having 
no agreed end point. Nationalists and Unionists support 
irreconcilable constitutional futures for Northern Ireland; there 
must be either the reunification of Ireland or a continued place 
for Northern Ireland within the UK. All of which leads to one 
big question, colouring our entire discussion of Brexit: will the 
Brexit settlement advantage one of these end points?
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The tail wagging the dog?
The adaptability of the European Union
The EU is a club made up of states, or it has been up to now. 
For some, the question is whether the EU can develop beyond 
this point: ‘the EU must be regarded as an organization of men 
and women as opposed to a simple union of states, and one 
that accommodates different kinds of representative institutions’ 
(Della Cananea, 2010, p 300). The flexibility demonstrated 
towards key concepts in EU law in its proposed Brexit solutions 
for Northern Ireland suggests that it is, indeed, embracing this 
challenge. Northern Ireland has amply demonstrated its capacity 
to reshape two national constitutions, and in Brexit, it is forcing 
a supranational body to confront what kind of organisation it 
aspires to be and what being one of its citizens means.
It is a favourite theme of Brexiteers that the EU is giving up 
nothing during the current negotiations. However, just how 
far the EU has come with regard to Northern Ireland is clear 
in the Commission’s initial mission statement on the Brexit 
negotiations:
[T]he Union is committed to continuing to support 
peace, stability and reconciliation on the island of Ireland. 
Nothing in the Agreement should undermine the 
objectives and commitments set out in the Good Friday 
Agreement in all its parts and its related implementing 
agreements; the unique circumstances and challenges on 
the island of Ireland will require flexible and imaginative 
solutions. Negotiations should in particular aim to avoid the 
creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland, while respecting 
the integrity of the Union legal order. (European Commission, 
2018b, para 14, emphasis added)
The Phase 1 Agreement affirmed that Northern Ireland would 
enjoy special status after Brexit and started to flesh out the nature 
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of what that meant for the EU but also for the UK and Ireland: 
no diminution of human rights standards; regulatory alignment 
between Northern Ireland and Ireland, the facilitation of trade in 
goods and services on the island of Ireland; and EU citizenship 
and fundamental rights for the people of Northern Ireland. This 
solution stands to redefine core tenets of the EU legal order.
The most important provisions of the Phase 1 Report stated 
that even if no final deal is reached, the sections on Northern 
Ireland would be binding. In short, the post-Brexit geopolitical 
landscape of Northern Ireland has been outlined, and now the 
task is filling in this picture in more detail. Dublin, London and 
Brussels each play a role in setting out the detail of what post-
Brexit Northern Ireland will look like, but Northern Ireland 
(even without a functioning Assembly) provides its own force 
in these negotiations, and is no stranger to being a distinct 
constitutional space.
Northern Ireland: a constitutional conundrum
The UK Constitution is, in some respects, a defensive 
arrangement. In Law and Public Opinion, Dicey confided to his 
readership that he saw no place in the world for small states, 
which would inevitably be swallowed up by larger ones in 
the imperial world of 19th-/early 20th-century international 
relations. A unitary constitution with power centralised in 
Westminster was the only way to stave off national annihilation 
(Dicey, 1917, p 323). As with other things he wrote, he turned 
out (in the long run) to be wrong. Ireland was able to break 
away from the UK and establish its own statehood, a status that 
is strengthened by its ability to act as part of the EU.
Northern Ireland could be described as a law unto itself, 
requiring special constitutional settlements, from Home Rule 
to the Anglo-Irish Agreement to the Good Friday Agreement 
(GFA). Although many UK scholars insist that almost all of 
these developments were sealed off from the rest of the UK 
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Constitution – ‘what happens in Northern Ireland stays in 
Northern Ireland’ (King, 2009, p 185) – this is an essentially 
London-centric view of the UK Constitution. Partition 
reshaped the UK as much as it created Ireland, Home Rule 
in Northern Ireland was a first attempt at devolution, and the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement and the GFA challenged classic ideas of 
the state and citizenship. The agreement of special post-Brexit 
arrangements, however, stands to make Northern Ireland an 
even more radical constitutional space.
The conclusion of the Phase 1 talks brought Northern Ireland 
to centre stage, bringing with it suggestions that the tail is 
somehow wagging the dog. The Conservatives’ reliance upon 
the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP’s) confidence-and-supply 
agreement at Westminster required that the deal be accepted by 
Arlene Foster, and her last-minute jitters about how it would 
be perceived by her supporters generated days of frantic extra 
negotiations in December 2017. However, Northern Ireland’s 
special place within Brexit is not the product of the DUP’s 
machinations. The Phase 1 deal has the potential to reshape 
EU law, the UK Constitution and Northern Ireland’s status. It 
also necessitates a change of constitutional narrative; Northern 
Ireland cannot be treated as peripheral to Brexit.
Intertwining the GFA into Brexit
The GFA: an end, not a beginning
The GFA provided a platform for ending the violence of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, and it addressed sources of conflict 
by measures such as extending anti-discrimination protections, 
human rights protections and police reform. It obliged the 
divided communities to work together in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly/Executive, but power sharing always assumed that 
the two communities were a fixed feature of life in Northern 
Ireland and, indeed, operated to reinforce that division. It fixed 
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in place a system that ignored those who did not fit well into 
those two communities or who those two communities rejected.
In the new peace, visible identity differences became an 
insistent feature of life in Northern Ireland. Wearing a Northern 
Ireland soccer strip or a GAA jersey after decades of studiously 
concealing identity provided a moment of glorious release for the 
people of Northern Ireland, but identity politics also manifested 
itself in flashpoint parades and language debates that ultimately 
eroded the capacity for effective power sharing. For others, 
this era has been marked by the rejection of ‘two-community’ 
divisions in Pride and Alliance for Choice marches in Northern 
Ireland (Fenton, 2018, pp 216–18). The referendums in Ireland 
introducing marriage equality in 2015 and repealing the 8th 
Amendment on abortion in 2018 have galvanised a larger section 
of Northern Ireland’s society into demanding comparable rights 
to those available in Dublin and London.
The GFA does not stop Brexit, and even if it could, it is 
certainly worth asking whether it should. However, the GFA 
was endorsed by popular referendum in two jurisdictions 
and, as such, has as much legitimacy as the Brexit vote. It 
envisaged Northern Ireland as being in the EU, even if it was 
not explicitly defined in terms of EU membership. The GFA 
therefore conditions how Brexit impacts on Northern Ireland. 
For instance, it obliges the maintenance of equivalent rights 
protections between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. The equivalence requirement does not envisage exact 
mirroring of rights on either side of the Irish border, as debates 
over reproductive rights and equal marriage provisions illustrate, 
but it does work against a free-for-all Brexit that wrenches 
Northern Ireland out of the all-island framework.
The people of Northern Ireland: canny actors or big wee’uns?
Whereas ‘We the People …’ in the US Constitution has poetic 
elegance, there remains an awkwardness in the phase ‘the people 
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of Northern Ireland’. The GFA recognised a people defined by 
their differences; it did not bond Unionists and Nationalists, but 
hoped that those bonds would emerge in the context of power 
sharing. The Phase 1 Joint Report holds out EU law rights to 
this group. Under EU law, many rights are tied to residence in 
the EU. Rights such as freedom to establish an EU company do 
not extend to an EU citizen resident in New York, but under 
the Joint Report, they will extend to an EU citizen resident 
in Belfast.
In other words, the Phase 1 Report does not, as it says, 
simply affirm the GFA. It is a new development that could be 
as significant a constitutional moment for Northern Ireland as 
the GFA before it; a beginning and not an ending. Even if this 
is not the intention of negotiators, the Withdrawal Agreement 
could quietly forge a common identity based on positive benefits 
for the people of Northern Ireland and potentially smuggle 
this identity into existence while everyone is fixated on other 
aspects of Brexit.
DUP politicians Sammy Wilson and Ian Paisley Jr have 
suggested that the people of Northern Ireland should be canny 
actors in this new game, collecting passports for all occasions. 
Their assumption is that this act will not impact on identity; 
people will take an Irish passport to access their EU law rights, 
and a UK passport to fully secure their rights in the remainder of 
the UK if the Common Travel Area (CTA) becomes problematic 
after Brexit, but doing so will have no impact on their being 
British or Irish. However, now that being ‘of Northern Ireland’ 
is of itself something valuable, the likelihood is that if Belfast 
emerges as a hub in which companies seek to take advantage 
of being in the best of both worlds in UK/EU terms, these 
traditional ideas of identity will shift, at least for individuals who 
perceive benefits to this new reality.
To gain this new identity, what do the people of Northern 
Ireland have to give up? Northern Ireland will exist as a polity 
upon which EU rules are imposed, but without having a direct 
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say in their creation unless Ireland extends its franchise for 
European elections. The DUP’s current leverage within the UK 
Parliament is fleeting, and will likely not outlast another general 
election. Furthermore, the space for devolved government 
seems as uncertain as it ever has since 1998. Northern Ireland 
will sit at the confluence of multiple constitutional orders, 
but its people will potentially be left as ‘big wee’uns’, with 
little ability to influence many of the laws that govern them. 
Constituent power might be neutered, and the decision-making 
space bureaucratised, but if this settlement works, it will not 
necessarily shift Northern Ireland towards Dublin or London; 
it could maintain it as a place apart.
‘It’s the economy (stupid)’
Brexit will reshape identities, both constitutional and personal, 
but the UK and the EU seem to be committed to preserving 
rights and ensuring that there are no new borders on the island 
of Ireland. Readers could therefore be forgiven for thinking 
that if a Withdrawal Agreement is struck, nothing will actually 
change for businesses in Northern Ireland, but the reality is 
much more complicated.
Let’s say that we arrive at a successful Withdrawal Agreement. 
The UK government has, to date, maintained that it wants any 
‘special status’ for Northern Ireland to be, at most, temporary, 
and that it will ultimately endeavour to get rid of the ‘hard 
border’ by some other means, like ‘Max Fac’. Up until the 
White Paper of July 2018 ministers also touted the ability to set 
its own product and agricultural regulations as one of the main 
advantages of Brexit. A particularly memorable example was 
Boris Johnson enthusing that Brexit will mean ‘doing wonderful 
things with our own regulations to promote organic carrots’, 
misunderstanding a reporter’s question about clarity rather than 
carrots (Bartlett, 2018). The EU has, of course, responded by 
making any deal contingent on the UK not seeking to undercut 
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the EU by introducing the world’s ‘least red tape’ regulatory 
regime (European Council, 2018).
Somewhere between these two ‘trade’ positions, we will find 
the future – and the future will have an impact on business in 
Northern Ireland in practice, even if there is no hard customs 
border. For Brexit to make any sense, the UK will need to make 
itself competitive – and if it cannot do so by scrapping all ‘red 
tape’ on products, it will do so through whatever international 
deals it can sign with other countries. This may make it more 
attractive for some of Northern Ireland’s businesses to look away 
from Ireland and the EU, but less so for the agri-food industry 
that makes up so much of the Northern Ireland economy as 
it relies on freshness and short transport distances to make its 
products valuable (Allen, 2016).
Something will have to be done to make Northern Ireland’s 
milk and chickens saleable, even though farming activity (and, 
consequently, the price of products) will no longer enjoy the 
considerable support of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. 
The UK government’s pledge to keep that kind of subsidy in 
place until 2022 is all well and good, but it does not provide for 
a sustainable future for Northern Ireland’s agri-food industry 
– and despite aspects of agricultural policy being devolved to 
Northern Ireland, any funding for subsidies will have to keep 
coming from Westminster if they are not coming from the EU 
(BBC, 2018c).
We risk ending up with an open land border that sees a lot of 
business from the EU to the UK, but not an awful lot in another 
direction. The conclusion of a successful ‘trade deal’ that keeps 
that border open might end one Northern Ireland-centred 
Brexit panic, but it cannot possibly counteract all the economic 
upheaval that Brexit will cause (Connelly, 2018a, pp 41–3).
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Finding love in a hopeless place
The EU was long seen by Northern Ireland Nationalists as 
a means of diluting UK sovereignty over Northern Ireland. 
The DUP’s visceral rejection of the EU (best summarised 
by Ian Paisley Sr’s exhortation to milk the Brussels cow dry 
before slitting its throat) is, by contrast, conditioned by their 
regard for anything that reaffirms UK sovereignty as good for 
Unionism. The Brexit negotiations, however, indicate that new 
barriers could emerge between Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, throwing those certainties into doubt. Talk of national 
sovereignty ignores both the political reality of Europe and how 
Northern Ireland has, over the last century, become increasingly 
distinct from Ireland and the remainder of the UK.
The prioritisation of an open border between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland by both Dublin and London suggests 
that the status quo largely suits both. Indeed, while Dublin 
secured a guarantee that future unification of Ireland within the 
EU would be treated like the reunification of Germany, it has 
also maintained that this would only occur under the terms of 
the GFA (as confirmed by the Irish Constitution). The Phase 1 
Agreement does not affect the GFA’s consent principle, nor does 
it change the consent requirements of Ireland’s Constitution. 
Any shift in such a direction is likely to be gradual. The 56% 
support in Northern Ireland for remaining within the EU, even 
accompanied by the growth of the non-Unionist vote share in 
the 2017 Assembly elections, do not presage an imminent end 
to partition.
Effective peace agreements rely on all sides being able to sell 
the deal as a victory to their supporters, whereas ineffective 
ones sustain a narrative of winners and losers. The GFA 
arrangements have proven to be amazingly resilient despite the 
DUP’s strident efforts to present them as a defeat for Unionism. 
It has helped that the DUP has been obliged to buy into the 
process since the St Andrews ‘renegotiation’. As a result, the 
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GFA provides a workable foundation on which the current 
negotiations can build. Can this provide a sustainable framework 
for governance after Brexit? Perhaps, but the lesson from 1998 
is that some actors will undoubtedly seek political advantage 
by destabilising such arrangements. The danger is that the UK 
Government continues to try to have its cake and eat it too. The 
July 2018 White Paper prioritises both the Union (in terms of 
the constitutional integrity of the UK) and the need for special 
arrangements for Northern Ireland after Brexit. It envisages 
the UK and EU adopting a ‘responsible approach to avoiding 
a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, in a way 
that respects the constitutional and economic integrity of the 
UK and the autonomy of the EU’ (May, 2018d, p 7). These 
aspirations will, however, prove hard to fit together, given that 
the EU and UK negotiating positions on the extent of “special 
status” for Northern Ireland post-Brexit remain far removed 
from each other.
After Brexit, Northern Ireland could become a place apart, 
where EU citizens benefit from EU membership even outside 
the Union, and where a combination of the ability of its people 
to maintain multiple citizenships and regulatory alignment 
with EU rules allow its politicians to restructure its economy. 
To get there, however, compromise will be needed. Northern 
Ireland remains sandwiched uncomfortably between two 
unions. Brexit must therefore address the reality of the GFA as 
a peace settlement, the reality of people’s lives near a land border 
and even the reality that Northern Ireland is a place where 
imaginative solutions can – and do – happen.
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